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This dissertation examines the role of political regimes in attracting foreign 
investments in the oil sector.  Despite similar pressures from global capital, the 
degree of investment environment stability varies among states.  Drawing on the 
experiences of three oil-producing countries, Azerbaijan, Norway and Russia, I argue 
that regime type determines the level of political competition for influence over 
investment policies and the institutional mechanisms that shape it.  Based on the 
interaction of two dimensions - the number of veto players and the strength of 
mediating institutions - I distinguish three distinct regime types that have varying 
capacities in creating stable and attractive investment conditions for foreign investors. 
The three cases studied in this dissertation illustrate that both consolidated 
democracies and highly autocratic regimes are able to create stability in investment 
relations, while hybrid regimes, that are in between the extreme ends of autocratic-
democratic continuum, are more likely to make arbitrary and unpredictable policy 
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changes that threaten the profitability and security of investment projects.  I further 
argue that the procurement of foreign capital, as well as the failure to procure it, has 
effects on regime type.  Once secured, foreign capital can reinforce both autocratic 
and democratic regimes or in the case of hybrid regimes can push them in either an 
autocratic or consolidating democratic direction.  Hence, challenges of globalization 
polarize the options available to political elites in hybrid regimes as they try to open 
their economies to foreign investment. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
WINNERS AND LOSERS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Azerbaijan signed the “Contract of the Century” in 1994, with ten foreign oil 
companies committing $8 billion in oil investment over the course of the next 30 
years. Soon thereafter, the president of the newly independent state Azerbaijan 
embarked on an ambitious strategy of attracting as many and diverse foreign oil 
companies as possible into the Azeri oil industry. He pledged that as a result of this 
oil strategy, in the next decades Azerbaijan would experience “a new dawn.”1 And to 
the amazement and awe of analysts and policymakers alike, Azerbaijan, with a gross 
domestic product of only $4 billion, attracted a total of $3 billion investment in its oil 
industry over the course of the next seven years.2  Even though it is not the former 
Soviet republic with the largest oil reserves, Azerbaijan has the most foreign direct 
investment per head of any state in the region. According to the Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) Performance Index created by the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), in terms of success in attracting FDI, 
Azerbaijan ranked the 3rd highest among 140 nations during 1994-1996 and the 8th 
highest during 1998-2000.3  As such, not only did Azerbaijan become the ‘showcase 
                                                          
1 Stefan Wagstyl and David Stern, “Oil Strategy Can Change Nation,” Financial Times Survey 
(November 22, 2000). 
2 U.S. Department of Energy, Azerbaijan Country Analysis Brief ( May 2001) Energy Information 
Administration (www.eia.doe.gov).  
3 This ranking by UNCTAD is based on the ratio of a country’s share in Global FDI flows to its share 
in Global GDP. It is considered a more accurate measure than absolute values of inflows of the shares 
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for the art of doing business’ in the Former Soviet Union but also acquired the title of 
“frontier of global capitalism” among foreign investors. 4 
Not too far away from Baku, in Moscow, the capital of the biggest successor 
state to the Soviet Union, however, not much investment activity was taking place. 
Given the country’s large endowment of natural resources and educated labor force, 
as well as its potentially large market, attracting foreign investment should not have 
been too difficult for Russia. Yet, the record has been discouraging. In spite of 
explicit efforts by the government to attract foreign capital to reform its oil industry 
and bring production levels up, Russia received far less foreign investment than it 
could, both relative to the size of its economy and in comparison with other emerging 
markets. For the period 1989 to 1998, Russia ranked 21st among 25 countries of 
Central, Eastern Europe and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in terms of 
per capita foreign direct investment.5 Between 1994-2001, Russia received about $ 
21.5 billion in total FDI, of which $3.2 billion went into the oil sector. With 4.6% of 
world’s total proven oil reserves, almost 6 times the oil reserves of Azerbaijan, Russia 
received 7 times less FDI for each barrel of its oil reserves than Azerbaijan.6  
                                                                                                                                                                      
of FDI in national investments because it assesses how successful a country is in attracting FDI relative 
to the size of its economy.  
4 Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Crude Face of Global Capitalism,” The New York Times Magazine (Oct.4, 
1998): 57. 
5 Ernst & Young (CIS) The Investment Climate in Russia (1999):7.  Adjusting for population size, 
Russia has received $15 foreign direct investment on a per capita basis compared to $84 for Poland, 
$118 for Czech Republic, and $221 for Hungary. 
6 Author’s own calculations based on UNCTAD 2002 Handbook of Statistics, U.S. Energy Information 
Administration Country Reports and BP Statistical Review 2002. These figures are calculated by 
dividing total FDI in oil by total proven oil reserves in that country.  
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According to the same UNCTAD FDI Performance Index, Russia ranked 108th and 
104th highest among 140 nations during 1994-1996 and 1998-2000 respectively.  
Even though there are signs of increasing FDI in Russia today, there is still suspicion 
and hesitation on the part of investors to make long-term commitments.7 The initial 
euphoria of investing in Russia turned into a nightmare for most investors as the first 
decade of transition came to an end. After so many years of Soviet isolation, the 
doors to the Russian ‘prize’ wide open but eager investors would not walk through it. 
Indeed, Russia continued to be a “riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma.”8  
In the 1990s, while these former Soviet republics were competing with each 
other to attract foreign investment, another major oil producer, Norway, was being 
commended in policy and academic circles as the example par excellence of a 
successful oil producing state.9 Starting its oil development in the 1970s, during a 
tough period for the oil industry around the world, Norway was able to attract 
significant amounts of foreign direct investment in its oil industry and then use this to 
build national competence in oil and meet the high welfare demands of Norwegian 
society. From 1971 to 1996, a total of $200 billion was invested in exploration, 
construction, and operations on the Norwegian continental shelf.10 Calculations based 
on FDI figures from the UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics show that Norway 
                                                          
7 For example, in February 2003, BP agreed to pay $6.75 billion to form a new Russian oil company. 
This deal is considered the largest single investment in post-Soviet Russia.  
8 A famous depiction of Russia by Winston Churchill in a radio broadcast on 3 October 1939.  
9 See for instance, Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1997). 
10 This figure includes domestic and foreign investment together. International Trade 
Administration.“Oil and Gas Services Update: Norway,” International Market Insight (06/21/2001). 
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received 92 cents of foreign investment per barrel of its proven oil reserves between 
1994-2001. In the recent years, Norway has been sharing its experience of oil 
development with other oil producing countries, especially Russia and Azerbaijan. 
Norwegian delegations of oilmen have been frequenting Baku and Moscow, giving 
advice to governments and oilmen about how to successfully operate partnerships 
with foreign companies and how best to use their oil revenues.   
 
TABLE 1.1: FDI statistics for Azerbaijan, Norway, and Russia  
  
Total FDI1 
(millions of $) 
World FDI Rankings2
(out of 140 nations) 
FDI in Oil3 
(millions of $) 
FDI in Oil / 
Proven Reserves4
($) 
  1994-2001 1994-1996  1998-2000 1994-2001 1994-2001 
AZERBAIJAN 3,787  3rd   8th   3,029 0.43 
NORWAY 21,762  59th   60th  8,704  0.92 
RUSSIA 21,524 108th  104th   3,228  0.06 
Sources: 1. FDI Figures from UNCTAD 2002 Handbook of Statistics 
2. This ranking is based on the FDI Performance Index (by UNCTAD World Investment Report 2001), which is the ratio of a 
country’s share in Global FDI Flows to its share in Global GDP. This ratio for Azerbaijan  is 9.2 for 1994-1996 and 3.3 for 
1998-2000. For Russia and Norway these ratios are 0.3 and 0.3 and 0.9 and 1.0 respectively.  
3. Calculations based on the percentage of oil investment in the overall FDI provided by U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) Azerbaijan Country Report, Foreign Investment Promotion Center under the Russian Ministry of 
Economy, and U.S. Department of State Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs Country Commercial Guide: Norway.  
4. Calculations based on UNCTAD 2002 Handbook of Statistics, U.S. Energy Information Administration Country Reports and 
BP Statistical Review 2002. These figures are calculated by dividing total FDI in oil by total proven oil reserves in that country.  
 
These three countries with significantly different cultural, historical and 
socioeconomic backgrounds share several characteristics. First of all, they are all 
major oil producers with significant oil resources. Norway, Azerbaijan, and Russia 
possess 0.9%, 0.7%, and 4.6% share of the world’s total proven oil reserves, 
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respectively.11 Their oil industries remain the focus of most foreign interest. Second, 
the oil industries in these three countries provide a significant portion of their 
government revenues. Oil revenues as a percentage share of total government 
revenues in 2001 are 50% in Azerbaijan, 40% in Russia, and 25% in Norway.12 
Simply put, the engine of the economy in these countries is the oil sector. Lastly, all 
three countries have needed and still need foreign expertise and capital in order to 
develop their oil resources and build national competence. In essence, they have been 
competing for the same scarce international capital. Despite their similar needs for it, 
however, these cases demonstrate significant variation in the ability to attract foreign 
capital (see Table 1.1). While both Norway and Azerbaijan have attracted significant 
amounts of foreign investment, Russia has received very little capital relative to its 
needs and potential.  
This dissertation explores the causes behind the different levels of foreign 
investment and their political effects in these three countries. I make two main 
arguments. First, regime type plays an important role in determining the extent to 
which foreign investment can be attracted and the form that investment takes. Second, 
the procurement of foreign capital, as well as the failure to procure it, has effects on 
regime type. Once secured, foreign capital can reinforce the political regime in place. 
I further argue that globalization can have a polarizing effect on regime type because 
                                                          
11 Data gathered from the BP Statistical World Energy Review (2001) (www.bp.com). With these 
figures, Norway, Azerbaijan and Russia have the 13th, 14th and 8th largest oil resources in the world 
respectively.  
12 Based on country reports of Azerbaijan, Russia and Norway from the Energy Information 
Administration/U.S. Department of Energy  (www.eia.doe.gov). 
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elites aware of the importance of attracting foreign capital make institutional changes 
in their political regime in anticipation of the financial and political benefits that will 
ensue from such changes.  
 
II. Explanations for Foreign Investment Patterns 
In the emerging global world, foreign direct investment is an essential link 
between national economies, as well as a catalyst for economic growth.13 “The 
benefits that FDI brings, such as capital, knowledge, technology, skills, management 
know-how and market access, are becoming increasingly important for development 
as complements to domestic resources in host countries.”14 In today’s globalized 
economy, virtually all countries- and especially developing and transition countries- 
are competing with each other for greater amounts of foreign investment. FDI as one 
of the main agents of globalization, however, does not flow evenly across countries. 
While some countries benefit greatly from it, others are less successful in attracting it. 
Some have even lost the FDI that flowed in during the 1950-1975 period. 
This unevenness in investment flows is explained by traditional FDI theories 
in terms of company-specific economic factors driving the location of international 
production. In brief, these theories include: The product cycle model, which depicts 
FDI as a way firms capture remaining profits by expanding overseas to protected 
                                                          
13 “Chapter 1: Promoting Linkages,” World Investment Report 2001 (New York: United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 2001). According to this report, empirical 
evidence suggests that for emerging economies a 1% point increase in FDI (measured as a proportion 
of GDP) leads, ceteris paribus, to an extra 0.8% point increase in per capita income.  
14 Ibid. 
    7
markets in search of lower production costs (Vernon 1974). The industrial 
organization theory, which focuses on FDI as the natural outcome of the size, 
management, engineering, and organizational skills, and international oligopolistic 
rivalry of multinational corporations (Hymer 1960; Kindleberger 1969; Graham 
1978; Buckley and Casson 1976,1981; Rugman 1985;) and finally trade theories that 
emphasize FDI emanating from differentials in the endowments of capital and labor 
between countries (Markusen 1995.)15 In addition to these company-specific 
variables, other studies also pay attention to the country-specific economic 
determinants -such as market size, labor costs, access to raw material and 
infrastructure development- as major determinants of resource-seeking FDI 16 (See 
Figure 1.1). 
While economic characteristics are clearly relevant, countries with similar 
economic endowments nevertheless show significant variation in their abilities to 
attract capital. International capital only goes to and stays put in places where the 
investment environment is conducive. A key factor in investment decisions is the 
stability of the policy framework that shapes investment relations between foreign 
companies and the government. Investment relations, whether governed by general 
legislation or ad hoc negotiated agreements entail rules of the game, which provide 
mutually agreed-upon conditions of behavior, interaction, and responsibility on the 
                                                          
15 For detailed discussions of these economic theories of FDI, see Paul Fischer, Foreign Direct 
Investment in Russia: A Strategy for Industrial Recovery (MacMillan Press, 2000), 19-45. 
16 Harry G. Broadman and Francesca Recanatini, “Where has all the Foreign Investment Gone in 
Russia,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2640 (July 2001):10. 
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part of the host government and a foreign company. A stable investment environment 
provides general standards of treatment (including guarantees in such areas as the 
transfer of funds, expropriation and dispute settlement) and has a predictable and 
transparent legislative and regulatory framework in which channels of negotiation are 
clear and open. In the absence of a clear, enforceable framework defining ownership, 
taxation, dispute settlement and regulation, foreign investors fear that they risk 
expropriation, onerous administrative intervention, or unpredictable laws and 
regulations. 
 
FIGURE 1.1: Explanations for FDI Patterns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While many studies of FDI recognize the importance of stability in investment 
regimes, they do not systematically analyze the conditions under which it is created. 
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Although concepts such as “political risk” and “political and legal stability” are often 
used to explain patterns of FDI, no theoretical connection between regime politics 
and stability of the investment environment has been offered.  
 
III. Regime Type and Policy Stability 
This dissertation analyzes relations between regime type and the stability of 
investment environments that makes foreign investment possible. Its basic 
assumption is that legal, regulatory and administrative guarantees and incentives for 
foreign investors are the product of a political process resulting from the interaction 
of many domestic groups within an institutional context.  The challenges of 
globalization tend to create winners and losers within countries. While some groups 
are able to take advantage of access to technology and integration with the world 
markets, other groups are threatened by the presence of multinational corporations 
and do not benefit from foreign investment.  
The stability of a policy environment depends on overcoming the opposition, 
or winning over the consent or acquiescence of non-beneficiaries. Regime type is 
important because it determines the relative political power of opponents and 
proponents of FDI by shaping institutional relations between them. It also determines 
the institutional channels open for foreign investors to influence decision-making. 
Overall, regime type molds the level and intensity of competition for influence over 
policies and the institutional mechanisms that shape that competition. Therefore an 
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analysis of the winners and losers of globalization requires a comparative study of 
political regimes that are more and less conducive to international investment.  
 I distinguish among three regime types according to the degree of 
institutionalized competition they provide. As indicators of institutionalized 
competition, I focus on the strength of veto players in the state and the strength of 
mediating institutions that build policy coalitions and offer bargaining mechanisms 
among veto players. I argue that the interaction of these two variables produces policy 
environments that are characteristics of three distinct regime types: authoritarian 
regimes, consolidated democracies and hybrid regimes. Such treatment of regime 
type as a continuum rather than a dichotomy is in line with the recent burgeoning 
literature on hybrid regimes (Karl 1995, Diamond 2002, Schedler 2002, Levitsky and 
Way 2002, Carothers 2002). This dissertation contributes to the recent literature by 
analyzing ways in which the hybrid regime category differs from authoritarian and 
democratic regimes in terms of its ability to integrate into the global economy.  
In authoritarian regimes, there is virtually no meaningful institutionalized 
competition for power and influence over government policies. The coexistence of 
weak veto players and inadequate mediating institutions insulates decision-makers 
from group pressures, expands their range of directive powers, and increases their 
capacity and flexibility to offer investors attractive investment policies with long-term 
guarantees. In such weakly institutionalized and uncompetitive political regimes, 
foreign investors usually have direct access to a small number of ruling elite persons. 
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This simple power structure makes it possible for rulers to promise that terms of an 
investment relationship will be secure throughout the life of investment projects.  
On the other end of the spectrum are highly competitive and institutionalized 
democracies. In such regimes, there are many veto players to check and constrain the 
authority and policies of the government. However, this high degree of pluralism does 
not necessarily lead to institutional deadlocks or policy instability because there are 
strong political parties, interest organizations and effective bureaucracies to aggregate 
different interests into policy coalitions and establish mechanisms of negotiation and 
bargaining among them. Decision-makers use these mediating institutions to co-opt 
veto players into the policy making process and overcome their opposition through 
compromises. The result can be a stable policy environment in which investors feel 
that their contracts are secure. Moreover, a democratic institutional structure creates 
opportunities for investors to ally themselves with domestic groups to influence 
government decisions or get involved in policymaking directly. Their perception of 
stability derives from open, transparent channels of competition and negotiation in the 
political system and from the sense that they have reliable means of promoting and 
defending their investment interests.  
Finally, in hybrid regimes that are neither fully democratic nor authoritarian, 
the level of institutionalized competition is limited. There are some significant veto 
players that challenge government policies, but there are not enough institutional 
incentives or constraints to ensure effective conflict resolution among veto players. In 
hybrid regimes it is difficult to overcome opposition through negotiations and 
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compromises. This limited institutionalization can contribute to radical and sudden 
policy changes or at least, too much uncertainty about government policies. Foreign 
investors consequently feel insecure about the future of their projects. Moreover, they 
do not have clear institutional channels to influence decision-making directly or 
through alliances with strong interest groups.  
The Azerbaijani and Norwegian cases in this dissertation suggest that 
globalization in respect of FDI flows favors two polar opposites: established 
democracies and authoritarian regimes. Both regime types are able to create policy 
environments that significantly reduce political risk for foreign investors. By contrast, 
the Russian case demonstrates that globalization in the form of FDI flows is not 
favorable to countries struggling to create new democratic structures in the midst of 
economic uncertainty. Limited institutionalized competition in a hybrid regime that is 
located between the extremes of the authoritarian-democratic continuum can lead to 
arbitrary and unpredictable policy changes that threaten the profitability and security 
of investment projects. In hybrid regimes like Russia, high degrees of political risk 
keep investment levels down.  
 
IV. Political Effects of Foreign Capital 
In this dissertation I further argue that the flow of foreign capital, as well as 
the need to attract it, has significant effects on regime type. Generally, in the 
literature, the political effects of foreign capital are seen as either positive or negative 
without any distinction among the political systems in recipient countries. 
    13
Emphasizing the positive effects of foreign capital, neoliberals assume that FDI 
brings economic prosperity to countries and sows the seeds of democracy. They argue 
that national differences in an increasingly interdependent world become less 
important and that foreign investment flows have a largely uniform effect on 
countries. Most neoliberal theorists do not pay much attention to the challenges 
facing hybrid regimes, as in the post-Soviet region, where countries are trying to 
establish democracy and market institutions at the same time. Analyzing the effects of 
foreign capital without paying attention to the different capacities of political regimes 
to attract it fails to recognize divergent state responses to globalization. 
Dependency theorists, on the other hand, argue that the structure of the world 
economy produces a group of peripheral states that are exploited by foreign capital 
and are doomed to remain authoritarian as a consequence of their marginal economic 
position in the world. A variant of dependency school, the rentier state literature looks 
more specifically at the negative effects of oil rents and contends that reliance on a 
primary commodity, almost without exception produces a distinctive institutional 
setting in which democratic accountability of rulers is weakened.  
Challenging these two schools of thought about the political effects of foreign 
capital, I argue that international capital’s involvement should not be taken as given, 
but should instead be regarded as shaped by domestic politics. The negative or 
positive political effects of foreign capital depend on the existing political structures. 
In an authoritarian regime like Azerbaijan, political elites use foreign capital to 
deepen their control over society. In Azerbaijan foreign capital has strengthened the 
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authoritarian regime. In a democratic regime like Norway, by contrast, economic 
success brought by the inflow of foreign capital has increased the legitimacy of 
decision-makers and strengthened the foundations of a democratic welfare state. 
Foreign capital in this context has had a positive effect on further consolidation of 
democracy.  It is this dissertation’s contention that political regimes not only help 
determine whether there will be foreign investment in the first place, they also 
mediate the effects of foreign capital once it arrives.   
The Russian case that I explore further suggests that pressures from foreign 
investors for a stable investment environment induce certain institutional changes in 
hybrid regimes facing dire economic problems. Ruling elites have the option of 
creating policy stability either by excluding or co-opting opposition groups. In doing 
one or the other, they move the regime either towards more democracy or more 
authoritarianism. Specifically, political adjustments that Russian president Vladimir 
Putin has been making in order to attract foreign investment illustrates the effects of 
globalization on hybrid regimes.  
 
V. Importance of Stability in Oil Investments 
To study the relations between regime type and FDI, I examine foreign 
investments in the oil industry. The oil industry has historically been one of the most 
globalized industries in the world. Oil is a key fuel in industrial production as well as 
a vital input in the manufacture of a wide range of products. “By the early 1980s the 
oil industry accounted for one-half of the tonnage, two-thirds of the ton miles, and 
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one quarter of the value of all commodities traded internationally.”17 Not only in 
terms of trade, but also in terms of oil exploration and production, the oil sector has 
historically been highly internationalized, involving many governments and 
multinational corporations.  
At the same time, political risks involved in oil investments have usually been 
very great compared to other industries with similar global reach. Due to the high 
stakes involved in oil, both multinational corporations and host governments have 
striven to control the development of oil resources. Corporations want to maximize 
their return on massive capital investments and ensure the long-term stability of 
projects. Governments also want to maximize their share of the financial gains and 
exert control over the industry’s management. Due to the nature of the oil industry, 
however, governments and foreign investors need each other to share technology and 
the costs of development. Because of the capital-intensive nature of exploration and 
development, the sunk and fixed nature of investments, as well as the long lead times 
before production commences, generates income and recovers costs, the investment 
regime’s stability and reliability is of vital importance to multinational oil 
corporations. Governments provide for stability and reliability first by formulating 
laws that establish the terms of an investment relationship as regards taxation, 
ownership, regulation, use of resources, and dispute management. Second, they 
provide stability by creating an administrative framework that oversees the 
                                                          
17 Albert L. Danielsen,  The Evolution of OPEC (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1982.) 
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implementation of laws and regulations and offers channels of negotiation for 
investors.  
Stability and reliability of the investment environment has always been a 
crucial factor for foreign investors in the oil business. At the beginning of the 
twentieth century, international oil companies with their technological expertise, 
significant capital resources and sophisticated networks of refining and marketing 
facilities had unprecedented control over the development of natural resources around 
the world.18  By 1947, “the seven sisters cartel controlled 99% of international 
production and in 1966 was still producing 84% of the crude oil traded on 
international markets from reserves estimated to comprise 89% of the world’s 
total.”19 Especially in the Middle East, where most of the world’s oil is located, these 
companies dominated oil operations based on traditional concessions that covered 
large territories for long periods of time.20 The host countries obtained no propriety 
claims to the petroleum produced and merely received the financial returns of bonus, 
rent and royalty.21  
                                                          
18 A major exception to this trend became the Soviet Union after the revolution in 1917; The Soviet 
state nationalized all assets and major international companies left Russia.  
19 Theodore H. Moran, “Managing an Oligopoly of Would-be Sovereigns: The Dynamics of Joint 
Control and Self Control in the International Oil Industry Past, Present, and Future,” International 
Organization 41:4 (Autumn 1987), 594. 
20 The traditional concession had its origin at the turn of the century with the grant in 1901 by the 
Persian Government of an oil concession to W.K. D’Arcy. For further discussion of traditional 
concessions, see Henry Cattan, The Evolution of Oil Concessions in the Middle East and North Africa 
(1967); Theodore Moran,  The Evolution of Concession Agreements in Underdeveloped Countries and 
the United States National Interest  (1974). 
21 Keith W. Blinn, “Production Sharing Agreements for Petroleum and Minerals,” Private Investor 
Abroad- Problems and Solutions in International Business in 1978, The Southwestern Legal 
Foundation (1978): 307. 
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Unable to challenge the multinationals, for many years the oil producing 
countries could not translate their interests into action. Starting in the 1950s, however, 
governments of oil producing countries tried to exert political control and sovereignty 
over petroleum resources and restrict the operations of multinational corporations.22 
They regarded oil as the most strategic sector in their economy- its “commanding 
height”23- and saw control of the oil industry, even at the expense of additional 
international capital, as the key to economic development. The emergence of new 
entrants in the form of independents, the ‘communist oil offensive,’ as well as the 
new international order that the U.S. sought in the aftermath of the World War II 
contributed to the rising wave of natural resource sovereignty assertions by host 
countries, which culminated in the establishment of OPEC.24 As a relatively unified 
and collective bargaining entity, OPEC achieved success in maintaining posted prices 
artificially above the world petroleum price, and it helped change the terms of the 
investment relationship between multinationals and host governments. In the 1970s 
and early 1980s, market forces favored the oil producing countries and created 
significant political risks for investors.  
                                                          
22 In 1950, Saudi Arabia concluded negotiations with Aramco to rectify a perceived economic inequity 
to the host countries by establishing the 50-50 profit-sharing principle. In 1951, the Iranian Prime 
Minister Musaddeq nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. 
23 According to Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw in their book The Commanding Heights: The 
Battle Between Government and the Market Place That is Remaking the Modern World (1998), this 
term goes back to 1922 when Lenin first used it during his speech at the Fourth Congress of the 
Communist International. Later it was adopted by Nehru and the Congress Party in India and spread to 
many parts of the world. It refers to the most strategic parts of the economy.  
24 Kate Gillespie and Clement M. Henry, “Introduction,” in Kate Gillespie and Clement Henry (eds.) 
Oil in the New World Order (University Press of Florida, 1995), 1-21. 
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Since the early 1980s, however, the investment relationship has changed 
significantly. There is no longer a fear of oil scarcity, instead, there is severe 
competition for investment capital to exploit abundant oil deposits. International oil 
companies have secured access over the last decade to petroleum resources in 
countries previously not open to them.25 Oil and gas operations are today pursued in 
more than 100 countries worldwide.26 Whereas the gist of governments’ policies in 
developing countries was previously to replace the investments of international oil 
companies with their own national capabilities, now many governments have 
reversed their policies and are actively seeking foreign investors to contribute capital, 
technology, managerial capacity, and access to markets.27 Increasingly restrictive 
investment and oil legislation during the 1970s has been modified or replaced by new 
laws that emphasizing investment guarantees and incentives.28  
This most recent relationship between host governments and multinational 
corporations for developing oil resources is best reflected in oil agreements. In their 
new partnership, governments and companies negotiate their interests through one of 
two main types of oil agreements: concessionary and contractual. Concessionary 
                                                          
25 Those new provinces that are opened to private interests since mid 1980s are Algeria, Vietnam, Iran, 
Brazil, Venezuela, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Russia.  
26 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy of Norway, “Ownership of Statoil and Future Management of the 
SDFI,” Storting proposition no.36 (2000-2001). 
27 One major example of government-industry cooperation in the oil sector is the so-called “Apertura” 
program adopted in Venezuela. Apertura, or openness, was an ambitious program adopted by the 
government of Rafael Caldera and the Venezuelan national oil company (PDVSA) to attract 
international investment and substantially increase country’s oil production capacity. Saudi Arabia 
similarly reestablished severed ties with multinational oil companies to develop oil fields in remote 
regions of the kingdom.  
28 According to UNCTAD World Investment Report 2001, between 1991 and 2000, a total of 1,185 
regulatory changes were introduced in national FDI regimes, of which 1,121 were in the direction of 
creating a more favorable environment for FDI.  
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agreements are divided into administrative licensing and auction-based licensing, 
while contractual agreements are divided into service and production sharing 
agreements. Although these two types of agreements differ in terms of levels of 
control by company, differing compensation and revenue shares, and differing levels 
of state-company involvement29, they all serve the same purpose: to stabilize legal 
and fiscal rights of investors in exchange for their operational and financial 
obligations to host governments. The three cases examined in this dissertation suggest 
that concessionary agreements work better in developed countries where legal and 
fiscal systems run smoothly and where there is trust in administrative practices. In 
less developed countries foreign investors demand contractual agreements, like 
service contracts and, increasingly, production sharing agreements (PSAs) in order to 
guarantee their rights and obligations under a contract that is not subject to possible 
arbitrary administrative interventions.30 
The cases that I analyze - Norway, Azerbaijan and Russia- display a 
significant variation in the ability to create a stable investment environment. Through 
different types of oil agreements Norway and Azerbaijan have provided legal, 
administrative and fiscal guarantees and incentives for foreign investors, while Russia 
has driven off eager foreign investors as a result of arbitrary, unstable, and 
unrewarding investment rules.  A brief overview of each country’s investment 
environment will be useful at this point. 
                                                          
29 Ernest E. Smith and John S. Dzienkowski,“Fifty-Year Perspective in World Petroleum 
Arrangements,” Texas International Law Journal (Winter, 1989):10. 
30 Blinn (1978). 
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VI. A Comparison of Investment Environments 
Norway began to develop its oil resources at the end of the 1960s. Having no 
geologists, petroleum economists or lawyers specialized in petroleum issues, Norway 
needed foreign expertise and risk capital to share the burdens and costs of exploration 
and extraction of oil under the North Sea. As early as 1965, the government issued a 
Royal Decree, which formulated a concessionary oil agreement model for the 
administrative allocation of exploration licenses. In this “North Sea model,”31 instead 
of signing a civil contract with investors, as in a PSA, the state entered into 
negotiations with oil companies for exploration programs, and for commitments 
written into exploration licenses. The licenses were obtained through an 
administrative procedure in which the state chose companies according to specific 
criteria. General standards of treatment, such as dispute settlement mechanisms, 
expropriation, repatriation of funds, work schedules etc., were embedded in the 
licenses.  
In step with the unprecedented growth of host governments’ bargaining power 
during the 1970s, the Norwegian state retained full control over the development of 
                                                          
31 This type of administrative licensing was first used by Norway and U.K. in the 1970s and is known 
as the North Sea Model. With strong state traditions but with equally strong need for foreign 
investments, these countries elaborated this model of oil resource management to accommodate 
company interests under public control. The advantage was the access to the experience and 
technology of foreign partners without totally giving in to their demands. To offset the domination of 
foreign companies, these governments created a web of legal and financial regulations in order to 
capture a given part of the rent and in order to influence the micro-economic behavior of foreign 
companies.  
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oil resources, and at times imposed relatively unfavorable terms upon foreign 
investors. The bargaining power of the Norwegian state peaked in the early 1980s, as 
indicated by toughened terms in its investment agreements. These policy changes in 
the 1970s and early 1980s reduced the profitability of some oil projects but were 
never regarded as posing political risks by foreign investors. The stated principles of 
the legal and administrative framework for the oil industry remained intact and there 
were no uncertainties about rules of the game. No major changes were made in the 
principles, rights, and obligations of state institutions and the oil companies. Investors 
were provided with enough legal and fiscal guarantees to function satisfactorily in 
Norway at a time when their interests were being systematically challenged and even 
compromised elsewhere in the world.32   
By the mid 1980s, when oil prices collapsed and competition for investment 
intensified, the Norwegian government adjusted the economic terms of its relations 
with foreign companies. For instance, in 1986 the Norwegian state initiated a tax 
reform that reduced the government take substantially. While remaining responsive to 
the interests of foreign companies, the Norwegian state also pursued goals such as the 
geographical and social distribution of offshore activities and prevented major 
accidents or negative side effects like harm to fishing grounds. In these ways, the 
                                                          
32 The 1970s represent a period in international oil markets when most host governments increased 
their assertiveness and sought for a greater share of profits, more restricted areas with expedited 
exploration schedules, provisions for periodic surrender of portions of the granted area, and 
commitments to train personnel in the related skills and technology. Countries in the Middle East and 
other OPEC countries turned to nationalization at the end as a means of regaining control over their 
resources. North Sea countries, Norway and UK stand out in this period as providing a less assertive 
environment for foreign investors.  
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Norwegian state was able to strike a balance between the interests of the foreign 
investors and domestic groups and ensure the investment regime’s stability. 
Consequently, despite difficulties in working in one of the world’s harshest 
exploration areas, major foreign companies from around the world continued to invest 
in oil projects in Norway. The policy environment’s stability and reliability became 
an argument for oil companies to accept the terms offered, even when they were less 
favorable.  
Opening its oil industry to international capital only during the 1990s, 
Azerbaijan has also been successful in creating a stable investment environment, 
which swiftly and efficiently met the demands of foreign investors. The Azeri 
government not only used PSAs, which by this time were proven to be instruments of 
stability for investors in developing countries, but it also created an investment 
regime in which each contract have the status of a law. This meant that each PSA 
contract would acquire the force of law of the Azerbaijani Republic and prevail over 
any other existing or future law, and decree, whose provisions might conflict with a 
specific PSA. This arrangement gave investors a sense of stability and reduced the 
political risks of investing. The result was 21 PSA contracts with Azerbaijan that 
committed an estimated total investment of  $60 billion.33 
Unlike in Azerbaijan and Norway, foreign investors faced even greater 
difficulty in Russia after 1991. The legal system governing oil activities was fraught 
                                                          
33 U.S. Department of Energy, Azerbaijan Country Analysis Brief, Energy Information Administration, 
(May 2001). 
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with complexity and ambiguity. For much of the 1990s the only regulated form of 
investment in the Russian oil sector was joint ventures for which a license to carry out 
oil development had to be obtained. However, the licensing regime did not provide 
sufficient security, stability or predictability for foreign investors, in contrast to 
Norway’s. In fact, the Russian system contained a number of grave concerns for 
investors. For instance, licenses were subject to state legislative action that resulted in 
unilateral changes and modifications of licenses, without granting foreign investors 
any ability to prevent or influence this process. Rules for the length, operation, or 
termination of licenses in many of the laws were contradictory or vague. This 
paralyzed the operations of foreign investors. Moreover, the legal hierarchy 
established under the Constitution of 1993 was not very clear as to the distribution of 
authority between the Federation and its regions in which oil reserves were actually 
located. Finally, the severity of the tax burden was rivaled only by the frequency and 
unpredictability with which it changed. Export duties were changed perhaps a dozen 
times in ten years under this licensing regime. Exporters struggled with cumbersome 
and restrictive quota and licensing requirements, only to be plunged into confusion 
when the restrictions were lifted albeit with no clear procedures for gaining access to 
overburdened pipelines. 
Given these problems with the Russian legal and fiscal framework, the 
preferred form of investment in the petroleum sector soon became PSAs. Russia is a 
textbook setting for the use of PSAs. It is rich in hydrocarbon resources, but lacks the 
financial and technical means to develop them efficiently. Moreover, as just 
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discussed, its tax and legal regime has been too unpredictable and burdensome to 
attract large-scale, long-term investments. The PSA law in Russia was designed to 
‘jump-start’ oil and gas investments by immediately establishing a special legal 
regime for PSAs in an attempt to insulate investors from risks. Despite the immediate 
need for and continuing insistence of foreign investors on PSAs, however, adoption 
of a PSA law and necessary regulations for its implementation have not even now 
been fully completed. In fact the creation of a stable investment environment for oil 
investors has been one of the fiercest political struggles that the new Russian state has 
experienced during its first decade of existence. No wonder that PSAs soon became 
labeled as ‘Progress Stalled Again.’ 
There are several alternative explanations for why Azerbaijan and Norway 
created stable investment environments and attracted significant amounts of oil 
investment while Russia did not. In the next chapter, I discuss some of these possible 
explanations. While I acknowledge the influence of other factors, I conclude that 
regime type has the greatest analytical utility in explaining the variation. 
 
VII. Research Methodology 
A comparison of the three cases is based on field studies conducted in 
Azerbaijan in the summer of 1999, Norway in January 2001, and Russia in spring 
2001. In order to analyze oil sector investment environments in these countries, I 
conducted a total of 75 in-depth interviews with various foreign investors, leaders of 
their lobbying organizations, government bureaucrats, legislative deputies, 
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journalists, scholars, and special analysts. In addition, I studied numerous government 
and private reports, documents, journal and newspaper articles, and scholarly works.  
The research had two components. The first consisted of interviews about the 
investment environment in each country. Respondents were asked to assess 
contracting or licensing policies in terms of the legal and fiscal guarantees they 
provided for foreign investors. Technical aspects of each investment regime were 
studied in depth with the help of numerous documents provided by oil companies. 
Historical data on the evolution of each country’s investment regime was collected 
through archival study of various journal and newspaper articles. The second research 
component involved questions about the political risks that the investment 
environment posed for investors. Respondents were asked to discuss the different 
interests of societal and state actors regarding oil investment policies. Then, they were 
asked to evaluate the institutional mechanisms through which state and societal actors 
interacted with each other and reached policy outcomes.  
Offsetting methodological limitation of comparing and contrasting just three 
cases, my study facilitates a close examination of the investment policy process in 
these important oil producing countries and uncovers more clearly mechanisms that 
link regime type to foreign investment flows. My analysis rests on a comparative 
analysis using both the ‘method of difference’ and the ‘method of similarity’. I 
compare countries that follow alternative paths, assessing the explanatory power of 
hypothesized critical differences. I also explore variations among countries following 
a similar trajectory, which isolates the peculiarities of each case.  
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VIII. Organization of the Dissertation 
The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter Two situates my two main 
arguments in literature dealing with the relations between regime type and foreign 
capital. Its first part, I briefly outline the alternative explanations for stability in an 
investment environment and give reasons why I do not find them convincing. I then 
discuss the two dimensions of institutionalized competition as they affect the ability 
of governments to overcome opposition to investment policies that are favorable to 
foreign investors. Using these dimensions, I construct a continuum of regime types in 
order to distinguish the capacities of states in creating stable investment 
environments. In the second part of the chapter, I discuss the shortcomings of 
neoliberal and dependency theories for explaining the political effects of foreign 
capital and I present my argument about globalization’s reinforcing and polarizing 
effects on regime type. I conclude the chapter with a thumbnail sketch of how the 
political regimes in Norway, Azerbaijan and Russia fit with my theoretical model.  
Succeeding chapters analyze in-depth each country’s experience with the 
globalized oil industry. Chapter Three looks at Norway’s oil investment environment 
and its political regime’s capacity to overcome opposition to investment policies. The 
Norwegian case provides an example of how a consolidated democracy with high 
degrees of institutionalized competition can provide policy stability and reduce 
political risks. It also shows the positive effects of foreign capital in further 
consolidating a comprehensive welfare state. Azerbaijan’s investment environment is 
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explored in Chapter Four. The lack of institutionalized political competition there is 
depicted as an alternative source of stability that is attractive to foreign investors. The 
Azeri case shows how less developed countries can compensate for lack of credible 
institutions by providing safe havens for investors.  Unlike Norway, however, foreign 
capital’s alliance with the Azeri regime has contributed to large income inequality, 
widespread poverty and strong political repression. As such it has reinforced an 
authoritarian regime. Chapter Five analyzes attempts by the Russian state to produce 
a stable investment environment, emphasizing the struggles to create a PSA regime. 
The chapter focuses on the weakness of hybrid regimes in attracting foreign 
investment and highlights the political choices facing Russia’s leaders today as they 
join the international competition for investment capital. Finally, Chapter Six 
summarizes how the empirical evidence accords with my theoretical model in 
Chapter Two. I discuss my argument’s generalizability to other possible cases. 
Overall, this dissertation grapples with the compatibility of various regime types with 
oil-driven globalization, and the political effects of foreign capital that this 
globalization entails.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
POLITICAL REGIMES AND FOREIGN CAPITAL 
 
 
I. Introduction 
A country’s comparative advantage in attracting foreign investment in oil is 
based not only on economic variables such as the size of its resources, the cheapness 
of labor, the size of its domestic markets and supporting industries, but also on the 
legal, operational, and regulatory framework of its investment relations with foreign 
investors. Hence, countries with similar economic endowments in oil compete with 
each other on the basis of stability in their investment environments. The questions 
that this chapter addresses are: why some oil-rich countries are better at providing 
guarantees and incentives for investors, while others are slow or reluctant to do so 
and how success or failure in attracting foreign investment affects political regimes.  
   I first discuss alternative explanations for why some countries do better than 
others in creating stable investment environments. Culture, geo-political 
considerations, ideology, and even a country’s size are frequently regarded as 
important ingredients of stability. Without entirely dismissing these ingredients, 
however, I focus on the capacity of different political regimes to formulate and 
implement attractive investment policies.  In this section, I canvas the limitations of a 
dichotomous distinction between regime types and I offer an alternative way to 
distinguish political regimes along a continuum of varying degrees of institutionalized 
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competition. In step with recent scholarly interest in hybrid regimes, I give special 
attention to the difficulties hybrid regimes face in their attempts to create stable 
investment environments and attract foreign investment.   
In this chapter’s second section, I discuss neoliberal and dependency claims 
about the political effects of foreign capital and argue that the direction and 
magnitude of these effects depend on the success or failure of a political regime to 
attract foreign capital in the first place.  I argue that once attracted foreign 
investments have a reinforcing effect on authoritarian and democratic regimes. For 
hybrid regimes, by contrast, foreign capital has polarizing effects. In the face of 
globalizing pressures, a hybrid regime type is at base not viable and it will transit 
either to the authoritarian or the democratic type. I conclude the chapter with a 
thumbnail sketch of the political regimes in Norway, Azerbaijan and Russia and how 
they fit with my theoretical model.  
 
II. Structural and Cultural Explanations 
 
In explaining the variation in the stability of investment environments in 
different countries, variables such as culture, ideology, prior integration with the 
world economy, geopolitics and even the size of a country can provide some 
background conditions and underlying trends.34 For instance, the historical, socio-
                                                          
34 A similar cultural argument is made by Charles Kindleberger in his 1951 piece “Group Behavior 
and International Trade.” He argues that a country’s level of social coherence determines 
policy/institutional response to economic changes. According to Kindleberger, social coherence 
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economic and cultural development of some countries may make them more open to 
foreign capital. Positive attitudes, beliefs and values towards foreigners may prevent 
the politicization of investment policies and make it easier for the decision-makers to 
offer attractive terms to foreign investors.  
This line of argument is often used when comparing the performances of 
countries like Norway and Russia. In Norway, for instance, it is argued that 
Scandinavian culture, the small size of the country and its strong economic relations 
with the outside world historically have created a certain business mentality that 
inhibits the politicization of investment issues and thus enables smooth formulation 
and implementation of legal, regulatory and administrative rules governing 
investment relations with foreigners. Conversely, many emphasize Russia’s cultural 
uniqueness and its particular history in explaining the inhospitable attitude towards 
foreign initiative.35 The late and partial development of Russian capitalism, the 
weakness of the pre-Revolutionary middle class, and the indoctrinization of seventy 
years of Soviet rule are said to have left Russian citizens distrustful, individualistic, 
unconcerned with profits, and hostile toward private, especially foreign enterprises. In 
the extractive industries particularly, it is argued that a residual Marxist mentality 
engenders a zero-sum game orientation to joint projects, whereby any profit 
transferred to a foreign company is viewed as a direct loss to a corresponding Russian 
                                                                                                                                                                      
includes internal social mobility, communication and shared values. An example for how size matters 
in integration with world economy is Peter Katzenstein’s Small States in World Markets: Industrial 
Policy in Europe, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985).  
35 David Dyker, ed. Investment Opportunities in Russia and the CIS (The Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1995). 
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firm. In addition, others argue that the country’s large size has created a more self 
sufficient, inward-looking economy with little incentive to open up to the outside 
world. According to this view, these cultural and geographic features politicize 
investment issues in Russia, produce severe confrontation between opponents and 
proponents of foreign investment, and create an unstable policy environment.  
There are also geostrategic explanations for why some countries offer stability 
in investment environments and others do not.36 For instance, in explaining the 
success of Azerbaijan in creating a stable and attractive environment, many 
emphasize Azerbaijan’s geostrategic objectives. Accordingly, in order to bolster its 
sovereignty and independence from Russia, and win international recognition for the 
conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan created the best possible terms for 
investors. To these ends, it also allowed a wide array of foreign companies to be 
included in the oil projects. In Russia, by contrast, the waning of superpower status 
produced a sense of national vulnerability. This increased the sensitivity of Russians 
to any type of foreign interference in the country’s political and economic affairs. 
“Russian pride” stemming from many years of international power is seen as one of 
the main factors in explaining the hostility towards foreign enterprises and thus 
domestic opposition to FDI among some groups.  
                                                          
36 Along similar lines, Meredith Woo-Cumings, Michael Loriaux and Sylvia Maxfield, in Loriaux, ed., 
Capital Ungoverned: Liberalizing Finance in Interventionist States (Cornell: Ithaca New York, 1997) 
explain financial liberalization that took place in many countries in the 1980s as a result of their geo-
political positions and the “predatory hegemony” of the United States.  
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These structural and cultural factors elucidate the constraints and challenges 
that these and other states face. However, they do not by themselves explain the 
conditions under which stable investment environments are created. Not only are 
these explanations deterministic, but they also cannot explain the existence of 
different interests, how interests change over time, and what policy outcomes are 
derived as a result of their interactions. Hence, these explanations tend to ignore how 
domestic politics constrain economic policy and shape state responses to the external 
environment. They too readily assume that states are unitary actors and that there is 
consensus about how they should behave. Given the political debates and struggles 
over the investment policies in each of these countries, there are many limitations to 
making generalizations based on culture, ideology or size of country. These factors 
may perhaps be used to explain the interests of certain groups in countries, but they 
do not explain the outcome of conflicts among many groups. In each country, there 
have been many losers as well as winners from investment policies formulated to 
attract investors.  
Politics, instead of underlying cultural and structural considerations, have 
been more influential in shaping states’ responses to globalization. Regardless of their 
different backgrounds, governments in all three countries considered here have 
become convinced of the need to make changes in their investment regimes in order 
to attract foreign investment. But, despite the common objective, outcomes have 
varied considerably. The issue, then, has not been the existence or absence of the will 
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to adopt investment-inducing policies, but the ability of pro-investment groups to do 
so in the face of opposition.  
 
III. Domestic Politics: Interests and Institutions 
 Instability in an investment environment occurs when the legal, regulatory and 
administrative terms of an investment relationship are unilaterally changed or 
undermined as a result of the actions of groups that are threatened by foreign 
investment.37 Therefore, one way to analyze the stability of the investment 
environment is to first look at the different interests that are affected by foreign 
investments and the distribution of power among them.38  
Challenges of globalization- the pressure to meet the heightened demands of 
foreign investors in this case- create winners and losers in every society. Because of 
the strategic importance of oil investments, opposition to investment policies come 
from various domestic groups such as nationalists, workers, environmentalists and 
business groups that feel threatened by the advantages these policies give to 
foreigners. However, as Geddes (1995) rightly points out, opposition to economic 
policies does not always come from societal actors. “In many countries the biggest, 
                                                          
37 Certainly instability may also be a result of external factors such as natural disasters, market price 
changes, war, etc. In this dissertation, however, I am interested in explaining the direct political causes 
of instability in the investment environment.  
38 In the political economy literature, these interest-based explanations are used to explain adjustments 
to the international economy. Similar to the main tenets of Marxism, these explanations emphasize 
economic determinism and focus on the costs of adjustments to private interests and the punishment 
that they can inflict on the state as a result of unpopular policies. For more details on this approach, see 
the works of Gourevitch 1997; Frieden and Rogowski 1996; Simmons 1994; and Milner 1998. 
    34
and certainly the most articulate and politically influential, losers from the transition 
to a more market-oriented economy are government officials, ruling-party cadres, 
cronies of rulers, and the close allies of all three.”39 Therefore, opposition to 
investment policies may also come from executive, legislative, regional or 
administrative actors whose power and authority are curtailed as a result of regulatory 
changes in investment relations. The pressures that these veto groups exert on 
decision-makers have a significant impact on the terms and consistency of the 
agreements. 
Governments that favor foreign investment are faced with the task of 
managing opposition to their policies that regulate the financial, regulatory and legal 
relations with the oil investors. Policy stability, then, depends on their ability to either 
build and sustain bases of support or to cut out opponents from the policy process. 
The strategies that government elites pursue, and the fashion in which they are 
implemented, hinge less on broad structural and economic forces than on the 
institutionally determined choices of these elites. Hence, the capacity of the 
government to create a stable and attractive investment environment depends on its 
ability to either co-opt or exclude opposition groups from decision-making.  
                                                          
39 Barbara Geddes, “Challenging the Conventional Wisdom,” in Diamond and Plattner, eds.,  
Economic Reform and Democracy  (John Hopkins University Press, 1995), 68. Geddes argues that 
understanding who the state actors are, what their interests are and what shapes those interests are good 
predictors of whether policies will be initiated and how far they will go. She makes this argument 
based on the empirical observation that-contrary to what conventional wisdom assumes-costs of 
liberalization on social forces have not been very high for many countries and that the opposition by 
labor unions was weak due to unemployment and economic crisis prior to liberalization attempts.  
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Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman in Without A Map: Political Tactics and 
Economic Reform in Russia (2000) discuss the two ways by which opposition to 
government policies can be neutralized. They argue that “either he who opposes must 
be expropriated of the stake that gives him leverage. Or he must be co-opted/ 
persuaded not to exercise his power to obstruct.”40 Expropriation -or exclusion- 
means cutting the opposition interests out of the policy process or of the dominant 
coalition in the central policy arena. It is to basically undermine their ability to 
subvert the implementation of the reforms. One way to do that would be to simply 
deprive them of their rights. Co-optation, on the other hand, implies not dealing these 
groups out of the game but dealing them new cards. The veto-power of the groups is 
not removed, but new incentives are created for them not to exercise it. This may 
involve an explicit bargain or a compromise that involves creating opportunities that 
give the opposing groups an independent interest in reform.  
Interests are essential in understanding policy success but without a 
consideration of the institutional context within which they interact, they cannot tell 
us the whole story. Pluralist approaches explain policy willingness and design, but 
they do not adequately explain policy outcomes. They simply extrapolate directly 
from interests to policy outcomes. There is no systematic effort in these analyses to 
                                                          
40 Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman, Without A Map: Political Tactics and Economic Reform in 
Russia  (The MIT Press, 2000),8. They cite a relevant quote from Machiavelli: “Men can either be 
pampered or crushed.” 
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explain how veto groups overcome dilemmas of collective action41, or gain access to 
centers of decision-making and exercise influence.42 The institutions of the state not 
only affect the range of policy instruments available, but they also tend to favor 
certain types of conflicts and outcomes while actively discouraging or preventing 
others. Institutional variation is therefore critical for understanding why some states 
are more capable than others in creating stability in their investment environments.  
The emphasis on both interests and institutional variation falls broadly within 
the realm of rational choice institutionalism, which sees institutions as setting the 
parameters of choice and imposing constraints on the behavior of individuals.43 
Accordingly, institutions structure the sequencing and availability of alternatives so 
as to lead the choices of rational individuals towards optimal and stable outcomes. 
Hence, the ability to use co-optation and/or exclusion strategies to overcome 
opposition groups is constrained by the institutional structure. The important question 
                                                          
41 According to Mancur Olson (1982), economic development can be viewed as a problem of 
collective action, which is that different social groups may benefit in the long run from cooperative 
sacrifices, but in the short run each has an interest in turning economic policy into a distributive game.  
42 An exception to this literature is Michael Shafer’s work Winners and Losers: How Sectors Shape the 
Developmental Prospects of States (1994) in which he argues that sectoral characteristics are a 
determinant of their capacity for collective action. Accordingly, the lower the economies of scale in a 
sector, the simpler the technology and skill-level used and the lower the capital required for entry, the 
lower the capacity for collective action.  
43 For a detailed description of the rational choice institutionalism and its differences with historical 
institutionalism, see Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative 
Politics,” in Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstretch, eds.,  Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in 
Comparative Analysis (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press: 1992),1-32 and Peter 
A. Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor, “Political Science and the Four New Institutionalisms,” paper 
presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (New York, 
September1994). According to rational choice institutionalists, relevant actors have a fixed set of 
preferences that they behave entirely instrumentally so as to maximize their attainment of these 
preferences often in a highly strategic manner that presume extensive calculation and access to 
relatively full information. The role of institutions is to resolve collective action dilemmas by 
providing actors with that information.  
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then becomes, under which institutional conditions are exclusion and cooptation more 
likely? 
 
IV. Significance of political regimes 
The relevance of regime type for understanding the institutional variations that 
shape economic policies has been the subject of one of the most heated and long-
standing debates in the political economy literature.44 A wave of bureaucratic-
authoritarian regimes in the developing world during the 1960s and 1970s brought, 
for the first time, the compatibility of capitalist economic development and 
democracy into question. Dependency theorists argued that authoritarianism was 
linked to the deepening phase of import-substituting industrialization and that in the 
face of dependent development the need for democracy dwindled (O’Donnell 1973; 
Cardoso 1973; Evans 1979). The appeal to the US and the multinational corporations 
of authoritarian regimes in developing countries was in their greater political capacity 
to insulate themselves from particularistic demands (Haggard 1990). They were less 
dependent on popular support and less concerned with electoral cycles.45 Democracy, 
on the other hand, was believed to unleash pressures for immediate consumption, 
threatening profits and investments and consequently retarding economic 
development (Galenson and De Schweinitz 1959, Huntington and Dominguez 1975). 
                                                          
44 For an overview of this debate, see Mancur Olson, “Dictatorship, Democracy and Development,” 
APSR 87 (1993): 567-76 and Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990.) 
45 Jose Maria Maravall, “The Myth of the Authoritarian Advantage,” in Diamond and Plattner, eds., 
Economic Reform and Democracy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995),14. 
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With the fall of Latin American dictatorships in the 1980s and the East Asian 
economic crisis of the 1990s, many scholars started to point to the weaknesses of 
authoritarian regimes in sustaining reforms. Accordingly, not only do these regimes 
lack the accountability and legitimacy needed to rally populations behind economic 
reforms, but also they are more prone to corruption. Democracies, by contrast, are 
seen as more capable of implementing economic reforms. Scholars argue that the 
predatory state can only be constrained by democratic institutions (North 1990). 
Moreover, through welfare measures democracies mitigate the harmful impacts and 
shortfalls of capitalism and reconcile opposing interests, which makes possible the 
survival of both capitalism and democracy. It is also easier for democracies to 
legitimate economic reforms if the policy process is transparent and accountable than 
if decision-making is secretive and corrupt. Finally it is easier for democracies to 
implement economic reforms if there is public confidence in the legitimacy of 
government itself.  
Even though the question of relative merits of authoritarian and democratic 
regimes continues to evoke intellectual analysis, as well as political passion, the 
general picture is inconclusive and contradictory. A growing body of cross-national 
empirical research on the economic effects of regime types has produced highly 
ambiguous results.46 As the three cases in this dissertation also demonstrate, the 
                                                          
46 Some of the examples of this cross-national quantitative literature on the relationship between 
economic performance and regime type are Larry Sirowy and Alex Inkeles, “The Effects of 
Democracy on Economic Growth and Inequality,” Studies in Comparative International Development 
25 (1990):126-57; Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, “Political Regimes and Economic 
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distinction between dichotomous categories of authoritarianism and democracy does 
not adequately explain the variation in the ability to create stable and attractive 
investment environments. The findings of this dissertation show that both the 
authoritarian regime in Azerbaijan and the democratic regime in Norway were able to 
formulate and sustain stable policies and thus attract significant amounts of 
investment into their oil sectors.  
One reason why the relationship between regime type and economic 
performance is found to be weak and ambiguous in the literature is the problem with 
the definition and categorization of regime types. Most scholars, usually for purposes 
of measurement accuracy, have been treating political regimes as dichotomous 
categories without taking account variations within each.47 As the recent literature on 
political regimes also points out, there are variations among democracies as well as 
among authoritarian regimes.48  The minimal electoral definition of democracy to 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Growth,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 7 (1993): 51-69; and John Helliwell, “Empirical Linkages 
Between Democracy and Economic Growth,” British Journal of Political Science 24 (1994):225-48. 
47 Prezorwski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi in Democracy and Development: Political Institutions 
and Well-Being in the World (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 2000) admit that they prefer 
the procedural minimum standard definition of democracy for purposes of measurement accuracy.  
48 According to Collier and Levitsky (1997), there are more than 550 subtypes of democracy. Some of 
these subtypes identify specific institutional features or types of full democracy. Examples of some of 
these subtypes are parliamentary, presidential and federal democracies. There are also ‘diminished 
subtypes’ such as limited democracy, oligarchical democracy, controlled democracy etc. As for 
variation among authoritarian regimes, Juan Linz, in Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes 
(Boulder:Lynne Rienner, 2000) argues that authoritarian regimes range from sultanistic, and 
bureaucratic-military authoritarianisms where there is few if any channels of political participation to 
‘organic statism’, mobilizational authoritarianism in post-democratic societies, post-independence 
mobilizational authoritarianism and finally post-totalitarian authoritarianisms with limited, controlled 
or privileged political pluralism. 
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distinguish between these two regime types is increasingly questionable.49 Despite 
free or relatively free elections, some regimes have authoritarian tendencies.50 Such 
variation in the degree of democracy and authoritarianism has brought a new wave of 
scholarly attention to the analytical importance of hybrid regimes. It is apparent to 
many now that a great deal of new regimes are not democratic or any longer ‘in 
transition’ to democracy (Carothers, 2002). In recent years, there has been an 
unprecedented growth in the number of regimes that are neither clearly democratic 
nor authoritarian.51 
To better understand the qualitative differences between democracy and 
authoritarianism, I view them as specific types in relation to the overarching concept 
of regime. Rather than distinguishing them in terms of the existence or lack of 
electoral contestation, I use a criterion that places regime types according to the 
degree of institutionalized competition they provide. This alternative criterion serves 
both to introduce finer differentiation and to avoid conceptual stretching. Even though 
classificatory schemes impose an uneasy order on an untidy empirical world and are 
often blurry, these ideal types of political regime on a continuum of institutionalized 
                                                          
49 The minimal standard definition of democracy presumes full contested elections with full suffrage 
and the absence of massive fraud, combined with effective guarantees of civil liberties, including 
freedom of speech, assembly, and association.  
50 According to Collier and Levitsky, the concern with these authoritarian tendencies has led to the 
inclusion of other criteria that measure the effective power of governments to rule (Karl 1990, 
Valenzuela 1992) effectiveness of legislatures (Bollen 1980), checks on executive power (Schmitter 
and Karl 1991, O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986) or social and economic equality (Jackman 1974, 
Muller 1988). 
51 Larry Diamond, “Thinking about hybrid regimes,” Journal of Democracy 13:2 (2002): 21-35. 
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competition have significant analytical utility in explaining the variation among 
different states in the ability to attract foreign investments.  
 
V. Institutionalized competition and types of investment environment 
A regime is a system of rules and practices that determines who has political 
rights, how they can be exercised, and their effects for controlling the state. In this 
dissertation, I distinguish among regime types along the degree of institutionalized 
competition that they provide. This variable is especially important in understanding 
the stability of policies because it demonstrates the relative strength of opposition 
groups, the level of their political participation and the institutional mechanisms that 
shape their interaction with the decision-makers. Hence the ability to use exclusion, 
co-optation to overcome opposition depends to a large extent on the degree of 
institutionalized political competition in each regime. 
I measure the degree of institutionalized competition by looking at two 
variables: the strength of veto players and the strength of ‘mediating institutions’. The 
first variable, the strength of veto players measures the degree of political competition 
and pluralism in the state. More specifically, it demonstrates the constraints imposed 
on the decision-makers. These veto players could come from legislatures and regional 
administrative units. Depending on their numbers and strength, they can oppose 
government investment policies and act as barriers to the formulation and 
implementation of investment terms with foreign companies.  
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The second variable, the strength of mediating institutions, on the other hand, 
measures the ability of political parties, interest group associations, and bureaucratic 
organizations to aggregate different interests, form enduring coalitions, reconcile 
differences among the veto players through negotiations, and reach compromised 
policy outcomes that would ensure a stable investment environment for investors. In 
addition to providing links between state and society, highly institutionalized political 
parties and interest groups serve integrative functions between different branches of 
government as well as between central and regional/ local governments. 52  Not only 
do they provide formal channels of communication between veto players but they 
also facilitate bargaining and negotiation among them. By use of these mediating 
institutions, decision-makers can co-opt veto groups into government policies by 
creating new opportunities and incentives for them. Similarly, a centralized, 
hierarchical and coherent bureaucracy can overcome divisions over government 
policies by mediating between the branches of government as well as between central 
and regional administrations.  A strong cohesive bureaucratic organization can also 
build coalitions among legislators and interest groups and provide decision-makers 
with institutional mechanisms to reach policy equilibriums. Consequently, the 
strength of these mediating institutions is indicative of the capacity of the state to 
govern effectively.  
                                                          
52 Mainwaring (1998) offered “party institutionalization” as a new way of thinking about parties other 
than their number, the degree of ideological polarization (Sartori 1994) or fragmentation (Haggard and 
Kaufman 1995.) 
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An interaction of these two variables produces four theoretically possible 
investment environments (see Table 2.1). I call the first type of investment 
environment “imposed”. In this situation, the decision-makers do not face any 
opposition to their policies from any veto groups within the state. Legislatures either 
do not exist or are so thoroughly controlled by the ruling party that conflict between 
legislative and executive branches is virtually unthinkable. Rulers are invincible since 
“the electoral arena is little more than a theatrical setting for the self-representation 
and self-reproduction of power”.53 With no accountability, this type of a setting 
insulates the rulers from group pressures, expands their range of directive powers and 
increases their capacity and flexibility to formulate investment terms that are 
favorable to investors and acceptable to themselves. Moreover, the weakness of the 
mediating institutions frees them from the need to co-opt opposition groups and 
makes it easier for them to impose on the rest of the society the investment 
environment that they formulated with foreign investors.  
The second possible investment environment is a ‘chaotic’ one. Here there are 
veto players in the state that challenge the policies of the government. However, lack 
of strong mediating institutions leaves pluralism unchecked and unconstrained. The 
rulers are insecure because the electoral arena is a genuine battleground in struggle 
for power. Legislatures occasionally become focal points of opposition activity. In 
some cases, veto players are not limited to legislatures but are also seen in regional 
administrative units and bureaucratic agencies that pose significant challenges to 
                                                          
53 Andreas Schedler, “The Menu of Manipulation,” Journal of Democracy 13:2 (2002):43. 
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government policies. In these settings, the weakness of these conciliatory institutions 
is a detriment to coherent policymaking as well as to working relations between the 
executive and legislative branches. Decision-makers cannot overcome opposition of 
the veto players by totally excluding them because the challenges tend to be both 
formally legal and widely perceived as legitimate. What is worse is that decision-
makers cannot easily co-opt these veto groups either since they lack the institutional 
mechanisms for building enduring coalitions and facilitating negotiation and 
bargaining. Consequently, veto players within the state engage in jurisdictional power 
struggles to the detriment of compromised solutions.  The result is oftentimes policy 
instability, deadlock and in most cases chaos in the investment environment. 
Investors face arbitrary, conflictual, and aggressive investment terms that drive them 
away. 
The third possible investment environment is ‘negotiated’. There are strong 
veto players that challenge and constrain the power of the government. Despite the 
high degree of political competition and pluralism in the state, however, strong 
mediating institutions like political parties, interest groups and centralized 
bureaucracies help achieve the goal of building policy majorities as well as 
maintaining them. This is in line with the conclusions of the social choice theory. 
Using Arrow’s general possibility theorem (Arrow 1951), social choice theorists 
argue that enduring institutions that form long and durable coalitions can solve the 
collective action problems by reaching structure-induced equilibria (SIEs) (Riker 
1962, Shepsle and Weingast 1982, Aldrich 1995.) In this setting, coexistence of high 
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degree of political competition with strong enduring institutions provides decision-
makers with opportunities to co-opt competing veto groups into investment policies. 
The result is a negotiated, compromised investment environment that is acceptable to 
both foreign investors and domestic players. 
 
TABLE 2.1 Types of Investment Environment 
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Finally, the fourth category of investment environment is ‘structured’. In this 
setting, there is a relatively institutionalized ruling party and centralized state 
bureaucracy that monopolizes the political arena, using coercion, patronage, media 
control and other means to deny veto players any real chance of competing for power. 
In comparison to first type of investment environment, in this setting, centralized 
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elites are able to co-opt a reasonable range of social groups and form coalitions that 
support their policies. Investment terms are imposed on the rest of the society by 
institutionalized party structures and bureaucracy rather than by a single person 
holding almost all power in the system. The result is a structured and controlled 
investment environment. 
 
VI. Continuum of Regime Types 
Based on the two variables discussed above, I place political regimes that 
correspond to these investment environments on a continuum of low to high degrees 
of institutionalized competition (See Figure 2.1). At one end of the spectrum, there 
are authoritarian regimes that impose a stable investment environment. There are 
actually very few closed authoritarian regimes that are left in the world in the most 
conventional meaning of the term.  Today most authoritarian regimes hold some sort 
of elections and try to obtain at least a semblance of democratic legitimacy, hoping to 
satisfy external as well as internal actors. That is why most recently scholars started 
calling these façade democracies ‘electoral authoritarian regimes’ (Diamond 2002, 
Shedler 2002, Levitsky and Way 2002, Carothers 2002). For purposes of parsimony, I 
simply use the term ‘authoritarian’ to depict political regimes that produce very little 
to none institutionalized competition.  
At the other end of the continuum, there are highly competitive democratic 
regimes. In the literature, these types of inclusive regimes where the “rules of the 
game” are institutionalized are called consolidated democracies. Consolidation is the 
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process of achieving broad and deep legitimation by a normative and behavioral 
commitment to the specific rules and practices of the country’s constitutional system 
(Linz and Stepan 1997.) In a consolidated democracy, not only governance is 
improved by horizontal accountability, but also representative functions are improved 
by strengthening of political parties and their linkages to social groups. This type of a 
regime produces a negotiated investment environment that is stable and attractive for 
foreign investors.  
In between these two extremes, however, there are hybrid regimes. Most 
regimes today are neither clearly democratic nor authoritarian; they are hybrid 
regimes.54 They inhabit this ‘twilight zone’ between a consolidated democracy and 
uncompetitive authoritarianism. To order this universe of ambiguous regimes, 
scholars have been working with broad intermediate categories such as quasi 
democracy, semi democracy, and pseudo democracy. Others have been developing 
lists of more specific diminished subtypes such as illiberal, delegative, limited, 
unconsolidated democracies etc.55Certainly, this scholarly treatment of hybrid 
regimes is not entirely new. “It has intellectual foundations in the transitions 
paradigm and in other earlier comparative work on democracy.”56 However, in the 
recent years many scholars started to emphasize the importance of hybrid regimes as 
specific types of regimes rather than in terms of transition to democracy. Rather than 
                                                          
54 According to Larry Diamond (2002), about 36.9% to 53% of all countries have pseudo democracies.  
55 See David Collier and Steven Levitsky, “Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in 
Comparative Research,” World Politics 49 (April 1997): 430-51. 
56 Diamond, p.23. 
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seeing it as a diminished type of democracy, some in fact consider it a diminished 
form of authoritarianism and call it ‘competitive authoritarianism’ (Levitsky and 
Way, 2002).   
 
Figure 2.1: Continuum of Regime Type and Investment Environment 
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elections. Levitsky and Way (2002) for instance argue that political systems descend 
into electoral authoritarianism when violations of the minimum criteria for democracy 
are so serious that they create an uneven playing field.  In this dissertation, I focus on 
the interaction of two variables other than elections to define hybrid regimes.  Even 
though free and fair elections are a necessary condition for democracy, they are not 
sufficient. As Schmitter and Karl (1991) point out, elections occur intermittently and 
only offer narrow choices to voters. In between elections, however, the strength of 
veto players and mediating institutions has a significant impact on the policy 
environment. Hybrid regimes are not different from consolidated democracies and 
authoritarian regimes only by the nature of their electoral contests; they are also 
different in terms of the level of institutionalized competition they provide in between 
elections.   
The second and fourth investment environments that I discussed earlier 
correspond to hybrid regimes. In this dissertation I focus on hybrid regimes that 
produce ‘chaotic’ investment environments. Even though ‘structured investment 
environment’ is beyond the scope of this dissertation, I believe that it has analytical 
utility in pointing to institutional characteristics that distinguish among hybrid 
regimes. Such an investment environment corresponds to a description of ‘hegemonic 
authoritarian regime’ (Diamond 2002), ‘bureaucratic authoritarian regime’ or 
‘democracy with dominant party system’.57  More research needs to be done to 
                                                          
57 According to Larry Diamond (2002), Mexico is a good example of such a regime. I would argue that 
China is another good example. 
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clearly demonstrate the effects of this regime on the stability of investment 
environment and the ability to attract foreign investment. Future research on this 
category can contribute significantly to the recent scholarly interest on the varieties of 
hybrid regimes.   
To sum up, given similar external pressures from global markets, I argue that 
uncompetitive authoritarian regimes as well as highly competitive consolidated 
democracies are likely to be more successful in creating stable policy environments 
that facilitate the attraction of significant amounts of foreign investment. On the other 
hand, hybrid regimes with limited degrees of institutionalized competition make it 
difficult for governmental elites to overcome opposition to investment policies. 
Consequently, hybrid regimes, regardless of their economic endowments, may pose 
major political risks for foreign investors. Distinguishing among different political 
regimes in terms of the degree of institutionalized competition is a useful way to 
analyze the relationship between regime type and investment environment.  
 
VII. Political Effects of Foreign Capital 
My second argument in this dissertation is that the flow of foreign capital as 
well as the need to attract it has significant effects on political regimes. There is a 
significant body of political economy literature that looks at the effects of foreign 
capital on political structures. In general, two competing views can be found. The first 
centers on the logic of modernization, which assumes an inherent link between 
increased economic interdependence and democracy. This neoliberal approach 
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focuses on the liberalizing effects of foreign capital.  Neoliberal scholars contend that 
foreign capital sows the seeds of democracy by bringing prosperity to countries. More 
specifically they argue that foreign capital has the power to curb discretionary powers 
of authoritarian governments by disciplining the business environment, cutting 
patronage, promoting institution building and strengthening civil society (Lindblom 
1982; Mahon 1995; Stallings 1995; Rogowski and Frieden 1995; Block 1996; Henry 
1996/98; Winters 1996; Maxfield 1997).58 Foreign capital is also regarded as 
providing technology that allows for the more efficient use of local resources, 
creating a greater ability to promote reform over time (Gilpin 1975). 
The second view in the literature points to the anti-democratic properties of 
foreign capital. The “new wave’ of dependency theory provides an example of how 
foreign capital causes distortions in the political system of host countries.59 According 
to Peter Evans (1978), one of the pioneers of this theory, dependent development 
creates a particular transnational class coalition, a ‘triple alliance’ between state 
elites, foreign firms and local firms, all of whom share a common interest in rapid 
                                                          
58 A seminal contribution to this idea is Albert Hirschman’s Exit, Voice, and the State (1978) in which 
he outlines the role of “movable property” as a restraint on the government’s freedom of maneuver by 
checking on despotic and predatory rule. Slyvia Maxfield’s Gatekeepers of Growth (1997) is another 
good example of the need to make institutional changes to get credit and investment from international 
investors. She proposes an investor-signaling model of central bank interdependence according to 
which governments cede authority to central banks in order to signal their creditworthiness. Rogowski 
and Frieden (1996) also depict the pressures exerted on governments in regard to trade policies. They 
argue that as transaction costs decline, governments face increasing pressures from internationally 
oriented sectors to liberalize trade. The prospective winners of trade press for institutional reforms that 
reduce access to groups seeking exemptions.    
59 Dependency theorists who developed their thinking primarily with reference to the large Latin 
American NICs share many basic assumptions with writers on imperialism, proponents of a world-
systems perspective, and some structuralist theories of international political economy.  For a more 
detailed description of the main tenets of this theory, see Stephan Haggard, Pathways From the 
Periphery (Cornell University Press, 1990). 
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accumulation.60 “This in turn dictates a predictable political and sociological 
configuration, involving authoritarianism and inequality.”61 Since its position of 
social dominance is guaranteed by the support of its multinational ally, the local elite 
has little incentive to institute reform to improve the conditions of the masses 
(Magdof 1976; Rubinson 1977). Without mass legitimacy, the host government must 
rely upon repression to hold on to power.  
In a variant of this second view, the literature on rentier states, or more 
specifically petro-states,62 contends that oil rents reinforce authoritarian tendencies in 
a country and create obstacles for political change (Mahdavy 1970, Gelb 1986, 
Hughes 1975, Delacroix 1980, Shafer 1994, Chaudry 1997, Karl 1997). As Michael 
Ross (2001) in his seminal article summarizes, there are three general explanations 
for why oil has antidemocratic effects. “A ‘rentier effect,’ which suggests that 
resource rich governments use low tax rates and patronage to relieve pressures for 
greater accountability; a ‘repression effect,’ which argues that resource wealth retards 
democratization by enabling governments to boost their funding for internal security; 
and a ‘modernization effect,’ which holds that growth based on the export of oil and 
                                                          
60 Peter Evans, Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State, and Local Capital in 
Brazil, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).  Other dependency theorists are Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso, “Associated-Dependent Development: Theoretical and Practical Implications,” in 
Alfred Stepan, ed., Authoritarian Brazil (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973) and Douglas C. 
Bennett and Kenneth E. Sharpe, Transnational Corporations versus the State: The Political Economy 
of the Mexican Automobile Industry (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983). 
61 Haggard, Pathways From the Periphery, 18. 
62 According to Terry Lynn Karl in The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States (1997.) petro-
states can be considered a special subset of mining states.  The natural characteristics shared by all 
petro-states are 1) dependence on a single resource, 2) dependence on an industrial sector that is highly 
capital-intensive and an enclave, 3) reliance on a primary commodity that is depletable, 4) dependence 
on a resource capable of generating extraordinary rents, and 5) the fact that mineral rents accrue 
directly to the state. 
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minerals fails to bring about the social and cultural changes that tend to produce 
democratic government.”63  I argue in this dissertation that there is a fourth causal 
mechanism that can explain the anti-democratic effects of oil. Using Ross’ 
expression, this might be considered the ‘globalization effect’ that impedes 
democratization by creating an alliance between foreign investors and authoritarian 
leaders. Foreign investment not only provides new resources for the governing elite, 
but it also gives legitimacy to it.  
In addition to contributing to rentier causal mechanisms, this dissertation also 
points out to the shortcomings of neliberal and dependency theories in explaining the 
variation in political responses to foreign capital. Both of these approaches assume 
these effects to be unidirectional: either democracy-enhancing or democracy-
impeding. However, as scholars are increasingly pointing out, these effects are not 
uniform. For instance, many scholars distinguish the effects of different types of 
foreign capital on political regimes.64 As opposed to portfolio investments, they argue 
that foreign direct investments (FDI) can have only limited effects on political 
structures due to their lack of liquidity. While international investors in government 
bonds or equities can normally sell them immediately on news of an unfavorable 
change in the political environment, FDI investors are limited in influencing policy 
                                                          
63 Michael Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy,” World Politics 53:3 (2001): 326. 
64 In most of these analyses, the variation among the types of global capital is determined by factors 
such as risk structure, access to local information and number of investors. Another distinction among 
different types of global capital, according to Kiren Chaudry in Price of Wealth (1997), involves 
variations in the degree of control that different public-private sector groups exercise over the 
allocation and the extent to which that control is dispersed or centralized within these groups. To prove 
his point, she shows the different effects of remittances and oil rents on Yemen and Saudi Arabia 
respectively. 
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once they have invested in a physical plant. Hence, FDI’s role in promoting 
institution building remains confined to areas related directly to the security and 
profitability of foreign investment.  
Others also distinguish between different sectors in which foreign capital is 
invested. Accordingly, holders of foreign capital in manufacturing industries are most 
affected by the circumstances found in the host country because they rely on the local 
market for sales, they maintain extensive contacts with local firms that operate as 
suppliers and distributors, and they require access to large number of local workers 
(Reuber 1973; Vernon 1977; Richardson 1978; Caporaso 1980; Frieden 1981). By 
contrast, holders of foreign capital in the mining and other commodity sectors are 
more insulated and have fewer contacts with the host country. Foreign capital is 
concentrated in small enclaves, with its primary interest centering on extracting 
resources for international markets (Vernon 1971; Sklar 1975; Mahler 1981). In light 
of these considerations, it is argued that investors in this sector have few incentives to 
play an especially significant role in domestic politics, or to assist in institution 
building.  
Moreover, there are those who argue that the relative market and bargaining 
power of host governments vis-à-vis multinational corporations determines the extent 
to which political structures will be affected by FDI (Vernon 1971; Moran 1974). 
Unlike dependency theories, these bargaining models see the international 
environment not as a rigidly determinate structure but, rather, as a set of shifting 
constraints within which states have a range of maneuver. According to Vernon, the 
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“obsolescing bargain” captures the repercussions of product-cycle and market 
changes for bargaining between host governments and multinational corporations. 
The power of two parties is linked to the stages of their relationship and power shifts 
over time. Accordingly, the vulnerability of host governments to the political effects 
of foreign capital depends on their relative market and bargaining power vis-à-vis 
multinational corporations. 
Despite these attempts to refine the neoliberal and dependency theories to 
account for different political effects of foreign capital, there is no systematic analysis 
of political systems in the literature as an explanation for this seemingly obvious 
variation. The missing variable in all of these explanations is the political regime 
prior to the flow of foreign capital. As the three cases in this dissertation demonstrate, 
depending on the political regime prior to investments, foreign capital can have both 
democratic and anti-democratic effects. By making the causal connections between 
regime type and foreign capital, this dissertation contributes significantly to the 
aforementioned debate over the political effects of foreign capital.  
Along these lines, Terry Lynn Karl in Paradox of Plenty emphasizes the 
importance of institutional settings prior to the inflows of foreign capital. She argues 
that ‘stateness’ is a crucial determinant of how oil rents will affect domestic politics. 
Challenging the determinism in the rentier state literature, she contends that oil profits 
do not necessarily always make a state more rent seeking and authoritarian. Even 
though she emphasizes the importance of certain political variables-such as a 
professional bureaucracy, effective courts and regulatory institutions- in mitigating 
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the anti-democratic effects of oil rents, she falls short of providing a causal model for 
why political effects of oil rents are different across oil-rich countries.65  
I argue that political regimes not only help determine whether there will be 
foreign investment in the first place, but they also mediate the effects of foreign 
capital once it is invested (See Figure 2.2). In both authoritarian regimes and 
consolidated democracies, foreign investment has a ‘reinforcing effect’ on the 
political regime. The success of attracting significant amount of foreign capital into 
the economy strengthens and consolidates the existing regime regardless of its nature. 
Foreign capital provides not only additional resources to state coffers but it also gives 
legitimacy to the ruling elite.  
As the Azerbaijani case in this dissertation demonstrates, foreign capital has 
contributed to the further strengthening of the authoritarian regime by providing 
Aliev and his clique additional resources to suppress the opposition groups and buy 
off supporters through patronage. As opposed to the democracy-impeding effects of 
foreign capital in Azerbaijan, however, in a consolidated democracy like Norway 
economic success brought on by the inflow of foreign capital increased the legitimacy 
of decision-makers and strengthened the foundations of the democratic welfare state. 
Foreign capital in this context has had a positive effect on further consolidation of 
democracy.   
                                                          
65 Similarly, Michael Ross in his analysis of the political effects of oil rents fails to account for political 
regimes. Just like Karl, he acknowledges the variation in political responses to oil rents but explains it 
with differences in per capita income. Results of his empirical test demonstrate that “large oil 
discoveries appear to have no discernible antidemocratic effects in advanced industrialized states, such 
as Norway, Britain, and the U.S., but may harm or destabilize democracy in poorer countries.”(p.333) 
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Finally, I argue in this dissertation that foreign capital has ‘polarizing effects’ 
on hybrid regimes. Hybrid regime is one regime category where the political effects 
of foreign capital have not been studied at all. The Russian case in this dissertation 
contributes to the literature by suggesting that pressures from foreign investors for a 
stable investment environment induce certain institutional changes in hybrid regimes 
that face dire economic problems. Elites that are in power have the option of creating 
policy stability either by excluding or co-opting opposition groups. In doing so, they 
move the regime towards either more democracy or authoritarianism. The political 
Authoritarian 
Regime 
FOREIGN  
CAPITAL 
Reinforcing Effect 
(Democracy-impeding) 
Reinforcing Effect 
(Democracy-enhancing) 
Hybrid 
Regime 
Consolidated 
Democracy 
Need to Attract 
Foreign Capital
FOREIGN  
CAPITAL 
Polarizing Effect
Polarizing Effect
Authoritarian 
Regime 
Consolidat
ed
Consolidated 
Democracy
Figure 2.2: Political Effects of Foreign Capital 
    58
adjustments that Russian president Vladimir Putin has been making in order to attract 
foreign investment further uncovers the effects of globalization on hybrid regimes. 
 
VIII. A Comparison of Political Regimes in Norway, Azerbaijan, and Russia 
Norway is a perfect example of a consolidated democracy.  Norwegian 
government was able to create a stable investment environment for foreign investors 
by including opposition groups in the policymaking process and by mediating among 
them. High levels of political competition in Norway produce many veto players in 
the policymaking process. First of all, the parliament comprised of strong, coherent 
parties acts as a significant check on the executive branch. Second, regional 
governments and legislatures exert important constraints on the government. Even 
though Norway has a unitary political system, power is dispersed geographically. The 
political system has three levels: the national level with the national assembly and 
state bureaucracy; a regional level with democratically elected assemblies and 
regional bureaucracies; and local level municipalities with their own political 
assemblies and bureaucratic administrations.  Historically, the central bureaucracy 
has constituted a strong source of state power in Norway. In addition to government 
ministries, numerous parastatal organizations, with different agendas and interests 
create a highly competitive policy environment. 
Despite this high degree of competition, the existence of strong and coherent 
parties with close links to constituents has given the Norwegian decision-makers 
ample opportunity to reconcile conflicts of interest among veto groups. An extensive 
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corporatist structure and a strong centralized bureaucracy have further mitigated 
collective action dilemmas by institutionalizing bargaining and cooperation among 
diversified veto actors.  
In the oil policy arena over the last three decades, the powerful representation 
of societal interests, such as environmentalists, labor unions and business groups, has 
given Norwegian governmental elites institutional mechanisms to mediate between 
different interests and make compromises in shaping investment policies. The 
resulting balance of power moderated radical opposition to government policies by 
emphasizing consensus building and co-optation. The stability needed to attract 
foreign capital derived from negotiations and compromises made among veto groups. 
A tax reform in 1986, a scaling back of the role of the state oil company, abolishment 
of the ‘sliding scale’ mechanism of profit distribution and a robust set of safety 
regulations are examples of compromises made by Norwegian political elites to co-
opt different veto players into investment policies aimed at attracting investors.  
Azerbaijan, by contrast, is a typical example of an uncompetitive political 
regime. It has achieved policy stability not by including opposition groups in 
policymaking, but by excluding them. Even though there is electoral contestation, the 
regime has many characteristics of ‘sultanism’.66 Control of the state apparatus is 
vested in a small group of personally connected individuals, at the core of which sits a 
                                                          
66 According to Linz, sultanistic regimes are a type of autocratic regime in which “the ruler exercises 
his power without any restraint at his own discretion and above all unencumbered by rules or by any 
commitment to an ideology or value system. In many respects the organization of power and of the 
staff of the rule is similar to traditional patrimonialism as described by Weber (1968). But the lack of 
constraint derived from tradition and from continuing traditional legitimacy distinguishes it from the 
historical types of patrimonial rule.  
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presidential clique. This clique consists of president Heidar Aliev’s most trusted 
kinsmen, who monopolize the most sensitive and lucrative positions. There are no 
veto players within the state because the parliament is a symbolic and inchoate 
institution, and because regional state administrations have no voice in policy-
making. Moreover, societal interests lack organizational capacity to overcome 
collective action problems and resist exclusion by the dominant political elite. To the 
extent that there are any interest group organizations, they are either weak and 
powerless or dependent heavily on the autocratic state. Finally, party organizations 
are too weak and too detached from society to aggregate different interests into policy 
coalitions and constrain state policies.   
This regime has had a profound impact on the ability of Azerbaijan to attract a 
significant amount of foreign investment in its oil industry during the 1990s. First, 
parliament has rubberstamped every PSA contract into law without discussion or 
delay, while the bureaucracy had little input to the PSA process. There was not even a 
Ministry of Energy until June 2001. The near monopoly role of the state oil company, 
SOCAR, of which Aliev’s son is vice president, prevents bureaucratic interference at 
the higher levels of government and provides policy insulation. Such insulation 
creates a conflict-free environment in which political elites operate. With no critical 
institutional checks on their despotic rule from the Azeri parliament, bureaucracy, 
regional administrations or business groups, the ruling political elite has been able to 
negotiate with foreign investors with the utmost discretion and flexibility. Foreign 
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investors, for their part, have enjoyed the stable guarantees and incentives provided to 
them.  
In contrast to both Norway and Azerbaijan, Russia is an example of a hybrid 
political regime. Institutionalized competition is more tolerated than in Azerbaijan, 
but it is much more limited than in Norway. Despite president Yeltsin’s significant 
powers in the formulation and execution of policy, the federal and regional 
legislatures, regional and local governments in addition to different bureaucratic 
agencies have at times exerted important veto powers over executive decisions 
throughout the 1990s. Offsetting this limited pluralism and competition within the 
state, however, was the lack of strong mediating institutions to build policy coalitions 
and resolve conflicts among veto players. In contrast to Norway, Russia’s party 
system lacked high degrees of institutionalization. Their financial and organizational 
weaknesses prevented them from mobilizing different interests in society. Their weak 
ties to their constituencies made it difficult to aggregate different interests into policy 
coalitions and constrain the behavior of legislatures, government officials engaged in 
severe jurisdictional struggles. In contrast to the Norwegian centralized, professional 
bureaucracy, the Russian bureaucracy could not mediate between different interests 
and provide compromised policy alternatives. The divisions among government 
ministries and bureaucratic agencies constrained the policymaking authority of the 
decision-makers and contributed to the chaotic and incoherent policy making process 
during the 1990s.  
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Given this institutional mix and the enormous stakes in controlling oil 
resources, a PSA regime was presented as the only solution to oil industry’s 
investment problems. Despite its importance, the PSA issue immediately became 
what observers have called a ‘political football’ in Russia. State actors had conflicting 
interests over the procedure of assigning subsoil rights in PSAs and the control over 
the PSA tax revenues. The institutional system that assigned significant veto power to 
the parliament and the regions made strategies of co-optation or exclusion for 
political elites who championed PSAs less likely. The PSA process, which 
crystallized the problems associated with the creation of a stable investment 
environment, has thus far failed in Russia due to the weakness of a hybrid regime that 
gave formal powers to veto players without strong mediating institutions to keep their 
powers checked.  
 
IX. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I first discussed the analytical utility of structural and cultural 
variables in explaining sources of stability in investment environments. Culture, 
socioeconomic development, ideology, geostrategic considerations and even the size 
of a country help explain why some states are more successful in creating stability for 
investors than others. They certainly shed light on the interests and preferences of 
certain groups in society or within the state apparatus. However, these variables 
cannot account for the outcome of political struggles over investment policies. 
Evidence in the following chapters will clearly demonstrate why institutional 
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variation, rather than cultural and structural variables, provides a better analysis for 
differences in state responses to foreign investment.  
In this chapter, I demonstrated the causal link between regime type and stable 
investment environments. I argued that the formulation and implementation of 
investment terms is a political process. Policy stability requires resolving conflicts of 
interests among winners and losers of foreign capital either through exclusion or 
cooptation. The ability to use either strategy depends on the extent of institutionalized 
competition in a polity. Institutionalized competition measures the strength of the 
veto players and the institutions to mediate among them.  I argue that in both 
authoritarian regimes and consolidated democracies, decision-makers are usually able 
to respond to the demands of foreign capital by reducing political risks. However, in 
hybrid regimes- given the potential instability of partial institutionalization- they are 
more constrained in their ability to overcome opposition to foreign investment and 
thus create an attractive investment environment for foreign companies.  
In this chapter, I have also briefly outlined where my three empirical cases are 
located on a regime continuum. In the following chapters, I analyze each case 
separately and in more detail to show how their political regimes affect the ability to 
formulate and implement attractive investment policies in the oil sector. In the final 
chapter, I discuss the implications of this theory in general for the literature and 
specifically for countries that face similar challenges of globalization. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
NORWAY:  
‘ISLAND OF STABILITY’ IN STORMY WATERS 
 
I. Introduction 
Oil came as a surprise to Norway. In 1962, when Phillips Petroleum Co. 
announced its intentions to explore the Norwegian coastal waters, many were 
skeptical of the idea even to the extent that a geologist, in disbelief, said that he would 
drink oil if found.67 With no prior experience and expertise Norway, in less than a 
decade, established a broad national competence in oil and has used the proceeds for 
the benefit of the society at large. Norwegian crude oil production increased 
significantly from 1981 to 2001 (see Figure 3.1). In 2000, Norway ranked as the 
world’s sixth largest producer and third largest net exporter of oil. Government 
revenues from the oil sector have varied from 20% of the total state revenues in late 
1970s and early 1980s to around 33% in 2001 (see Figure 3.2).  
Foreign companies have greatly contributed to the build-up of the oil industry 
through their provision of capital, expertise and technology.  Between 1971 and 1996, 
a total of $200 billion was invested in exploration, construction, and operations on the 
                                                          
67 Author’s interview with Bjarne Moe (the Director General in the Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum 
and Energy) in Oslo, Jan.15, 2001. He also stated that Trygve Lie- the former General Secretary of the 
United Nations and then the representative of the Department of Industry- when approached by a 
delegation from the Phillips Petroleum company said that the company was mistaken and that there 
was no oil or gas in Norway.  
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Norwegian continental shelf.68 Calculations based on FDI figures from UNCTAD 
Handbook of Statistics show that Norway received 92 cents of foreign investment per 
barrel of its proven oil reserves between 1994-2001. This figure is very high when 
compared to the amount of FDI that many other oil-producing countries get for their 
oil reserves.  Most of the major multinational oil companies have been involved in the 
development of Norwegian oil, among them BP, ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch/Shell, 
TotalFinaElf, Phillips Petroleum and Conoco. Over time, the balance between 
Norwegian-owned and foreign companies has changed. In the first offshore licensing 
round in 1965, the foreign share of the oil fields was 91%. Today, foreign companies 
operate about 20% of the oil resources in producing fields. Even though Norway, 
through its resource management model, eventually took control of its own oil 
operations, it has consistently encouraged the participation of foreign oil companies. 
Many consider the development of the Norwegian oil industry as a ‘grand-scale 
clubbing together’ between the Norwegian state and the world’s biggest oil 
companies.69  
The potential oil resources of the North Sea were the main reason why 
multinational oil companies got interested in Norway in the first place. With 0.9% of 
world’s total proven oil reserves, the country is the 13th largest oil province in the 
world.70 Trends in the international oil market also contributed to Norway’s 
                                                          
68 International Trade Administration.“Oil and Gas Services Update: Norway,” International Market 
Insight (06/21/2001.) 
69 U.S. Department of Energy. Country Analysis: Norway (2001) Energy Information Administration, 
(www.eia.doe.gov). 
70 BP Statistical World Energy Review 2001 (www.bp.com) 
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attractiveness. High oil prices and problems of supply on a global scale during the 
1970s were important reasons why companies found it strategically compelling to 
invest in Norway. Oil embargos imposed by OPEC countries compelled multinational 
oil companies to secure access to new oil resources and thus reduce their dependency 
on the Middle East. On top of this, Norway’s proximity to major European markets 
and consumers made it geographically suitable for investment. Finally, its merchant 
marine was a strong domestic industry that increased Norway’s competitiveness 
among other oil producing countries. Norway has been and is still heavily engaged in 
tanker trade, transporting oil for the international oil companies.  
 
Figure 3.1 Norwegian Crude Oil production (1981-2001) 
 
Source: Norwegian Ministry of Energy 
 
While its potential resources in the North Sea, its geographic proximity to 
markets and strong domestic industries ensured the interest of foreign companies, the 
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harsh weather conditions, the difficulty of drilling in North Sea’s deep offshore 
waters and high government taxes dramatically increased the costs of oil development 
for them.71 Despite these commercial risks, however, investors continued to invest 
significant amounts in the country (see Figure 3.3.) I argue that this was due mostly to 
the ability of the Norwegian state to create a stable investment environment. 
 
 Figure 3.2 Net cash flow from petroleum operations (1977-2001) 
 
Source: Norwegian Ministry of Energy 
 
The Norwegian political setting was a totally new one for the major oil 
companies. In neither the Middle East nor North America, did they have to cope with 
governments that were actively concerned with resource policy and prone to 
                                                          
71 Water depths and weather conditions make development of offshore oil resources in the North Sea 
very difficult and risky. The Gulf of Mexico and Middle East are considered less risky places to 
produce oil. According to Energy Information Adminsitration’s Country Analysis in 2001, the cost of 
oil production is about $12-14 per barrel in Norway, while it is $3-4 in the Middle East.  
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intervene directly in industry.72 But with its strong state and social welfare traditions, 
Norway from the beginning of its oil industrialization was determined to use foreign 
oil companies to build national competence in oil and increase the welfare of its 
society. This meant significant state participation, regulation, and revenues from the 
oil sector as the state gained experience. It also meant modest rates of return for the 
oil companies. However, companies tolerated decreased short-term profits in return 
for long-term investment stability. In a period when major oil producers around the 
world were nationalizing their oil industries or imposing harsh terms on foreign 
investors, Norwegian demands made to the companies were relatively modest. While 
putting financial and operational burdens on the foreign companies to develop the 
national oil industry, the Norwegian state was able to provide enough incentives for 
them to continue investing.  
Domestic politics have played a crucial role in shaping the terms of this 
investment relationship. The government is central to the concession process, key 
decisions have to be approved by parliament and many domestic interest groups have 
a stake in oil development. Despite the multiplicity of actors in the policymaking 
process and their often-strong disagreements about certain issues, the investment 
environment has remained very stable, benefiting both domestic interests and foreign 
investors. The division of responsibilities among state institutions, regular 
consultations with the government and interest groups, and conflict resolution 
                                                          
72 In the U.S companies had experienced tough anti-trust regulation, but no direct government 
intervention. In the Third World, governments were generally weak and companies had privileged 
positions and were often exempted from national law.  
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mechanisms have given oil companies the means to influence policy and ensure the 
security and profitability of their projects. Throughout, the Norwegian decision-
makers were able to balance different domestic and foreign interests through 
negotiations and compromises. 
 
Figure 3.3 Investment Levels in Norwegian Oil Sector (1985-2001) 
 
Source: Norwegian Ministry of Energy 
 
Finally, the Norwegian investment regime has ensured that investors’ rights 
are not infringed. Despite major fluctuations in the international market for oil during 
the 1970s, and despite some subsequent changes in the economic terms of the 
investment relationship, the basic principles of engagement between the Norwegian 
government and the oil companies that were established in the late 1960s have 
remained intact throughout the three decades of oil development. Norwegian policy 
towards investors has been characterized by clarity, consistency, and continuity. The 
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stability of this investment environment has been an argument for oil companies to 
accept the terms offered them, even when they became less favorable. 
In the first part of this chapter, I discuss the historical evolution of the 
investment relationship between foreign investors and the Norwegian state. I examine 
alternative explanations for the stable investment environment and discuss their 
limitations. Then, I discuss how the highly competitive and institutionalized 
democratic regime has contributed to the stability that investors have so long enjoyed 
in Norway.  Finally, I emphasize the role foreign investments played in the 
consolidation of the democratic welfare state, as well as in the creation of an 
important player in international affairs.  
 
II. History of Relations Between Investors and the Government 
i. The initial phase: 1960s 
 In the mid-1960s, Norway enjoyed strong economic growth and full 
employment. It ranked seventh in gross domestic product per capita among the 
OECD countries. High living standards prevailed and poverty was virtually abolished. 
With no pressing need for oil revenues, the Norwegian government could initially 
afford not to give in to all the demands of foreign investors. In addition to this 
economic flexibility, a cautious policy towards the multinationals resulted from the 
traditional sensitivity of Norwegian society to the question of sovereignty. Having 
been dominated by Danes and Swedes for 400 years, Norwegians have always 
resisted exploitation by foreigners. Moreover, the experiences of hydropower 
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production in the beginning of the 20th century taught Norwegians important lessons 
about doing business with foreigners. Hence, from the outset of oil development it 
was crucial to set up a broad framework to regulate foreign company operations 
closely and provide a base for state control and capture of ground rents.  
 In 1964-65 a group of professionals, led by Jens Evensen73, formulated the 
first comprehensive regime for exploring and producing oil from the North Sea. A 
Royal Decree was passed and the first production licenses were awarded based on the 
concessionary model.74 In 1965 a Labor government granted 78 licenses to nine 
groups of foreign companies.75 These licenses provided an oil company or group of 
companies with exclusive rights to exploration, drilling and production within 
geographically defined areas. These concessions were much more restrictive than the 
“traditional concessions” at the beginning of the 20th century in terms of the limits 
they applied to geographical areas and the duration of permitted operations. 
Moreover, they were granted by an administrative procedure, in which the state used 
                                                          
73 Jens Evensen was the main architect behind the Norwegian offshore strategy. He was then the 
Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Chaired by Evensen and comprised of three 
scientists and two more civil servants, the committee deliberated for fifteen months to draft a set of 
regulations that were eventually promulgated by the Royal Decree of 1965. These civil servants 
worked very closely with the foreigners in coming up with this draft.  
74 The concessionary licensing regime was firmly rooted in the nation’s long tradition of regulating 
foreign investment in the hydropower production. Beginning in 1906, the Norwegian Parliament 
passed a series of laws that eventually created the Concession Act of 1917.  The national control was a 
sensitive issue and so the state introduced strict concession terms to control the activities of the foreign 
companies.  
75 In September 1965, the Labor government was defeated and a liberal-conservative coalition took 
over. Oil policy was basically left unchanged, as was the administration of oil. Only the criteria for 
license allocation were modified, with provisions of state participation being included. In 1969, the 
government granted 14 new licenses that provided for state participation in the form of ‘net profit 
sharing’ and ‘carried interest’. 
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its discretion to choose companies that met certain criteria.76 In this first licensing 
round in 1965 even though control of entry was strong, the Norwegian state had but 
limited control over operational matters. As such, it was not in a position to demand 
much from the companies. “The state had neither the expertise nor the capacity to 
follow up its ambitious goals beyond the entrance gate.”77 Without any prior 
experience and technological edge, the government initially had to rely on foreign oil 
companies and provide them with enough incentives to invest.78 As a well-known 
Norwegian analyst put it, this period down to the early 1970s was one of ‘wait-and-
see.’79 
 
ii. ‘Norwegianization of oil’: The 1970s 
 The discovery of a major field, the Ekofisk, in 1969 changed the dynamics of 
the relationship between the Norwegian state and the multinationals. When it was 
realized that the Norwegian part of the North Sea was an area with potential for huge 
resources, a strategy for ‘Norwegianization’ of oil industry was developed. This 
entailed gradual increases in national control, participation and revenues. The 
                                                          
76 In this discretionary method of allocating licensing, the applicants were not allowed to form license 
groups on their own. They were chosen by the authorities on the basis of specific criteria.  
77 Svein S. Andersen and Maja Arnestad, “The Taming of the Shrewd: Small State Meets Multinational 
Oil Companies” in Helge Ole Bergesen and Anne Kristin Sydnes, eds.,  Naïve Newcomer or Shrewd 
Salesman? Norway- A Major Oil and Gas Exporter (Fridtjof Nansen Institute, 1990),54. 
78 The competition with the British for companies willing to explore in the North Sea was another 
reason that led the Norwegians to offer easier terms to the investors.  
79 Svein S.Andersen, The Struggle over North Sea Oil and Gas (Scandinavian University Press, 
1993),61. 
    73
increased bargaining power of host governments around the world during the 1970s 
was used as pretext to impose new demands on the multinationals. 
 State participation in a Second Licensing Round between 1969-71 was the 
first indication of this change. Oil companies accepted a minor degree of state 
involvement, either as an agreed percentage of net profit, or as an option to participate 
directly if commercial discoveries were made.80 Another indication of change was 
three White Papers that the government presented to the Norwegian parliament 
(Storting) between 1968 and 1971. Based on these proposed principles of oil 
exploration and production, the Storting Committee on Industry in 1971 put forth the 
“Ten Oil Commandments,” which spelt out the ambitions of national control, 
developing a new Norwegian industry, paying heed to existing businesses and to the 
environment, and creating a state-owned oil company.81 During the 1970s it became 
very important to develop a broad Norwegian-based competence in offshore oil 
activities, and over the long run reduce the role of the foreign oil companies to that of 
consultants, developers and minority partners.82 
Pursuing these objectives, Norwegian government gradually began to assert 
managerial, operational, fiscal and ownership control over the industry. For the 
management of oil operations, as mentioned earlier, the government used 
administrative licensing rather than auctioning fields to the highest bidder. In this 
                                                          
80 Ole Berrefjord and Per Heum, “Political Governance of the Petroleum Industry- The Norwegian 
Case,” in Bergesen and Sydnes, eds.,  Naïve Newcomer or Shrewd Salesman? (Fridtjof Nansen 
Institute, 1990), 28-49. 
81 Ibid.,36. 
82 Government White Paper 25, 1973/74. 
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way, bureaucratic discretion took precedence over obtaining a maximum share of 
economic rent. The Ministry of Industry was able to encourage the exploration of less 
attractive areas by smaller companies and to insist that foreign companies use 
Norwegian goods and services as a condition for license approvals.83 The government 
also restricted leasing policies to speed up oil extraction. By dividing offshore areas 
into small blocks rather than large areas, the government speeded up exploration. In 
addition, in 1972, the government reduced concession periods for licenses to thirty-
six years from the traditional ninety years to encourage a timely development of 
resources.84 Finally, the government increased its managerial control through a 
depletion policy, which determined the rate at which oil resources were extracted. In 
1973, it imposed a yearly production ceiling of 90 million tones of oil. The goal was 
to have a moderate and conservative pace that reduced the relative influence of 
foreign oil companies over production policy. In this way, the Norwegian oil 
companies and offshore suppliers would have time to develop sufficient capacity to 
play a major role in oil development. As a result, between 1973-1979, only thirty-one 
blocks were licensed in contrast to ninety-two during the first seven years of 
licensing.  
As for regulatory control, a set of national safety regulations was passed with 
a Royal Decree on August 27, 1967. Established within a year of the commencement 
                                                          
83 Merrie Gilbert Klapp, The Sovereign Entrepreneur: Oil Policies in Advanced and Less Developed 
Capitalist Countries (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 77. 
84 In Kuwait the original 1934 concession to the Kuwait Oil Company was granted for 92 years. The 
D’Arcy concession in Iran was originally granted for 60 years.  
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of the first drilling activities, this decree addressed safety issues related to seismic 
explorations, drilling and the use of floating rings. In addition to the decree, the 
Petroleum Directorate was set up to be responsible for enforcing safety and 
environmental precautions. In developing the 1967 regulations, Norwegian authorities 
did not blindly submit themselves to the demands put forth by the oil companies. The 
Oil Advisory Board stated that while the oil companies possessed expertise on the 
exploration and production side of the drilling industry, the Norwegian authorities 
themselves were experts on maritime activities. And as a result, the Norwegian 
Directorate of Shipping and Navigation came to exert a dominant influence on the 
regulations that were to be developed even though many of the proposed regulations 
encroached upon the normal working practices and procedures of the oil companies.85 
In terms of revenue control, the government was able to carve out a significant 
share of public oil revenues through taxation. In the beginning, due to the 
uncertainties about its actual oil reserves, the government hesitated to tax companies 
too heavily and thus discourage them from investing. Between 1965 and 1972 the 
government collected a public revenue share composed of royalties, area fees and 
taxes on the posted prices that OPEC had established above market prices to assure 
minimum revenues for producer governments. The initial taxation rate in 1965 was 
10% for oil and was changed to a sliding scale of 8-16% by 1972.  
                                                          
85 Helge Ryggvik, “Offshore Safety Regulations in Norway: From Model to System in Erosion,” New 
Solutions 10:1-2 (2000): 67-116. 
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After 1973, however, the government became more concerned about getting 
its fair share of profits as a result of OPEC price increases. In 1974 and 1975, the 
government reached agreement with the companies. The companies would be now 
taxed at a substantially higher rate of 70%. In 1975, the government also created a 
new excess profits tax of 25%-the Special Tax- on residual profits after income taxes 
and royalties.86 
At the same time that it was increasing its tax revenues, the Norwegian state 
was getting less and less satisfied with having revenue control only through taxation 
policies. Revenues from royalties and taxes provided the government only with a 
20% share of total returns from oil production. To increase state revenues, 
government control was carried one stage further to ownership control. First, the 
government took a 51% controlling interests in a domestic oil company, Norsk 
Hydro. In 1969-70 the government also introduced state profit-sharing participation 
in leases to foreign oil companies. The participation percentage was based on the net 
profits of foreign oil companies. For instance, state participation increased from 5% 
in the Frigg field in 1969 to 40% in the Heimdal field in 1971.87 
Norwegian state’s involvement in the oil industry reached its peak with the 
creation of a 100 percent state oil company, Statoil, in 1972.88 This direct income 
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from the oil operations supplemented the fees, royalties and taxes that the government 
received from foreign oil companies. In addition to giving more economic power, this 
arrangement provided the government with enough political power to guide and 
control oil activities according to state principles and interests. The Ministry of 
Industry comprised its general assembly. The creation of Statoil was the 
government’s first entrepreneurial policy.  
These organizational arrangements that were established in 1970s, reflected a 
strong political wish to Norwegianize the petroleum industry. The concession rules 
were changed by the parliament to give Statoil a minimum of 50% share in all 
licenses. “In all the licenses after 1973 (the Statfjord field) Norwegian ownership 
interests have been more than 60% on the average, compared to some 10% in the pre-
1973 period. In addition to Statoil, the two other Norwegian oil companies, Norsk 
Hydro (51% state-owned) and Saga (100% privately owned), were also given 
operatorships of highly promising licenses. Since 1973 Norwegian oil companies 
have served as the operator for more than 60% of the licenses that have been 
awarded, compared to none before.”89 
To develop Statoil as a fully functioning oil company, the State required that 
the foreign companies bear all the exploration expenses in the licenses. The foreign 
oil companies agreed to a sliding scale scheme, in which Statoil’s shares could be  
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increased up to 75% if major discoveries were made.  Furthermore, the state wanted 
oil companies to contribute to the development of Norwegian industry through the 
industrial and technology agreements and to give preference to Norwegian suppliers 
of goods and services if these were competitive.  To monitor compliance, the ministry 
established a system of reporting that opened the bidding process to government 
scrutiny. These measures broke traditional supply patterns of the foreign companies 
and raised the Norwegian share of offshore business from 28% in 1975 to 62% in 
1978.90 
The beginning of the 1980s was ‘harvest time’ for the Norwegian 
government.91 Increased national competence further reduced dependency on 
multinational corporations. Statoil had developed into a vertically integrated oil 
company and almost achieved the capabilities of a multinational oil corporation. 
However, during this period, the Norwegian economy became increasingly dependent 
on oil revenues. The Norwegian government also became heavily indebted due to 
investment requirements and inflationary effects of oil.92 To compensate for 
economic difficulties, the government offered 70 offshore blocks for development 
between 1980-85 as opposed to the 31 that were offered during the period 1973-79.93 
This increase in production coincided with the price hikes in 1978-79, bringing 
                                                          
90 Brent F.Nelsen, The State Offshore: Petroleum, Politics, and State Intervention on the British and 
Norwegian Continental Shelves (Praeger, 1991), 71. 
91 Andersen, The Struggle over North Sea Oil and Gas, 149. 
92 Since 1973, many of the Norwegian industries became less competitive because of oil-induced 
inflation and currency appreciation. Companies were near bankruptcy and industries were in decline in 
shipbuilding, fishing, farming and textiles. Committed to full employment, the government heavily 
subsidized these industrial sectors-to a total of $14 billion between 1973 and 1980.  
93 Andersen, The Struggle over North Sea Oil and Gas,144. 
    79
government revenues from NOK 18 569 billion to NOK 46 694 billion (see Figure 
3.2.) The increase in the special tax from 25% to 30% in 1980 further increased 
government revenues, bringing the oil sector’s share of GNP from 9.4% in 1979 to 
19.1% in 1984.  
 
iii. The late 1980s 
By the mid 1980s internationally, the relative power of host-governments vis-
à-vis multinationals changed once again. Oil prices started to drop, and they collapsed 
in 1986. OPEC was losing its grip on the international oil market. Demand for oil had 
been subsiding because high prices in the previous decade had stimulated production 
in non-OPEC countries. This advantaged consumer countries but for producing 
countries with high costs it spelled trouble.  
Norway as a high cost producer was no exception. The Norwegian economy 
had by this time deteriorated significantly. Because of the great importance of the oil 
sector as a source of government revenue and as a stimulus for the national economy, 
Norway was among the first to be hit by the oil price collapse. There was a dramatic 
fall in government revenues from oil and gas production. Economic growth fell two 
percent from 1986 to 1987. In the following years, Norway was hit by the strongest 
recession since the 1930s. GNP decreased while unemployment increased form 2 to 
4.5%. The balance of trade went from record surpluses during the first half of the 
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1980s to record deficits.94  The oil and gas share of Norwegian exports dropped from 
38% to 29%.  
 Due to these economic hardships, the Norwegian government recognized the 
need to have multinationals bear a large share of the financial risk, contribute to lower 
production costs through technological innovations, and help secure market outlets. 
Some foreign companies had close links to decision-makers in gas importing 
countries and therefore were important for negotiating large-scale gas contracts.95 To 
reduce the financial costs for companies, a new tax regime was proposed in 1986 by 
the Labor government. Under this regime, foreign companies no longer had to bear 
the government’s and Statoil’s shares of exploration costs. Moreover, a ban on year-
round drilling in the far north, originally imposed for environmental reasons, was 
lifted. These measures were aimed at encouraging exploration, especially in the risky 
northern area. In 1990-1991, there was another tax reform based not on changes in the 
oil sector but on improving the general investment climate. The ordinary tax rate was 
reduced from 50.8% to 28.0% and the royalties for oil and gas production were 
eliminated after 1996. 
 Even though multinationals’ revenue shares and operational controls in 
licenses often changed- sometimes for the worse- during the 1970s and 1980s, they 
were still willing to invest. This was mostly because compared to other oil producing 
countries in this period the politically determined costs imposed by the Norwegian 
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government on companies remained relatively modest. The government almost 
always ensured that the investors had enough after-tax profits to make it worthwhile 
for them to continue. Fluctuations in government demands were in line with the 
fluctuations in oil prices. For instance, the government increased taxes only when the 
oil prices increased, and it reduced taxes when the prices went down. This regular 
adjustment to the market ensured a decent return for investors.  The government was 
also able to maintain a balance among different societal interests to ensure that no 
radical decision would be taken to threaten the profitability and security of investors’ 
projects. 
 Moreover, stable legal, administrative and regulatory rules gave investors 
incentives to stay. The terms of licensing that were formulated in 1964-65 were 
intact, and they provided a clear set of rules for investors. In addition, a clear division 
of responsibility between the institutions of the state presented investors with equally 
clear negotiation and influence channels. Finally, all government policies regarding 
oil production rates, taxation and state involvement in the oil sector were consistent 
with the Ten Oil Commandments introduced in 1971. Hence, investors operated in a 
very predictable administrative and regulatory environment. Overall, this stability and 
predictability attracted much FDI in the oil sector.  
 
III. Sources of Stability in the Investment Environment 
To explain why there has been so much stability in the Norwegian investment 
environment, many analysts have emphasized culture. They have argued that 
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Norwegian culture in particular and Scandinavian culture in general promotes 
egalitarianism, consensus building, and harmony within society. Norway is depicted 
as being especially fortunate for not having inherited an aristocracy. The political 
mobilization of the peasantry in the nineteenth century, as well as the socialist 
workers’ movement in the twentieth century, is seen as a factor contributing to the 
egalitarian values and goals of the Norwegian society. Following Eckstein (1966,) 
Norway is considered a ‘community system’ where social divisions are largely 
neutralized by ‘overarching sentiments of solidarity.’96  
Others find the sources of policy stability in Norway in strong elite unity and 
consensus. Scholars have identified three main elite settlements that have contributed 
to political and economic stability in Norway since the end of the 19th century.  The 
adoption of parliamentarism in 1884 as a strategic move to distance Norway from the 
colonial governance of Sweden is regarded as the first of these settlements. 
Subsequent settlements in 1905 and 1945 united Norwegian elites against the 
occupation of Sweden and Germany, respectively, by joining forces to work for 
national reconstruction. “All of these three events in Norwegian history have 
decisively contributed to the creation of a basic consensus among the elites about the 
main features and norms of the Norwegian political system and about the necessity of 
refraining from too strong political partnerships.”97  It can be argued in general that 
                                                          
96 See Neil Elder, Alastair H. Thomas and David Arter, The Consensual Democracies? The 
Government and Politics of the Scandinavian States (Basil Blackwell, 1988), 9. 
97 John Higley, G. Lowell Field, and Knut Groholt, Elite Structure and Ideology: A Theory With 
Applications to Norway (Columbia University Press, 1976). Engelstad Fredrik, Trygve Gulbrandsen 
and Oyvind Osterud, “Elite compromises in a stable democracy: the case of Norway,” paper presented 
    83
this consensus among political elites facilitated the resolution of major conflicts over 
policies and prevented unpredictable fluctuations in policy environment, reducing 
political risks for investors.  
Finally, there are those who argue that the country’s geographic location and 
its historical openness to international markets helped create a market-oriented culture 
in Norway even before the multinational oil companies arrived. For instance, Peter 
Katzenstein argues that states in small West European and Scandinavian countries 
have historically been dependent on the international economy to survive, and 
therefore they have never been hostile to doing business with the outside world.98 
Being such a small country, Norway has of necessity been heavily involved in foreign 
trade and exposed to international competitiveness. For instance, some 40% of the 
total output of its goods and services was exported in 1970 and imports exceeded 
exports by 52%.99 In 1990 the value of all Norwegian exports in commodities and 
services was as much as 44 % of GNP.100 Moreover, experience with the foreigners at 
the beginning of the century in developing hydroelectric power and aluminum 
industry, in addition to the important maritime sector, gave Norwegians an 
understanding of the market economy.101 All these factors are seen as contributing to 
the positive attitude of the Norwegians towards foreign investment in oil and lack of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
in the 1999 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta (September 1-5, 
1999),3. 
98 Peter J.Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1985). 
99 Walter Galenson, A Welfare State Strikes Back (University Press of America, 1986). 
100 Knut Heidar, Norway: Elites on Trial (Westview Press, 2001),97. 
101 Author’s interview with Daniel Heradstveit (a professor of international relations in the Norwegian 
Institute of International Affairs) in Oslo, Jan. 17, 2001.  
    84
politicization of these issues in the later part of the century. Being historically 
exposed to foreign influence, many have concluded that Norway posed little risk in 
terms expropriating or nationalizing foreign operations. 
As convincing as these arguments sound, they are not sufficient to explain the 
sources of stability in the Norwegian investment environment. They all assume 
consensus over investment policies based on culture, geography and elite 
configuration, though in fact there was never really a consensus regarding oil politics 
in Norway. These explanations take for granted the conflict and struggle among 
different interest groups over oil policy. Only in the early years of oil development, 
however, there was little politicization of oil issues due mostly to the fact that the 
Norwegian society was very skeptical and uncertain about the actual levels of oil 
resources it had. By early 1970s, however, with the discovery of the Ekofisk field, oil 
investment policy became an integral and contested part of Norwegian politics.102 
While some groups that historically benefited from economic openness were in favor 
of foreign investment, others displayed considerable mistrust and suspicion towards 
foreigners, especially because of being exposed to foreign domination for so many 
years. Such groups believed that industrial growth should be owned and managed by 
Norwegians consistent with cultural values. The influx of foreign oil companies 
caused various groups to worry that their socialist, environmental, and conservationist 
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values might not survive.103 The role of the state oil company, the rate of oil 
production and oil taxation were the principal issues over which fierce political 
struggles unfolded between different interests. 
An analysis of the interests and preferences of those groups who benefit and 
lose from foreign investments is necessary but not sufficient to understand the 
stability of the investment environment. The institutional structure within which these 
groups interact is also essential in understanding investment policy outcomes. I now 
turn to a discussion of the political regime in Norway and its ability to create a stable 
policy environment.  
 
IV. Political Regime and Stability 
Norway is clearly a consolidated democracy. There is a high degree of 
institutionalized political competition. First, there are many groups with veto power 
over the executive branch. Pluralism in the state coexists with strong mediating 
institutions. Conflict among veto players is institutionalized and regulated in Norway 
by strong political parties, interest group organizations, and a professional 
bureaucracy.  These institutions aggregate different interests, build policy coalitions 
and pressure the government to be accountable and responsive to different demands. 
Decision-makers are able to defuse potentially divisive political issues by co-opting 
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veto players into government policies through negotiations and compromises. The 
resulting balance of forces moderates political divisions and promotes consensus and 
stability.104 As such, Norway’s institutional setting reduces the potential political risks 
that foreign companies might otherwise face in their investments. 
The Norwegian parliament, the Storting, is an important veto player in the 
state.105 It is called a ‘working’ parliament because it does not only say yes or no to 
government proposals but it also gives the opposition a chance to criticize and present 
alternative policies. The Storting’s committees and party groups actively participate 
in reworking government proposals to meet objections of the parliamentary majority. 
Between 1945 and 1970 the Labor Party’s majority government ruled in the face of 
an opposition divided among four small parties. Since the 1970s successive minority 
and coalition governments have enabled Storting veto power to have greater control 
over oil policies.  
 In addition to the Storting’s veto power, the regional and local governments 
have been able to constrain central government policies. Norway is a unitary state but 
local government -consisting of municipal and county levels- has a long and strong 
tradition of participating in policymaking. Opposition to the center, or as some people 
call the Oslo elites, has been crucial in shaping policies. Municipalities are led by 
elected councils and headed by boards composed in proportion to the local parties’ 
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electoral strength. There are also county councils that are popularly elected but do not 
enjoy the same grassroots support and interest as the municipal councils. Known as 
‘local democracy’, or ‘community democracy’, this aspect of Norway’s political 
structure contributes to political competition. Moreover, the number of 
representatives of peripheral districts in the Storting is disproportionately great. 
Because constituency size is not adjusted, the ‘one vote, one weight’ principle is 
violated and this gives peripheral interests heigtened weight in decision-making.106  
Such high extent of pluralism in the state often produced significant 
constraints on the decision-makers in Norway. For instance, since the 1970s the fight 
for new jobs in the periphery strongly affected decisions on the location of new 
supply bases for the oil industry and the depletion policy. The government has also 
been on many occasions pressured by the parliament to change its tax and regulatory 
policies regarding oil activities.    
 This political competition in the state, however, is institutionalized through 
strong political parties, interest groups and a bureaucracy. Political parties are the 
traditional instruments of mobilization and participation in Norwegian politics. They 
offer the voters political alternatives at elections, recruit state’s political personnel 
and control the commanding heights of executive power.107 Individual politicians 
either rise through the parties or with the help of parties and they depend almost 
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entirely on their party for future political careers. Politics in Norway is by and large 
party politics.108  
Even though most parties are political coalitions in the sense that they 
encompass more than one cleavage, the left-right cleavage has always been the most 
important in defining the Norwegian political battleground. In broad terms, the Labor 
and the Socialist Left parties have been on the left; the Center, the Christian, and 
Liberal Parties have been in the middle; and the Conservative and Progress parties 
have been on the right. From 1945 to 1968, Labor was the dominant party, defining 
the broad contours of state policies, including oil policy. Since 1968, however, there 
has been a two-bloc competition for power.  Although party membership has been in 
decline in recent years, political legitimacy within most parties has rested with the 
party organizations. Especially, since 1970s, there has been a rise of professionalism 
in party organizations. Public subsidies have provided parties with a financial basis to 
employ party members and party sympathizers with organizational and media 
qualifications.109  
Despite the importance of political parties, many believe that interest groups 
play a more crucial role in Norwegian democracy. Political scientist Stein Rokkan 
argued that crucial economic decisions were seldom taken by the parties or by 
parliament, but occurred instead over the bargaining table where public authorities 
met directly with trade union leaders, farmers, fishermen, and the Employer’s 
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Association.110 Considering the degree of interest group activity in Norway, this 
claim may not be that far from the truth. In Norway, during “the early 1990s, roughly 
2,400 national organizations claimed 17 million members (in a country of 4 million 
inhabitants.) More than half of the population is a member of at least one national 
organization, and about half of these organizations operate within the field of 
industry.”111 Moreover, such organizations operate at the regional and local levels. 
“According to surveys in 1975, about half the voters had at least once taken part in a 
political action group. Later studies show that the proportion having signed at least 
one political action petition was 56% in 1981 and 61% in 1990.”112 
Political participation by interest groups in Norway has been conducted 
through what many have called societal corporatism (or corporate pluralism).113 
Under this configuration, interest organizations within a free, pluralist private sector 
bargain with public authorities and with each other in order to influence public 
policies. The public authorities in return consider private organizations both useful 
and legitimate partners and feel accountable to them. To accommodate these interest 
groups, decision makers use institutional devices such as co-optation to advisory 
committees or study commissions or they consult extensively when preparing 
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legislation (the ‘remiss’ system.)114 In this corporatist structure, a centralized and 
concentrated core of interest groups and informal, voluntary bargaining partners have 
forged consensus among interest groups, the state bureaucracy and political parties.  
Finally, the Norwegian bureaucracy serves important integrative functions 
between different branches of government, as well as between societal interests and 
the state. In many scholarly accounts the bureaucracy in Norway has been given 
credit for being extremely professional, autonomous and efficient, thereby 
contributing to stability. As in the Weberian ideal bureaucracy, recruitment has been 
based solely on merit and civil servants have been the best-educated elite group in 
society.115 Moreover, bureaucrats have been insulated from group pressures and, thus, 
corruption. They were able to pursue state goals independently and with utmost 
efficiency. The behavior of civil servants in Norway was predictably cautious and 
incrementalist and is based on expertise and strong organizational routines.116 
 Bureaucratic competence in oil has been achieved as a result of the vertical 
differentiation and specialized organization of the oil administration, and clear 
delineation of rights and responsibilities among bureaucratic agencies (Noreng 1980; 
Andersen 1993). The Ministry of Oil and Energy has been exclusively devoted to 
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policy functions, with control functions being delegated to the Petroleum Directorate. 
“The reason for delegating functions of control in Norway was to ensure that a rather 
independent body could exercise control and collect relevant information relatively 
independently from the Ministry, and thus be relatively immune to political 
pressures.”117   
While these agencies constitute the primary government structure pertaining 
to oil, other agencies comprise a secondary structure. The Finance Ministry, the 
Central Tax Board, Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Social Affairs, and Ministry 
of Communal Affairs are all secondary structures in the vertical administration of oil. 
Finally, the tertiary structure of government consists of permanent or ad hoc public 
bodies and committees with advisory or consultative functions, such as the Special 
Committees on Petroleum Taxation, The Petroleum Council etc. This basic 
institutional arrangement, established in the 1970s, has remained intact throughout the 
period of oil development in Norway. No major changes have been made in the 
principles, rights, and obligations distributed among public authorities and 
companies.  
In addition to bureaucracy’s vertical organization, close relations between 
bureaucrats and business contribute to a stable environment. The process of 
continuous consultation and debate over oil issues has provided a regular flow of 
information between bureaucrats and business groups and created coherence on 
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policy issues. For instance, when civil servants led by Jens Evensen were formulating 
the concessionary regime in 1965, they worked very closely with foreigners to create 
a system that was attractive to them. Even though oil policy became more contested 
in the 1970s and there were many nationalist slogans, the bureaucracy continued its 
regular consultations with foreign companies.118  
Another example of close links between bureaucracy and business is the 
composition and mobility of the staff serving in various state bureaucracies and 
companies. Some studies show that almost 60% of the staff in the Ministry of Energy 
moved into jobs in the private sector, more than half of those into the oil industry in 
1984.119 The same situation also applied to the Petroleum Directorate. More than 80%  
of those who left the Directorate in the 1980s found employment with companies in 
the petroleum sector. This movement from the public sector to oil companies implies 
that the state bureaucracy has worked as trainers and suppliers of qualified personnel 
for the industry. This transfer of bureaucratic values to the oil industrial complex 
created a mutual understanding, a ‘cognitive coalition’ that made for smooth 
functioning of the industry.120  High bureaucratic capacity has been complemented by 
Norway’s open and participatory democracy. The existence of non-oil based vested 
interests who were able to present their concerns in a democratic context  “prevented 
Weber’s dictatorship of the bureaucrats.”121 
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Now I turn to a discussion of the political competition over three oil policy 
arenas: the role of the state oil company; the rate of oil production; and oil taxation. 
All three issues were important for foreign investors since they determined the extent 
of their operational involvement and the profits they could reap. These cases are also 
illustrative of the way conflicts between different veto players have been contained 
and resolved in Norway’s democratic setting. 
 
V. Political Competition Over Oil Policy 
 Historically, there has been a tradition of strong state involvement and 
regulation in the Norwegian economy. Industrialization in Norway was late, getting 
seriously underway only between 1890-1910. At that time, Norway was one of the 
poorest countries in Western Europe with a weak capitalist class. Hence, an active 
government role was deemed necessary to speed industrialization. Moreover, with 
only one short intermission between 1968-1972, Labor Party coalitions governed 
Norway from 1945 to 1981, when they were unseated by a coalition led by the 
Conservatives. The Labor Party governing goals of full employment and economic 
growth without sharp price rises or balance of payments problems could be achieved 
only with public sector involvement in investment, consumption and trade.  
 Despite this record of heavy state involvement in the economy, over time the 
role of the state in the oil industry, as well as some of the government policies that 
facilitated this role, became increasingly disputed. Since 1973, the 50% share 
requirement for Statoil meant that Statoil was in a position to determine what should 
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be done with a large number of licenses on the Norwegian shelf. It could by itself 
veto any major proposal in every license. Moreover, other companies, especially the 
foreign companies, were obligated to finance Statoil’s share of exploration and 
production. The increase in Statoil’s power was attributed to the political ambitions of 
the Labor Party and Labor governments. Statoil was always considered the “Labor 
Party’s baby.” The government used it to assert national and public control of 
domestic oil production, but it also used it to serve its partisan interests in keeping 
Conservative Party oil interests at bay politically.122 
With the increase in oil prices during the 1970s, opposition parties became  
increasingly concerned that Statoil was becoming too powerful economically with its 
ability to dispose of huge cash flows.123 Especially the conservatives were worried 
that “instead of having Statoil as an instrument in national petroleum policy, 
politicians could become the instruments of oil in enforcing the company’s business 
interests.”124 As a result, a split between the Labor government and Statoil emerged, 
on the one hand, and the Conservative party opposition and the Petroleum 
Directorate, on the other. The ministry of Petroleum and Energy was caught in 
between.125  
 Private domestic and foreign business groups were equally suspicious of 
Statoil’s role in the oil industry. Foreign companies did not want to lose their relative 
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shares to the state. Similarly, various domestic business groups were unwilling to give 
up oil-related contracts or industrial opportunities so that the public sector could make 
gains in oil. Alarmed by the growing role of Statoil in the 1970s, many Norwegian 
industrialists, especially in the shipping industry, aggressively sought to gain larger 
share of oil profits. Being one of the most important and profitable earners of foreign 
exchange in the country, the shipping companies were in an advantageous position. 
Shortages on the world tanker market brought major tanker profits in 1970 and 1971 
and provided Norwegian ship owners with capital to challenge government policies. 
Fifty shipping companies and forty companies from other industries pooled their 
capital to form their own oil company, Saga Petroleum, in 1972.126 Meanwhile, 
Norway’s corporate giant, Norsk Hydro, also began to oppose the role of Statoil by 
organizing an independent advisory organization known as the Oslo Group to offer 
the government advice on petroleum policy.127 Comprised of business leaders and 
politicians from a variety of parties, including Labor, the Oslo group articulated 
militant criticism at Statoil.128 
In addition to Statoil’s proposals to invest in shipping, its advantageous 
position of controlling at least 50% of all the fields, in comparison to Saga’s 8%, 
caused these industrialists to join ranks with foreign companies and mobilize in the 
Storting against government policies. Using their influence with the Conservative and 
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Liberal parties, ship owners created an impasse for Statoil. Because the Storting 
controlled the company’s budget, the coalition among these parties in 1976 cut 
Statoil’s request for share capital to finance its Statjford development by 14%. The 
government was also forced to concede control of domestic subcontracting 
operations, such as supply boats and drilling rigs related to oil production, to private 
shipping interests. Moreover, it had to promise Norwegian ship owners that state 
companies would not invest in shipping-related operations.129 Institutionalized 
powers in the Storting were thus able to constrain government policy regarding 
Statoil and force compromises.  
In 1984 the government made another compromise by creating the State’s 
Direct Financial Interest (SDFI) so that the state could be directly involved financially 
in oil projects at the expense of Statoil. The financial base of Statoil was reduced and 
its share of licenses was weakened by changing voting rules.130 A clearer distinction 
was made between Statoil and the state. With the state directly financing oil activities, 
the government exempted the other two Norwegian-owned oil companies from the 
obligation to finance Statoil’s exploration expenses. And this obligation was 
abolished for foreign investors in 1986. The conflict over the proper role of Statoil 
and its impact on the activities of other business groups, including foreign ones, was 
resolved through compromises among the government, the major parties in the 
Storting, and business groups. Those who supported a strong role for the government 
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reduced the power of Statoil and gave concessions to domestic and business groups as 
well as to other political groups concerned with too much state regulation. In 
exchange for these compromises, they created the SDFI, which ensured that the state 
would still be the major investor in oil production. Overall, high degrees of interest 
representation and mechanisms of accountability in Norway produced these 
compromises among different veto groups and protected the interests of foreign 
companies against Statoil.   
The democratic regime also created an institutional setting in which foreign 
companies and domestic interest groups together challenged government policies and 
pressured it to protect their interests. In addition to allying themselves with foreign 
companies to reduce the role of Statoil in the oil industry, industrialists such as ship 
owners, who depended on open access to foreign markets, also supported foreign 
companies in their efforts to challenge the government’s offshore goods and services 
policy of Norweginization. Fearing foreign retaliation against them, the Norwegian 
Ship Owners’ Association charged that this policy fostered inefficiency in Norwegian 
industry and raised costs on the continental shelf far above those in other areas of the 
world. Against the Norwegian Engineering Industries and the Norwegian Iron and 
Metalworkers Union (which rejected free trade in offshore supplies,) the Ship 
Owners’ Association staunchly defended the rights of foreign companies.131  
Another major political debate surrounding oil issues occurred over depletion 
policy, which is the rate at which oil is to be extracted. This policy is crucial for 
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shaping the bargaining position of the host government in relation to foreign 
companies.132  After the Labor Party returned to power in 1973, it presented two 
White Papers to the parliament in 1974 regarding a new concession policy and need 
to control production volumes. The parliamentary report of Petroleum Industry in 
Norwegian Society recommended a restrictive approach to oil, emphasizing the need 
for a moderate rate of development and the need for public control over important 
aspects of the oil industry.133 A moderate rate of development was seen as a level of 
production of approximately 90 million tones of oil equivalents per year. The 
parliamentary debate in 1974 expressed concerns about inflationary pressures and 
structural change from too much oil revenue. The implication was that controlling 
production volume was essential for avoiding the economic and social consequences 
of the ‘Dutch Disease’ in Norway.134 Moreover, there were worries that necessary 
adjustments in sectoral and regional distribution of employment would threaten the 
Norwegian style of living.135 Even though this parliamentary report assigned a role 
for foreign oil companies, it recommended an increasing and progressive system of 
state participation in oil production.  
 This depletion policy was however opposed from several quarters. Interests 
that might have profited from a higher rate of production and a greater role for private 
enterprise felt cheated. This included private banks, private oil companies-both 
                                                          
132 A government opting for a high rate of production can be exposed to the demands and needs of 
foreign companies controlling the technology than a government opting for a low rate of production. 
133 The Norwegian Ministry of Finance, Parliamentary Report no.25 (1973-74). 
134 Andersen, 99. 
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domestic and foreign- and again the private ship owners who had invested heavily in 
drilling rigs. The Norwegian Ship Owners’ Association accused the government of 
unduly politicizing the oil issue by using the oil revenues to turn Norway towards 
socialism and undermining confidence in private industry.136  
 The government, however, was also subject to counter-pressure from a wide 
range of interests fearing a rapid pace of oil development. These interests included 
fishing, agriculture, many smaller enterprises, labor-intensive industries fearing a 
high cost pressure, and many wage earners fearing inflation and a more unequal 
distribution of income. Many of these groups thought that the level of production that 
was announced was too high. The Socialist Electoral Alliance, for instance, claimed a 
lower rate would be more environmentally responsible, would cause fewer 
disruptions in Norwegian society and would preserve the country’s sovereignty over 
its resources by not trying the country too closely with the West.137  
Another interest group that was adversely affected by oil production was the 
fishing industry. By 1970, 40% of Norwegian fish was coming from the North Sea, 
but about 50% of the Norwegian shelf south of the sixty-second parallel was in 
various stages of oil and gas exploration. Fishing suffered from operational 
interference; nets were damaged and navigation was impeded by oil activities.138 By  
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1975-76, southern fishermen had responded by organizing politically. To reduce the 
opposition of this domestic group to oil development projects by foreign and 
domestic companies, the government began granting compensation for gear damage 
through the Directories of Fisheries. The total amount granted by August 1977 was 
$1.67 million.139 The strength of these interest groups once again made the 
government responsive to their interests. To enlist the support of both sides in the 
depletion policy, the government co-opted them through compromises.  
The debate over depletion policy did not end there however. In 1971, the 
government had established the north of the sixty-second parallel as the northernmost 
limit for oil licensing because Norway, Britain and USSR at the time had disagreed 
on how to divide rights above that line. In mid 1970s, however, oilmen, backed by the 
Conservative party and a coalition of construction, shipbuilding industries, southern 
labor union groups and foreign companies pressed for northern licensing. The coastal 
counties Nordland, Troms and Finmark also stood to gain from the activity off their 
shores. They argued that more drilling would increase the rate of oil production and 
economic growth, provide jobs, and increase government revenues. Opposing these 
demands for oil production above this northern line, northern fishermen represented 
by the Ministry of Fisheries joined environmentalists and liberals lobbying in 
Parliament to prevent future northern oil operations. Also supported by the Agrarian, 
Christian and Socialist parties, this “Green Opposition” called attention to oil spills, 
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damage to the fishing industry, and changes in the economy and lifestyles in the 
region.  
Once again a compromise was reached. The “Northern fishing industry had 
pivotal political clout because fishing communities in the North controlled two seats 
critical to the Labor party’s parliamentary majority. These fishing interests threatened 
to shift the Socialist votes of northern fishermen if the Labor government, which was 
supported by the Socialists in the Parliament, allowed drilling north of the sixty-
second parallel.”140 The debate in the parliament in the early summer of 1974 showed 
that the government was ready to strike a balance between opposing groups. As a  
compromise, the government in 1977 required the oil companies to develop oil 
related support and service industries onshore. Moreover, it required that oil 
companies finance the cleanup of the seabed. In fact, Norway became the first North 
Sea country to introduce requirements for oil companies to avoid pollution and 
damage to marine life. In return, the labor organizations of two northern fishing 
counties, Troms and Finnmark, decided to support northern drilling but at a much 
slower rate.141   
One complicating factor for further oil development in the North was the 
blowout that occurred on the Bravo platform of the Ekofisk field. Despite its rather 
small proportions, the blowout had a direct effect on the depletion policy.142 Due to 
the criticism from environmentalists, the government both increased safety 
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regulations that the oil companies were exposed to and postponed the opening of new 
areas for exploratory drilling in the northern waters until the 1980s. The blowout, 
slower licensing and thus delays in the development of new areas combined to reduce 
the level of oil activity in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea. In the south the 
government ensured oil production by compensating fishermen, but in the north 
fishing and environmentalist interests ruled. Nonetheless, some drilling was under 
way in northern waters by early 1981. 
Taxation policy was another area where the democratic regime ensured 
compromises, and thus policy stability for foreign investors. This time, however, 
conflicts of interest were among different bureaucratic organizations and between the 
government and foreign companies.  The Ministry of Finance, as protector of 
government revenues, has always wanted higher taxes imposed on profitable fields to 
be able to pay for welfare services. The Ministry of Energy, ship owners and 
domestic oil companies, on the other hand, have regularly petitioned the authorities to 
use tax concessions to maintain activity on the continental shelf. The Industry 
Association for Oil Companies (NIFO) and Ship Owners Association have pressured 
the government on behalf of foreign oil companies. The support for their positions 
among societal interests was also bolstered by the direct links foreign companies had 
with government authorities. In many cases, they pressed for favorable decisions 
often in a manner indistinguishable from that of the domestic groups. Direct 
consultations and meetings with the government authorities provided foreign 
companies with means to influence policy. The government assured the companies 
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every opportunity to present information and opinions regarding taxation rates. The 
companies knew that as long as they had open, transparent channels to the decision-
makers, they could make their case.143 An example of this was witnessed during tax 
policy discussions in November 1974. A specially appointed Petroleum Revenues 
Committee presented a plan to the companies that served as the basis for discussions 
between the oil industry and the Ministry of Finance. The committee’s central 
proposal was an oil tax of 40% to be levied against oil profits. The companies 
strongly objected to parts of the proposal so the government rewrote the plan after 
extensive consultations with the companies.144 It finally established new excess 
profits tax-the special tax- at 25% in 1975.145 
Despite imposing one of the highest marginal rates of taxation on oil in the 
world, the Norwegian government has also given significant incentives to lessen the 
tax burden of foreign companies. The goal was to make it worthwhile for foreign 
companies to continue to explore.  First, companies were allowed to deduct most of 
their oil-related expenditures anywhere on the Norwegian shelf over a six-year 
period.146 Thus, companies could reduce or eliminate their tax bill on revenues 
generated from producing fields by investing in exploration or development work in 
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other parts of the Norwegian North Sea.147 Second, the rules governing the 
calculation of the Special Tax provided for a deduction called an ‘uplift.’ The uplift 
provision allowed companies to deduct ten percent of the purchase value of all 
installations and equipment taken into use over the preceding fifteen years, thus 
permitting companies to deduct a total of 150% of their capital expenditures from 
their Special Tax bills over a fifteen-year period. This introduced a progressive 
element into the system by exempting from Special Tax companies with high capital 
investment and low North Sea income.148  
Moreover, the government gave guarantees that levels of taxation would 
change only with the changes in the price of oil in world market.149 In other words, 
changes in the tax regime were not aggressive policies aimed at exorbitant 
government takes but defensive measures to keep the existing distribution of income 
stable.150 Furthermore, they were applied to domestic companies equally. The 
government also initiated a tax reform reducing the government-take considerably for 
fields where development had not yet been decided. As such the companies were over 
the long run guaranteed a decent return. What is more important, they were always 
reserved their place at the table to challenge and discuss state policies.  
Since the discovery of the Ekofisk field in 1969, oil policy in Norway became 
very politicized. Political parties, many interest groups, local authorities, and 
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government agencies got involved in one way or the other in the formulation and 
implementation of policies that affected the stability and attractiveness of the 
investment environment for foreign companies. Despite the high degree of political 
competition among many interested groups, the policy environment stayed stable and 
posed very little political risk for foreign investors.  
To sum up, the stability of the investment environment was made possible by 
the characteristics of the political regime. The institutionalized competition among 
interest groups provided incentives for political elites to build policy coalitions and 
reach consensus through compromises. The result was a balanced attitude towards 
foreign investment. The Parliamentary Report No. 25 in 1972 ensured the rights of 
democratically elected institutions to exercise full control over all aspects of oil 
policy. All the major policy changes were prepared in consultation with every 
important state institution and interest group that had a stake in oil policy. The system 
of regular parliamentary reports on the oil industry kept the general public well 
informed of the various issues.151  
This political competition among different groups in the society and the state 
also provided foreign companies with access to decision-making. By allying 
themselves with certain interest groups or political parties in society, foreign 
companies ensured that their interests were adequately represented in policy 
decisions. They were directly consulted by the government on a regular basis and 
their consent was required to make any major changes to the oil policy. The checks 
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and balances among the institutions of the state and the resulting rule of law ensured 
that their rights would not be compromised even when their economic interests were. 
 
VI. Political Effects of Foreign Capital 
 Norway was able to increase its oil production levels and thus its oil revenues 
with the help of substantial levels of foreign investment into the oil sector. Foreign 
companies have, not only brought expertise and technology to the Norwegian oil 
industry, but they have also shared the risks and challenges of oil development with 
the government during especially tumultuous times for international oil companies. I 
argue in this chapter that the democratic regime in Norway made it possible to create 
a stable investment environment that was attractive for foreign investors. Now I 
discuss how foreign investments, in return, have contributed to the political regime.  
 Oil revenues were instrumental in consolidating the democratic welfare state 
in Norway. To the extent that disagreements and conflicts arose over oil issues, the 
great disproportion of revenues to people made it quite easy for the governing elites 
to ‘pay off’ any group that was aggravated. In other words, foreign capital made it 
possible for elites to ‘buy’ political peace or at least acquiescence. In this respect, 
foreign capital indirectly greased an already smoothly functioning political system. It 
reduced the intensity of conflict over oil issues and provided the government with 
enough resources to make compromises to reach policy outcomes that were 
acceptable to all.  
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Foreign investments and ensuing oil revenues also entrenched the ‘welfare 
state’ in Norway. The influx of these resources permitted Norway to expand an 
already extensive social welfare programs. On U.N.’s human development index that 
measures broad well being, Norway ranked number one in 2000.152 U.N. considers 
Norway the number one place to live.  Social security and welfare services represents 
close to 40% of total governmental expenditures in 2001, a slight increase since 1991 
(see Figure 3.4). In terms of government spending on health services and education, 
Norway also ranks very high among advanced industrialized countries. 
Unemployment level of 4% is very low when compared to the levels in other Western 
European countries.153 
Finally, foreign capital has allowed Norway to become a significant player in 
the international arena. Norway is one of the few countries that donate millions more 
in foreign aid than the U.N. target of 0.7% of a nation’s GDP.154 Norwegians are 
committed to their role in international peace, environmental, cultural and economic 
affairs because it elevates an otherwise powerless country into the rank of global 
players. Nearly 1% of GDP is spent each year on foreign economic assistance. One 
third of Norwegian aid is routed via the UN system, which Norway considers an 
essential partner in the struggle for peace, human rights and democracy. Poverty 
alleviation, and equal rights for men and women are other key targets for aid, which 
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is directed to mainly the poorest nations around the world.  Oslo also plays a 
mediating role in foreign conflicts, from efforts to reconcile North and South Korean 
conflicts to the Middle East peace process. Only last year, Norway with its population 
of 4 million, accepted 10,000 asylum seekers- the equivalent in U.S. terms of close to 
three-quarters of a million asylum seekers. These highly altruistic foreign and 
domestic programs were all made possible by foreign investment and the ensuing oil 
revenues.  Foreign capital not only reinforced the democratic regime in Norway, but 
also turned it into an important player in international politics.  
 
Figure 3.4: Percentage of government expenditures (1991-2001) 
 
 
Source: Statistics Norway 2002. IMF Economic and Financial Data for Norway 
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VII. Conclusion 
 Despite its potential resources, Norway in the 1970s and 1980s was not an 
easy place to do business in. In addition to traditional strong state and strong societal 
interests, the 1970s posed many challenges for foreign investors. In line with the rise 
of their relative market and bargaining power, Norwegian governments increased 
taxation, imposed state participation, as well as, tougher regulations. These policy 
changes affected the economic attractiveness of the Norwegian investment 
environment. However, despite strict economic terms, investors continued to stay in  
Norway. First of all, the government ensured that companies would have enough 
profits and incentives even after high taxes and regulations. Second, the companies 
found stability in the policy environment and the basic principles of their investment 
relationship. As one oil company representative put it, “every company knows that it 
is going to be heavily taxed. What they are really concerned about is the predictability 
of the investment regime.”155  In Norway, that predictability and consistency was 
achieved when the Norwegian state announced in the “Ten Commandments” of 1971 
that defending the macroeconomic interests of the country was a top priority and that 
government take and participation would change depending on the price and supply 
of oil in the international markets. As a result, the oil companies were faced with a 
trade-off. They got long-term stability in return for some short-term economic costs.  
In this chapter, I discussed the sources of stability in the Norwegian 
investment environment. I argued that strong representation of interests in the 
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parliament and in the government through parties, interest groups and a competent 
bureaucracy, in addition to the competition among state institutions provided a policy 
environment that was stable and accommodating. Democratic institutions gave the 
governing elites incentives to negotiate between different interests and reach 
compromises as a result. High degrees of accountability ensured responsiveness to 
different interests and prevented any arbitrariness or overuse of executive power. 
Foreign investors could make use of this institutional environment by either allying 
themselves with certain domestic groups or behaving like one and pressuring the 
government directly. All throughout their presence in Norway, the investors were 
included in the political debate, had institutional means to influence policies and were 
supported in their interests by certain domestic groups. They were regarded as 
partners and given enough incentives to stay. The Norwegian political regime 
successfully balanced the need to serve the welfare of the society with the need for 
foreign capital to develop its oil resources. The consolidated democracy of Norway 
proved to be compatible with the expectations of the global economy.  
The success of the Norwegian state can be attributed not only to its ability to 
attract foreign investors and pursue oil projects as partners. It is also due to the ability 
of the state to resist the overwhelming impact of the oil bonanza that became a curse 
for many other oil producing countries. The Norwegian state, unlike states in other 
petroleum-rich countries, was able to resist the temptation to spend oil revenues on 
corruption and white elephant projects. The state warded off the insidious rentier 
behavior that accompanied booms elsewhere. Moreover, unlike other states, it 
    111
managed to sustain its domestic tax base and protect its non-oil fiscal capacity. 
Norway put much of its oil revenues into a petroleum fund to store wealth for the 
time when oil starts to run out. Highly institutionalized networks of organized 
interests and significant opportunities for public debate prevented the symptoms of 
Dutch Disease from turning into an oil curse. As Johen P. Olsen (1988) has rightly 
argued, Norway’s institutions managed to turn petroleum into “just another raw 
material.”156   
 In the following chapters, I analyze the investment environment in two other 
major oil producers, Azerbaijan and Russia. Despite stark differences in their culture, 
history, economic development, and even size, all three of these countries faced the 
similar challenges of creating a stable investment environment for foreign oil 
companies in order to attract the much-needed investment capital into their oil 
industries. However, their abilities to meet the demands of foreign investors have 
varied considerably. In this chapter with the Norwegian case, I have demonstrated 
how a consolidated democracy was able to overcome opposition and provide stability 
for the investors. In the next chapter, I discuss how stability can also be achieved in 
an authoritarian regime like Azerbaijan. It is striking to see how two countries with 
very little in common had similar successes in the global economy.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Azerbaijan: ‘One-Stop Shopping’ For Investors 
I. Introduction 
 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the former Soviet republics have been 
striving to become part of the global economy as new sovereign states. Among these 
states, Azerbaijan’s performance in terms of attracting foreign investment has been 
the most impressive. According to UNCTAD World Investment Report 2002, on the 
foreign direct investment (FDI) performance index, out of 140 countries Azerbaijan 
ranked third highest from 1994-96 and eighth highest from1998-2000. Since the 
“Contract of the Century”157 in September 1994, Azerbaijan signed oil contracts 
valued at $60 billion dollars with 33 companies from 15 countries around the world. 
According to some accounts, it has attracted the most foreign direct investment per 
head of any state in the former Soviet Union.158 It is seen by many as the Former 
Soviet Union’s ‘showcase’ for the art of doing business, the ‘frontier of global 
capitalism’ and a ‘united nations of oil’.159  
The commercial attractiveness of potential Caspian energy resources explains 
the initial interest of international oil companies in Azerbaijan. Some conservative  
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accounts appraise Caspian at 30 billion barrels (around 3% of the world’s oil supply) 
while the optimistic analyses of the U.S. Department of Energy and Caspian 
governments put the region as high as 200 billion barrels.160 According to the British 
Petroleum Statistical Review, Azerbaijan’s reserves are at least 7 billion barrels. 
While there are different accounts of Caspian Sea’s potential, there is no question that 
this is a major oil province in terms of international oil market dynamics.  There is 
considerable pressure from the oil companies to develop these energy resources 
relatively quickly considering that Iran, Iraq, and much of the Persian Gulf have 
remained closed to exploitation by western companies.161 Competition among oil 
companies has made the Caspian energy resources very attractive.  
Also geo-strategically the Caspian oil is very attractive for foreign 
governments, especially for the U.S. government. Extraction of oil from the Caspian 
is viewed as a potential counterbalance to excessive dependence on the Middle East. 
In the aftermath of the Cold war and now 9/11, the U.S. has seen the development of 
these resources as part of its national security objectives. In order to break the 
hegemony of Russia in the region, and isolate Iraq and Iran, the U.S. government in 
the last decade has encouraged U.S. based oil companies to invest in the region. And 
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more recently the war on terrorism has made foreign investment more of a strategic 
tool to win allies in the region.  
Even though home governments’ geostrategic objectives are important, oil 
companies do not necessarily base their investment decisions on them.162 Before 
companies make a decision to invest in a certain region, they consider and weigh 
many commercial risks involved in their projects. Even though the Caspian is a 
prospective oil province and companies need to secure a share of it to diversify their 
assets, there are many transportation and exploration risks facing oil projects in the 
region. First of all, the commercial attractiveness of the Caspian region is increasingly 
being questioned. There have been difficulties in locating new finds, making the 
initial optimistic assessments of the potential in this region far-fetched. Moreover, 
high production costs of oil in the region as compared to other oil provinces make 
investing in Azerbaijan less attractive commercially especially during low oil 
prices.163 In addition, the Azeri sector of the Caspian is landlocked and the proposed 
oil pipelines to carry the oil to western markets are ripe with geopolitical struggles 
among the countries of the region.164 Hence, building the ‘politically accepted’ 
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pipelines means additional costs for the companies. Finally, the disputed legal status 
of the Caspian is another difficulty that oil companies need to overcome to be able to 
continue their operations. The interesting question, then, is what other factors 
counterbalance these commercial risks and make the region still attractive for foreign 
companies?  
In this chapter, I argue that the stability of the investment environment in 
Azerbaijan has been an important factor in shaping investment decisions. The 
geostrategic interests of the foreign governments in addition to the commercial 
interests of the companies emphasize more the external actors’ incentives rather than 
the ability of the Azeri government in creating such an attractive investment 
environment. Not every country with commercially and geo-strategically attractive oil 
resources is able to attract significant amounts of foreign investment. Even though 
there are also many cultural and geostrategic explanations for why Azeri leaders have 
been willing to open their oil industry to foreign investment, I argue that the ability to 
realize this objective depends on the political regime. In this chapter, first I briefly 
discuss the history of oil development in Azerbaijan and the relations of the Azeri 
government with foreign investors. Then I present alternative explanations for the 
stability in Azerbaijan’s investment environment and discuss their shortcomings. 
After analyzing the relationship between Azerbaijan’s political regime and its oil 
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policy, I finally discuss the implications of foreign capital on state-building and 
political regime. 
 
II. History of Relations Between Investors and the Government 
 
 i. The Nineteenth Century 
 
The history of oil in Azerbaijan is long and rich. In the thirteenth century 
Marco Polo reported hearing of a substance, which came from the ground near Baku 
that was ‘good to burn’.165  By the early nineteenth century, a small oil industry had 
developed in Azerbaijan. In 1806 there were 50 oil wells, by the middle of 1860s, the 
number reached 218. The first oil well to be drilled in Azerbaijan took place in the 
Bibi-Heybat field in 1844, 11-12 years earlier than those drilled in the US. In 1873, 
Baku’s real oil rush began when the first gusher occurred on this field. This led to 
Baku’s first oil boom- “the boom that was to make it the world’s most productive oil 
province by the turn of the century.”166  
At the end of the nineteenth century, Baku became the center of attention for 
foreign investors. At this time a large refining industry also sprung up to turn crude 
oil into kerosene. Additionally, the completion of the Baku-Batumi railroad in 1883 
connected Baku to world oil markets. During the 1870s and 1880s the famous 
Rothschild family and Nobel brothers financed the oil industry in Baku. By 1883, the 
Nobel Brothers’ company owned half of Baku’s oil exports. At the same time, 
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Russian and Armenian companies started to play an important role in the Baku oil 
business. Baku provided the primary oil source for the Russian empire. In 1890, 
97.7% of Russian oil came from Baku.167 Azerbaijan was the first in the world in the 
total amount of oil produced from 1899 to 1901, extracting 100.9 million tons per 
year, which made up more than 50% of the world’s production. Oil production in the 
U.S. at that time amounted to only 9.1 million tons per year.168 
 Soon, however, oil production in Azerbaijan started to decline. Around the 
revolutionary year of 1905, strikes, ethnic conflict and general chaos in the Tsarist 
Russia engulfed Baku. Exports were cut off and local oil industry quickly lost its 
momentum. Between 1904 and 1913, the Absheron peninsula went from supplying 
31% of the world’s petroleum exports to less than 8%.169 However, there was still 
enough attraction to Azeri oil during this period, especially from the Germans during 
World War I. Germans came all the way up to Georgia in June 1918 but the war 
ended before they could reach Baku.  
 
ii. The Soviet Period 
 After a brief period of Azerbaijani independence (1918-1920,) the Soviet state 
took control over the Azeri lands in 1920. With communist take-over, the oil industry 
                                                          
167 Nasib Nassibli, “Azerbaijan: Oil and Politics in the Country’s Future,” in Michael Croissant and 
Bulent Aras, eds. Oil and Geopolitics in the Caspian Sea Region (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1999). 
168 Khoshbakht Yusifzade, “Oil and Gas Industry in Azerbaijan,” USACC Investment Guide to 
Azerbaijan (1999):63. 
169 Ibid.,50. 
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immediately became nationalized. Stalin abolished all joint ventures with foreign oil 
companies. Azeri oil, however, did not lose any of its significance. Seeing oil as 
crucial to fueling economic growth, the Soviet government increased the production 
levels to record high 23.4 million tons and built a new pipeline to export its oil to the 
West. During this period, Baku also became the center for production of oil 
equipment in the USSR. 170 
 The World War II made Baku once again a prize for the Germans as Hitler 
became preoccupied with gaining control over these fields. Fearing a German victory 
in the Caucasus, the Soviet state ordered much of the region’s infrastructure to be 
dismantled and sent north and east to more secure Volga-Urals region, which 
geologists had identified as a promising oil province. They called this new oil region 
the “second Baku.’ Equipment, factories, skilled personnel and even the Baku-Batumi 
pipeline were moved to Tatarstan and Bashkiria, where they provided the basis for 
postwar oil boom.171 With the discovery of various other fields, such as the Western 
Siberia in mid 1960s, the percentage of the Azeri contribution to total Soviet oil 
production dropped from 71.6% of Soviet oil output in 1940 to 39.2%, 12%, 5.7%, 
and 2.4% in 1950,1960, 1970, and 1980 respectively. In terms of oil output, 
production declined from 21 million tons between the years 1964 and 1968 to 13 
                                                          
170 The first oil industry machine building works, now known as Sattarkhan Works, was founded in 
Azerbaijan in 1922. Between 1923-1925 they began construction of sub-surface pumps, rotary drilling 
rings, and blow out preventors. Large-scale production of rods began in 1925-26. For more details, see 
“The Oil and Gas Industry of Azerbaijan” Azerbaijan International (1999.) 
171 Yergin, 51. 
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million tons in subsequent years.172 Due to the impoverishment of the oil fields 
onshore, the Soviet government started to extract oil in the Azerbaijani sector of the 
Caspian Sea in the 1940s. Despite the decrease in oil production however, Azerbajan 
remained the center for production of oil industry machinery in the Soviet Union. 
Baku was also famous at this period for training petroleum engineers and in 
conducting petroleum research. The city in fact was called the “Oil Academy.”173 
 The relaxation of foreign economic relations during Gorbachev’s perestroika 
opened the doors of Baku oil to foreign investors once again. The initial attention of 
foreign companies was in the three untapped offshore deposits, Chirag, Azeri and 
Gunesli, located in the Caspian Sea bed off of Baku. In January 1991, the Azerbaijani 
republic issued a decree soliciting bids for the exploration of these three fields and in 
June 1991 a consortium was formed under the leadership of Amoco to develop 
them.174  
 
iii. Oil in a New State 
 With the independence of the Azeri republic from the collapsing Soviet Union 
in October 1991, a new era in Azeri oil began. The disintegration of the Soviet Union 
led to a breakdown of the all-union Soviet market, which had negative repercussions 
for the economy in Azerbaijan as well as in the other newly independent states. 
                                                          
172 Sinan Ogan, “Baku Petrolleri,” Yeni Forum 9 (1993):17. 
173 Nassibli,104. 
174 Ibid. 
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Disruption of trade links was in fact a principal reason for the very sharp fall in 
production, which was particularly intense in Azerbaijan. The economic slump 
resulted directly from the fact that this republic was strongly oriented towards the 
production of raw materials and thus heavily dependent on the other Soviet republics 
for other goods. Azerbaijan’s economic troubles were compounded by a war with 
Armenia, over the disputed territory of Nagorno Karabakh. As a result of this 
macroeconomic instability inherited from the Soviet state, oil came to dominate the 
economy and became the industry on which hopes for a richer future were pinned.  
Acknowledging the dismal situation the oil industry and the economy were in, 
the first democratically elected leader of Azerbaijan, Abulfez Elchibey, started to 
actively promote foreign investment in the oil industry. He believed that remittances 
from oil contracts in the form of direct investment, bonus payments, and oil sales 
presented the best hope for improving the industry and securing the much-needed 
capital for the economy at large. In May 1993, six agreements were signed creating 
joint ventures for the development of oil deposits. In the same month talks about the 
oil contracts and the possibility of having Elchibey sign them were planned in 
London. However, in June 1993, the expansionist circles in Russia, fearing 
Elchibey’s close relations with Turkey and the West, forced him from power before 
he could sign the contracts.  
 After the coup against Elchibey, Heidar Aliev became the president of 
Azerbaijan in 1993. At first, he halted all talks with foreign oil companies, stating that 
he wanted to ‘review’ the agreement. Soon however, he began meeting with 
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representatives of the companies assuring them that the deal would go through. After 
three months of negotiations with foreign companies, in September 1994 Aliev 
signed, what was called, the “contract of the century” with ten foreign companies. 
The contract entailed the development of three offshore fields of Chirag, Azeri, and 
Gunesli with $8 billion foreign investment over the course of 30 years. To coordinate 
the consortium’s joint operations, the Azerbaijan International Operation Company 
(AIOC) was created in early 1995.  
The trend of constituting new consortiums continued after this first contract.  
To date, Azerbaijan has signed 21 contracts with 33 companies from 15 countries. 
According to U.N 2002 Handbook of Statistics, between 1994 and 2001, a little more 
than $3 billion have been invested in the oil sector and the annual investments in 
Azerbaijani oil sector are expected to reach $8 billion to $10 billion by 2005.175 The 
PSAs that have been already signed are cumulatively valued at $60 billion.176 Fueled 
by these contracts, the country began a period of steady growth in the latter half of the 
decade. Oil production increased from 180 thousand barrels/day to 280 thousand 
barrels/day in 2000, while consumption declined (see Table 4.2.) Azerbaijan’s real 
GDP rose by almost 6% in 1997, 10% in 1998, 7% in 1999, and 11.4% in 2000. The 
oil industry currently accounts for 70-80% of total foreign investment, and 85% of 
                                                          
175 Stefan Wagstyl, Financial Times (Nov.22, 2000):11. Considering that Azerbaijan has a GDP of 
only $4 billion, this investment figure is substantial. As discussed in the first chapter, the ratio of FDI 
to Azerbaijan’s proven oil reserves is 0.43, meaning that for each barrel of its proven reserves, 
Azerbaijan received 43 cents of FDI.  
176 U.S. Department of Energy.  Azerbaijan Country Analysis Brief ( May 2001) Energy Information 
Administration  (www.eia.doe.gov).  
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Azerbaijan’s exports.177 Oil-related revenues make up nearly 50% of budget 
revenues.178  
 
iv. Aliev’s Investment Policy 
Before analyzing the alternative explanations for Azerbaijan’s success in 
attracting foreign investment, we first need to analyze the characteristics of its 
investment policy regarding oil industry in the last decade.  The 1992 Law on 
Protection of Foreign Investments establishes the basic principles of foreign 
investment in Azerbaijan and guarantees unconditional legal protection to foreign 
investors. The basic concept is that foreign investment may be made in any type of 
activity unless it is prohibited by Azeri law. The legislation provides that foreign 
investments will not be subject to nationalization by the Azeri government. 
Additionally, if subsequent legislation adopted in the Azeri republic adversely 
impacts investment conditions, the legislation effective as of the time of the 
investment will be applied throughout the term of the agreement. And finally, the law 
provides for specific recourse to the International Center for the Settlement of 
Investment disputes if it is seen as a more effective dispute forum for foreign 
investors than the Azeri courts.  
 
                                                          
177 Business Information Services for the Newly Independent States (BISNIS). Azerbaijan: 
Commercial Guide 2000, (www.bisnis.doc.gov/bisnis/country/azerbaijan) . 
178 According to BISNIS Country Commercial Guide 2000, with full development of the AIOC fields, 
oil production is projected to peak at between 1.5 and 2 million barrels per day between 2010-2020.  
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Table 4.1 Azeri Oil Production and Consumption, 1992-2000. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Despite this law and a number of other laws and regulations regarding foreign 
investments, Azerbaijan has created a different legal environment for investors in the 
oil industry in the hope of minimizing their risks and hence attracting more 
investment. As its investment regime regarding oil industry, the Azeri leaders chose 
the Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs,) principle mechanisms for attracting 
foreign investments especially in developing countries. These contracts outline the 
regulatory, financial, organizational, legal and compensatory relationship between 
investors and host governments. Under the PSAs, contractors are granted the sole and 
exclusive exploration, development and production rights within the contract areas. 
The PSA law and regulations, i.e. the PSA regime, provide that the state is bound by 
the contractual obligations to the investor and should be liable for breach of contract 
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(Blinn 1978, Smith and Dzienkowski 1989). Under a PSA, the scope of the state’s 
obligations and investors’ rights can be freely negotiated to the extent prohibited by 
law. This is characteristic of a civil relationship, where the parties act more or less as 
equals in a commercial context (Johnston 1994). In addition to leveling the legal 
playing field, the PSA also provides a stand-alone tax regime, in which the investor 
enjoys a predictable tax liability, which is completely independent of the general tax 
regime of the state. Therefore, replacing the existing tax regime with PSA secures for 
the investor the stability of the investment regime over the term of the contract’s 
validity and an individual approach to particular projects. 
 There are many different PSA models used around the world. The 
“innovative” aspect of the Azeri PSA regime is that instead of a generic PSA law, 
each contract after being ratified by the Azerbaijan parliament (Milli Majlis) assumes 
the force of law and prevails over any other existing or future law or decree whose 
provisions differ from or are in conflict with the contract. Hence, each contract 
contains detailed stability provisions, assuring that the contractor’s rights and 
interests under the contract are not subject to any change, modification or restriction 
without prior consent by the contractor. These contracts also contain detailed 
arbitration provisions generally accepted in international practice.  
Moreover, as opposed to standard tax and royalty schemes, PSAs provide 
physical mechanisms for rendering to the Azerbaijani state its share of profits, while 
allowing foreign energy companies to recoup their investments. Foreign participants 
recover their capital and operating costs in the form of a share of crude production at 
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the beginning of the production cycle. The remainder of a field’s oil output is then 
split between the state and its foreign partners according to a formula agreed upon for 
each individual PSA. Finally, the only tax levied on the contractor is the profits tax 
payable at a fixed rate for each PSA. Currently all PSAs provide for profits tax at 
either 25% or 32% depending on when the agreement was signed. The PSA provides 
protection against future increases in the profits tax rate. The contractor is exempt 
from all other existing or future taxes, duties, excise taxes, etc. including export and 
import duties or taxes.179  
Overall, then, the government of Azerbaijan has provided contractors with 
numerous guarantees, including but not limited to: exclusivity of rights to the contract 
area; protection against any infringement by the government in the rights and interests 
of the contractors; the right to full and prompt compensation of any right, interest and 
property of contractors expropriated, nationalized or otherwise taken by the 
Government; enforceability of the PSAs according to the terms thereof; obligations of 
the government to provide the contractors with licenses, approvals, visas and with any 
other permissions necessary for the investors to carry out their activities in 
Azerbaijan; and the right of contractors to access onshore construction and fabrication 
facilities, supply bases and all necessary transportation and infrastructure facilities. 
                                                          
179 There are currently two different types of tax regimes that are applicable in Azerbaijan, which are 
the statutory tax regime and the oil consortia tax regime. The statutory tax regime applies to all foreign 
investors operating outside o production sharing agreements. The oil consortial regime applies to all 
foreign investors involved in PSAs, including foreign oil companies functioning as contractor parties 
and foreign service companies providing services to the contracting parties or the operating company.  
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PSAs also stipulate that all rights to sovereign immunity are waived by the 
government.180 
Despite the generally-accepted importance of PSAs for creating a stable 
investment environment and attracting significant amounts of foreign capital, not all 
oil producing countries have been able to formulate and implement an effective PSA 
regime to reduce investment risks for investors. The Russian case, as will be 
discussed in the next chapter is a case in point. Now I turn to different explanations 
for Azeri success in achieving this stability in the investment environment.  
 
III. Sources of Stability in the Investment Environment 
Many analysts point to the cultural openness of the Azeri people and the broad 
consensus over country’s oil policy as contributing to the success of creating a stable 
investment environment.181 The common belief is that unlike some of the other post 
Soviet societies, Azeri public has a positive attitude to the notion of profit making by 
foreign investors. There are no major groups that are ideologically against private 
capital or foreign initiative.182 In search of its identity, the Azeri society strives to 
learn as much as it can from the West and therefore is open to all the help and support 
                                                          
180 James IV Baker and Natik Mamedov, “Oil and Gas Production Sharing Agreements,” USACC 
Investment Guide to Azerbaijan (1998): 60-61. 
181 For instance, Vitaly Begliarbekov (SOCAR department manager) during his interview with the 
author on July 15, 1999 argued that the general attitude in the country is very positive regarding the 
contracts signed with foreign investors and that this positive environment is what ensures stability.  
182 Assim Mollazade (Popular Front Party of Azerbaijan) during his interview with the author in Baku, 
July 13, 1999, gave an example from the Communist party of Azerbaijan. He argued that when old 
communists gathered in the center of Baku for a demonstration in May 1999, they only could find 200 
people to support their cause.  
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it can get. It is also argued that even the opposition groups believe that oil 
development remains Azerbaijan’s best hope of distancing itself from the domination 
of Russia. It seems to many that there is broad consensus over Azerbaijan’s inability 
to develop these resources on its own.  
In addition to cultural characteristics, the political objectives of the Azeri 
leaders explain the warm welcome and encouragement given to foreign investors in 
the last decade. 183 It is argued that with every PSA, Azeri leaders sought to achieve 
one or more of five political objectives: resolution to the conflict with Armenia over 
Nagorno-Karabakh, a resolution to the dispute over the legal status of the Caspian 
sea, a reversal of US policy on official aid to Azerbaijan, a resolution of geopolitical 
blockages for pipelines to export oil to world markets, and a diversification of 
countries and companies in order to gain a broad base of support for the country and a 
broad base of ‘vested interests’ to help maintain political stability in Azerbaijan.184 
By allowing foreign investors to take part in the development of oil, the Azeri elites 
have converted investment relationships into diplomatic currency.185 Aliev, it is 
argued, was extremely keen to secure both strong international allies to fortify 
himself against internal and external enemies, and a ready source of hard currency for 
                                                          
183 Mancur Olson in his book Power and Prosperity (2000,) argues that there is a strong and robust 
relationship between the time an autocrat has been in office and the quality of property and contract 
rights in his domain. He argues that an autocrat with a short-term horizon has no reason to consider the 
future output of his society and that his incentives are those of a roving bandit. However, an autocrat 
with a long-term tenure usually cannot gain from confiscating capital assets, because it normally 
means that there will be less investment and less income, and therefore less tax receipts in the future.  
184 Julia Nanay,  “Azerbaijan’s Offshore Oil Consortia,” USACC Investment Guide to Azerbaijan 
(1998):54. 
185 David I. Hoffman, “Azerbaijan: The Politicization of Oil” in Robert Ebel and Rajan Menon, eds., 
Energy and Conflict in Central Asia and the Caucasus (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2000), 
55-79. 
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the reeling Azerbaijani economy. Internationalization of the Caspian was seen as a 
national security priority.186  
 Even though these explanations are useful in understanding the motivations 
and objectives of state elites, they assume consensus over a broad range of issues 
regarding oil development. In fact, the policy objectives of the ruling elite are not 
representative of the interests of the Azeri people in general. The secrecy of 
negotiations with foreign oil companies, high number of oil contracts (pace of 
investments,) mysterious disappearance of bonus payments, unfair terms of the 
contracts for Azeri people, and low tax rates for oil investors are some complaints 
that opposition groups increasingly voice in this country.187 Even though opposition 
parties are not against foreign investment in principle, they have serious objections to 
the terms and procedures of oil agreements.188 Therefore, these alternative arguments 
explain policy design on the basis of elite preferences but do not take into account the 
institutional capacity of the elites to overcome opposition and carry out these policies. 
                                                          
186 The investor portfolio of the country is a good example of this. Over 33 companies from 15 
countries were invited to take part in the Azerbaijan oil development.  The high number of embassies 
in Baku is proof to the saying that flag follows trade.  
187 Magerram Zulfugarov (National Independence Party) during his interview with the author in Baku, 
July 3, 1999 argued that the terms of the contracts that were signed during the Elchibey presidency 
were much more advantageous to the Azeri society than the contracts under Aliev. A common 
argument that is shared by all opposition parties is the squandering of oil bonus payments by the 
incumbent regime. They complain that the bonuses are never reported to the parliament and that there 
are no official documents stating on what these bonuses are spent. They all suspect that the bonuses 
“end up in the pockets of several top officials.” Assim Mollazade (Popular Front Party) during his 
interview with the author also criticized the secrecy of the government in its relations with foreign 
investors and wonders why the government is hiding these documents from opposition groups if there 
is nothing wrong in them for the Azeri society. Moreover, most of the opposition parties believe that 
the revenues from the first contracts should be used to improve the national oil industry and that 
Azerbaijan should be able to develop these resources in the future on its own.   
188 Author’s interview with opposition party representatives, Magerram Zulfugarov and Nazim Imanov 
from National Independence Party, Sulhettin Akperov, (Musavvat), Ali Kerimov, Assim Mollazade 
from Azerbaijan Popular Front Party, and Mahir Asedov from Azerbaijan Democratic Party.   
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In order to explain why Azeri leaders were able to create such an attractive 
investment regime, I now turn to an analysis of the political regime in Azerbaijan.  
 
IV. Political Regime and Stability 
Given the importance of oil for Azerbaijan, it is not surprising that oil industry 
and politics are closely linked.  The success of the Azeri state in attracting significant 
amounts of foreign investment over the last decade can be attributed to the stable 
investment environment its political regime has provided for investors. Azerbaijan is 
a typical example of an authoritarian regime. Institutionalized competition for power 
and influence in the political system is very limited. Absence of significant veto 
players and representative institutions insulate the ruling elite from any opposition to 
investment policies. Moreover, this regime offers foreign investors easy and direct 
access to decision makers. As such, the regime provides a ‘one-stop shopping’ for 
investors in which they can negotiate the terms of the investment agreements with a 
few actors and bypass any potential opponents to these terms. 
 First of all, the state power is very concentrated. The political order is 
dominated by the figure of President Heidar Aliev.189 Since he came to power in 
1993, he has consolidated his position through skillful manipulation of state 
institutions and formal political structures. While the Azerbaijani constitution of 1995 
                                                          
189 Heidar Aliev spent his early career in the KGB, eventually becoming the first Azeri to head the 
KGB of Azerbaijan. A Brezhnev protégé, he served as first secretary of the Communist Party of 
Azerbaijan from 1969 to 1982 and then under Yuri Andropov, was elevated to the central party 
leadership as a full member of the Politburo. In 1987, under Gorbachev, he fell from favor and was 
removed from his post. He returned to Azerbaijan and for a time headed the local parliament in his 
home province of Nakhichevan until his presidency in 1993.  
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established a system of government based on a nominal division of powers between a 
strong presidency, a legislature with the power to approve the budget and impeach the 
president and a judiciary with limited independence, in reality these state institutions 
have been deliberately engineered to reinforce rather than moderate the power of the 
executive.190 The three nominally independent high courts-the Constitutional Court, 
Supreme Court, and High Economic Court- are extremely susceptible to executive 
influence, and moreover are staffed primarily with judges beholden to Aliev.191 
Similarly, the parliament (Milli Majlis) exercises virtually no legislative initiative or 
oversight independent of the executive. The ‘flawed’ parliamentary elections in 1995 
resulted in a total of eight political parties gaining representation in the parliament. Of 
the 125 seats, only eight were occupied by the political opposition, the rest going to 
President’s Yeni Azerbeycan party, allied pro-government parties, and primarily pro-
government unaffiliated candidates.192 Moreover, within the state, lack of regional 
distribution of power prevented any bargaining between the political center and other 
regions of the country. Azerbaijan is divided into 76 administrative districts, but their 
governors are directly appointed by the president. Absent a voice in state decisions, 
regional authorities have no formal powers to keep the executive branch in check.  
                                                          
190 The president himself presided over the Commission charged with drafting the Constitution and 
many articles related to the powers of the executive seem to reflect Aliev’s own preferences.  
191 Hoffman, 61. 
192 Pro-government parties included the Azerbaijan Democratic Independence Party, the Motherland 
Party, the Democratic Entrepreneurs Party, the Alliance in the Name of Azerbaijan, and the Azerbaijan 
National Statehood Party. The Popular Front, the Musavat Party and the Azerbaijan National 
Independence Party provided the main opposition.  
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 Lack of political competition within the state is mostly due to the fact that 
elections are neither free nor fair. The parliamentary elections of 1995 were seriously 
flawed and many violations were reported. Almost three quarters of the candidates 
who represent opposition groups were denied registration. In rural areas, proxy voting 
and block voting were common. Even in urban areas, there were incidences of one 
member of a family voting on behalf of all its members. In 1998, when Aliev stood 
for reelection, he won with a suspicious 75% of the vote. There were widespread 
reports of fraud, and one electoral district announced a voter turnout well in excess of 
100%.193 The 2000 parliamentary elections was another missed opportunity for 
democratic development in Azerbaijan. As the U.S. based National Democratic 
Institute (NDI) stated, the 2000 elections represented “a continuation of a pattern of 
seriously flawed elections in Azerbaijan that fail to meet even minimum international 
standards.”194 One of the major problems with the election was the registration of 
candidates. Even though a total of 13 parties presented the 50,000 signatures 
necessary for registration in the party list election, the Central Election Committee 
rejected the applications of eight of these on dubious grounds. The situation was not 
different for the single member constituencies, where more than half of the candidates 
were refused registration.195 In addition, numerous abuses were noted on election day, 
from ballot-stuffing, intimidation of voters and opposition members of electoral 
                                                          
193 Pope Hugh, “Autocracy is Spreading in Former Soviet States,” Wall Street Journal (Oct. 14, 1998.) 
194 Quote taken from Svante E. Cornell, “Democratization Falters in Azerbaijan,” Journal of 
Democracy 12:2 (April 2001):128. 
195 Ibid.,126. 
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commissions. As a result, leaders of the main opposition parties were left out of the 
new parliament. While the ruling party received more than 70% of the votes, only one 
opposition party was announced to have passed the 8% threshold. The situation led to 
unanimous opposition boycott of the parliament. The regime reacted by reducing the 
ruling party’s official election results and acknowledging that two other opposition 
parties had passed the threshold.196 Azerbaijan now has three opposition parties in the 
parliament.  
In addition to a lack of political competition within the state, institutions that 
can mobilize opposition groups into policy coalitions and provide mechanisms to 
regulate conflict among them are also very weak in Azerbaijan.  Parties tend to be 
centered around an individual with a strong personality and/or sufficient wealth to 
establish a power base. The political scene is characterized by seeming inability of 
many individuals to subordinate themselves to a party led by someone else. Programs 
and party platforms, insofar as they are discussed at all, are generally vague, 
consisting of little more than idealistic platitudes. Few parties have developed 
nationwide party organizations. Party membership is almost always very small and 
restricted in its social range, drawing predominantly on a network of personal 
contacts and acquaintances.197 Party politics do not play a significant role in either 
parliamentary or presidential elections: candidates at both levels are elected as 
                                                          
196 Ibid., 128. 
197 Shirin Akiner, “Emerging Political Order in the New Caspian States,” in Bertsch, Craft, Jones and 
Beck, eds.,  Crossroads and Conflicts: Security and Foreign Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia, 
(Routledge, 2000), 90-129. 
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independents rather than as representatives of a particular party. All parties and other 
types of political groupings must be officially registered, otherwise they are declared 
illegal and liable to prosecution. The preconditions for registration are onerous and 
they are difficult to fulfill without government backing.198 The notion of loyal 
opposition oftentimes is used to mean “non-critical” or “cooperative” opposition 
rather than indicating the opposition parties’ loyalty to a democratic system. 
Toleration for opposition and criticism in the party system remains low.199 The 
absence of a visible presence or organization outside parliament means that they tend 
to resemble parliamentary factions more than established institutionalized parties.200  
Interest group institutionalization in Azerbaijan has a record similar to party 
institutionalization. The main interest group organizations are concerned with human 
rights issues, gender rights and ecological problems. In general, they are closely 
supervised by the authorities. Their activities are hampered by the fact that they have 
limited and often short term funding. Like the political parties, they attract very little 
public support and are frequently regarded with suspicion.201 Their influence on the 
policies of the government is very limited. As for the media, a large proportion of the 
communication media, electronic or print, is either state-owned or state-run. 
Consequently they support the government and restrict themselves to reflecting 
official views. Due to the harassment from the government, the limited number of 
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199 Audrey L. Altstadt, “Azerbaijan’s struggle toward democracy,” in Dawisha and Parrott, eds., 
Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus  (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
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independent media outlets cannot provide an alternative source of information and a 
forum for national debate but rather end up reinforcing the official line.  
Given the first few years of the newly independent state, perhaps it is not 
surprising that opposition groups are routinely excluded from participation. Until 
Aliev came to power in 1993, Azerbaijan was enveloped in political turmoil and 
instability. Between the independence in 1991 and 1993, Azerbaijani politics was 
characterized by a series of coups, ethnic conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and several 
separatist movements in other parts of the country. During this period, the country 
had four presidents.202 Having come to power in such a background of political 
instability, Aliev soon consolidated his power and started state building by 
systematically purging his opponents. Coercion was used to maintain public support 
for the regime through manipulation of the media and the selective use of laws as a 
means to curb incipient opposition. Instances of violations of human rights in 
connection with the suppression of political opposition were widespread. Opposition 
groups have had their rights abused through arrest and imprisonment, violent 
disruption of political rallies, and the arbitrary exclusion of individuals and parties 
                                                          
202 On August 30, 1991 Azerbaijan’s communist regime headed by Ayaz Mutalibov declared its 
independence. In September 1991, he was elected unopposed as president. At the beginning of March 
1992 Mutalibov was forced to resign as president following the massacre of Azerbaijani civilians at 
Khojali in Nagorno-Karabakh. After him, Iagub Mamedov served as an interim president until June 
1992 when Abulfaz Elchibey, the leader of the Azerbaijan Popular Front won new presidential 
elections with 57% of the votes cast. Moscow’s discontent with Elchibey ended in a Moscow operated 
coup by Colonel Surat Husseinov in June 1993. Elchibey’s departure paved the way for the ascension 
of Heidar Aliev. When new elections were held in October 1993, Aliev won by a landslide.  
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from the political process.203 Freedom House notes that Azerbaijan is ‘not free’ and 
that the country has one of the lowest freedom scores in the world. 
 Finally the Azeri bureaucracy does not have the institutional power to act as a 
bridge between different branches of government or between interest groups and the 
state. It virtually has no input in decision-making. Policy-making remains essentially 
a presidential prerogative, with ideas and inputs coming from a close circle of senior 
ministers, advisers and aides around the president, rather than from government 
departments.  Politically, clans, mafias, and extensive patronage networks dominate 
the various government ministries and provide powerful yet informal avenues for 
advancement and promotion. Membership in Aliev’s political party, New Azerbaijan 
Party (NAP), became an important factor in administrative appointments and 
promotions. 
Even though Azerbaijan on paper has elections, democratic institutions and a 
constitution, a deeper analysis reveals that political and economic power of 
individuals and groups is determined by their proximity to the president. 
Economically, a close relationship with President Aliev or his family can translate 
into favorable terms for business in terms of preferential contracts, tax exemptions 
etc. These networks may be based on regional clans, the most prominent being the 
regional tribe composed of Azeris from Armenia (Yeraz) and the Azerbaijani enclave 
of Nakhichevan. President Aliev himself is from Nakhichevan and most of his inner 
                                                          
203 Edmund Herzig, The New Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia (The Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1999.) 
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circle come from this regionally defined tribe. They may also be based on kinship. 
For instance, Aliev placed his family members in important positions. His two 
brothers and his son, Ilham Aliev, are in the political council of NAP and his son is 
also the Vice President of the state oil company (SOCAR).  
Another important network consists of bureaucrats and new businessmen who 
were Soviet era associates of the president. Much of Aliev’s political power in the 
earliest part of his presidency stemmed directly from strong and persisting ties forged 
during the Soviet era. Moreover, the direct guarantor of Aliev’s political power 
ultimately stems from his control over the power ministries: the Army, the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of National Security. These institutions protect 
the president from overt coup attempts and manipulate public political discourse in 
the president’s favor through media censorship, suppression of political dissidents. 
The top levels of these institutions are in turn staffed with Azeris from Aliev’s tribe 
and are also granted extensive leeway in pursuing profitable economic ventures. In 
short, the linking of economic and political networks in Azerbaijan provides 
incentives for the country’s elite to support the president and his policies.204 Finally, a 
massive personal cult has been orchestrated around Aliev, marked by numerous  
portraits in public places and adulatory commentaries in the official media. Aliev is 
often cast in the role of sage father to the young nation. Such an organization of 
autocratic power brings the Azeri system close to what Linz and Stepan define as a 
‘sultanistic regime’.  
                                                          
204 Hoffman, 62. 
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V. Political Competition Over Oil Policy 
Given these characteristics of the political regime, it is not surprising that the 
mechanisms for controlling Azerbaijan’s oil sector are tightly clustered around the 
president. Based on a presidential decree dated Sept.13, 1992, the State Oil Company 
(SOCAR) maintains a near monopoly over the management of the country’s oil 
industry. Even though SOCAR has many departments and an extensive organization, 
only three main actors direct most of SOCAR’s affairs: SOCAR President Natik  
Aliev, SOCAR Vice president Ilham Aliev and Valekh Alekperov, who conducts 
negotiations with foreign oil companies as the director of foreign relations department 
of SOCAR. As a practical matter, SOCAR functions as a vertically integrated state oil 
company and a government ministry.205 The president of SOCAR acts as a minister 
reporting to the president directly. Between these three actors and Heidar Aliev, top-
level decisions are made regardless of the formal government hierarchy. The ties that 
bind the Azerbaijani oil industry to the president’s office also condition SOCAR’s 
relations with other state bodies. Potentially powerful state bodies such as those 
involved in investment activities, privatization or regulatory duties have proven 
incapable of either diminishing SOCAR’s hold over the industry or of extending their 
influence into this lucrative sector.206 This led to an absence of administrative turf 
wars and helped oil projects sidestep many potential administrative pitfalls and 
delays. 
                                                          
205 Until June 2001, there was not even a Ministry of Energy in Azerbaijan. The state oil company, 
SOCAR,  had the responsibilities of a Ministry. 
206 Hoffman, 61. 
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The procedure of adopting PSAs is a good example of the power structure in 
Azerbaijan. PSAs are initiated by either SOCAR or the companies themselves. In the 
first method, SOCAR opens a tender and companies make a bid. Actually this option 
is rarely used. Unless SOCAR sees a high interest in a very attractive area, companies 
become proactive and show their interest in a field or structure.207 Before both sides 
proceed with negotiations, the offer is taken to the President for his approval. Only 
after he gives his consent in the form of a decree, can the negotiations presume.208 At 
this stage the three officials from SOCAR and foreign company representatives 
negotiate the terms of the agreement.209 Once they reach an agreement, the 
President’s approval is needed again before it is sent to the parliament for ratification. 
Meanwhile, for technical, legal  and “grammatical” inspection, the draft is sent to the 
Petrochemical Department of the Government, which works in collaboration with the 
legal and tax advisors. Here except for some typo corrections, nothing actually gets 
changed.  The only contribution of this bureaucratic agency is the signature of the 
chairman of the department on a statement of “government guarantees,” which is 
already designed by the President and the foreign companies together.210 After this 
                                                          
207 Author’s interviews with Fred Marshall (Government Affairs Manager in Exxon) in Baku, July 6, 
1999; Sabit Baygirov (first ex-president of SOCAR) on July 7, 1999; and Vitaly V.Begliarbekov 
(SOCAR) Baku, July 15, 1999. 
208 Author’s interviews with Unal Bayram (Mobil)in Baku,  July 2, 1999 and Vitaly Bagliarbekov 
(SOCAR). 
209 According to Vitaly Begliarbekov, the criteria that Azerbaijani side uses to award a license to a 
company are the size of the project area, the financial capacity of the company, the bonus payments it 
is willing to make and finally the Azeri content, i.e. company’s presence in Azerbaijan, its premises, its 
desire to hire local personnel, to form joint ventures with local partners for infrastructure, and the 
social investment (in education, health etc.) that the company is offering  to make.  
210 Author’s interview with Rasim Dadasov (head of the Petrochemical Department in the Government 
of Azerbaijan) in Baku, July 3, 1999. Mr. Dadasov stated that the contents of the contracts were kept 
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procedure, the president sends the document to the parliamentary commission on 
Mineral Resources, Energy and Ecology the day before the ratification session in the 
parliament. The commission spends about half an hour, at most an hour on the 
draft.211 Without making any changes, the chairman of the commission together with 
the head of the Foreign Investment Department in SOCAR give a briefing to the 
parliament on the terms of the agreement. Again in a very short amount of time the 
deputies are asked to vote only yes or no on the draft proposal after which the 
agreement is ratified.212 Parliament, irrespective of the constitution, exercises 
virtually no oversight powers over the PSA process.213 All along, the parliament has 
not once rejected or even returned for review an oil contract put before it.214 The 
process does not end there. It once again goes to the president for final approval and 
then becomes law when the president signs and officially declares it. As it is, the 
process is set up so that nobody except those four individuals has any input in the 
decisions.  
The absence of strong and relatively autonomous state institutions in  
Azerbaijan is seen as a blessing for foreign investors at least in the short run. 
SOCAR’s strong position and proximity to the seat of political power makes it a 
                                                                                                                                                                      
secret from the media or opposition parties. He argued that this is due to a request from the foreign oil 
companies and not so much due to the intentions of the government to exclude opposition groups!!  
211 Author’s interview with Asia Manafova (the chairwoman of Mineral Resources, Energy, and 
Ecology Commission in the Azeri Parliament) in Baku,  July 8, 1999. Ms. Manafova is a member of 
the New Azerbaijan Party.  
212 Author’s interview with Nazim Imanov (National Independence Party) in Baku, July 7, 1999.   
213 Magerram Zulfugarov (National Independence Party) during his interview with the author in Baku, 
July 3, 1999, depicted the parliament as “a branch of the president.” 
214 Sulhettin Akperov (Musavvat Party) during his interview with the author in Baku, July 5, 1999, said 
that the contracts that are given to deputies are not the same as the original contracts. They are either a 
very short version or a narrowly selected part of it.  
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favorable partner to oil investors. During the negotiation and implementation of the 
contracts, foreign investors feel no pressure to defend their intentions to opposition 
parties or interest groups. Despite their many concerns with the format and content of 
the oil contracts, opposition groups do not have any institutional power to contribute 
to the decision making process, let alone pressure the government or the foreign 
companies.215 The informal distribution of political power gives ruling elites the 
incentives and power to exclude these opposition groups and co-opt others through 
patronage networks.  
Foreign investors, on their part, are satisfied with the simple power structure 
and absence of opposition to their contracts. They know where the political power 
resides in and whether or not they like it this knowledge gives them insurances that 
their voices will be heard.216 The PSAs, as one company representative put it, provide 
them with “a suit of armor in terms of being able to walk through what would 
otherwise be dangerous and difficult.”217 He further stated that the single most 
attractive thing about investing in Azerbaijan- apart from the presence of 
hydrocarbons is the PSA framework under which companies and the government 
mutually set the rules. The PSA, according to foreign investors, isolates them from 
corruption and manipulation by petty officials and bureaucrats. The president’s and 
parliament’s signatures on the contracts “smoothes all those difficult barriers out of 
                                                          
215 Fred Marshall, during his interview with the author, stated that as a foreign oil company they have 
not had much of a relationship with the parliament and opposition parties. He argues that that 
responsibility resides with the government and that being a commercial entity, they try not to get 
involved in politics and take sides.  
216  Unal Bayram, Mobil. 
217 Author’s interview with Peter Henshaw (BPAmoco representative) in Baku, July 20, 1999. 
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the way.”218 Even though, officially foreign companies claim that they have no 
regime preferences, they nevertheless have good relations with Aliev and his clique 
and praise them for being ‘far-sighted individuals.’219  
For their part, government officials are proud of their innovative and ‘genius’ 
style of doing business with foreign investors.220 Even though, a generic PSA law has 
been and still is in stage of preparation,221 Aliev and his oil team have chosen 
meanwhile to continue this process of turning each contract into law in order to win 
time and avoid any hurdles in the process of coming up with a general law.222 This 
way, they also believe that they provide a significant amount of flexibility to both 
themselves and the investors. Each contract gives them opportunities to maneuver 
depending on the specifics of each project.223 “Only if those in Russia were smart 
                                                          
218 Ibid. This is a very interesting comment considering that foreign investors regard corruption by 
lower level bureaucrats as disruptive and problematic but consider high level corruption as manageable 
and even to a certain extent acceptable.  
219 Fred Marshall (Exxon Government Affairs Manager.) Mr. Marshall has repeatedly commented on 
the importance of individuals and how they by themselves can make a difference. 
220 Author’s interview with Rafig Abdullajev (SOCAR Assistant of President) in Baku,  July 1, 1999. 
221 Mahir Asedov (Azerbaijan Democratic Party) during his interview with the author in Baku, July 16, 
1999, argued that this generic law was prepared as a result of collaboration of several deputies, 
including opposition deputies like himself,  in the first years of the republic but Aliev on purpose never 
allowed it to be discussed and passed in the parliament. Mr. Asedov further argued that this has 
nothing to do with inexperience or timing as some government officials claim. Instead, he said that this 
case by case process increased Aliev’s control over the contracts and was an obvious attempt to bypass 
the parliament, which would have been responsible for developing this legislation. He finds it 
outrageous that an oil rich country like Azerbaijan still does not have a general legislation on oil.  
222 The difference between a generic PSA law and case by case contract law is that under a body of 
law, everybody is playing by the same rules, same criteria. However, in a case-by-case approach, each 
negotiation and contract is different. The terms of each contract may reflect different priorities. 
However, this does not necessarily mean inconsistency in legal provisions. Usually the differences 
among contracts are in the commercial framework. They have different models of profit distribution, 
participating interests etc. Otherwise they are very similar in the legal guarantees they provide.  
223 During the interview, Rafig Abdullajev also pointed out that this method gave enough flexibility for 
the government to increase its share of revenues with each new contract. 
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enough to do what we have been doing here” says a SOCAR official, “they would 
have reaped the benefits of foreign investment just like us.”224 
 
VI. Political Effects of Foreign Capital 
Positive reinforcements from investors regarding this investment policy 
legitimize the importance of the political regime in the eyes of the ruling elites and 
give them incentives to entrench their power even further. The interaction between 
the political superstructure and the oil sector in Azerbaijan is not only confined to the 
influence of politics on oil deals. Causality runs in the other direction as well. The 
flow of investments and the political regime that makes it possible create a vicious 
cycle for Azerbaijani politics.  
Oil investments shape state-building and political regime in Azerbaijan in 
several ways. First of all, “the exploitation of energy resources initially supports 
whatever regime type is already in place when new revenues come on stream.”225 
There is a significant body of literature on how oil dependence reinforces 
authoritarian legacies and is reinforced by them.226 In Azerbaijan, the onerous 
legacies from the Soviet Union makes the ‘oil curse’ even more formidable. As a 
former Soviet republic, Azerbaijan “inherited political institutions that entailed near-
universal state ownership of property and a bureaucracy imbued with an autocratic 
                                                          
224 Interview with Rafig Abdullajev.  
225 Karl, 44. 
226 See chapter 2, p.53. 
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and interventionist mentality.” 227 This Soviet legacy of centralized power was further 
strengthened since independence in 1991. The persisting elites from the communist 
era have acquired the right to set the rules of the game for international oil contracts, 
and sought the active support of foreign capital in the further concentration of their 
own authority. Aliev has designed tax laws that gave the top echelons of government 
maximum control over the awarding and subsequent distribution of oil rents. Thus the 
ratification of each PSA allowed the government to negotiate a new tax regime, 
increasing its own leverage.  
Even though the full impact of big oil wealth is still years away, oil related 
revenues pouring into a highly concentrated structure of power are leading to further 
concentration of power. SOCAR is likely to remain the primary mediator between the 
government and foreign oil companies. It will also continue to be SOCAR’s 
prerogative to remit the resulting revenues to the state coffers. The way oil revenues 
are used is likely to remain opaque due to the continued absence of accountability. 
Much of this oil wealth will most likely be spent by the regime to buy the political 
support of strategically critical groups and to exclude those that are resilient.228 As a 
result, rather than power sharing, exclusionary politics will increasingly become the 
                                                          
227 Gertrude Schroeder , “Economic Transformation in the Post-Soviet Republics,” in Bartlomiej 
Kaminski, ed., Economic Transition in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, (1996),12. 
228 The ownership and degree of concentration of the financial system is a good example of the 
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and how oil revenues are likely to effect credit allocation, see Oksan Bayulgen, “External Capital and 
Political Structures: The Case of Azerbaijan,” The Anthropology of East Europe Review 17:2 
(Autumn 1999). 
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norm in Azerbaijan. Even though some still hold out the possibility of democratic 
elections and more inclusive politics in the future, it seems more likely that the 
patronage networks that Aliev’s regime has so meticulously created will rally around 
his son Ilham Aliev as the successor to the ‘throne.’ The already divided and 
squabbling opposition, which Aliev calls ‘the children,’229 offers little hope in terms 
of breaking the autocratic cycle and leading the country towards democracy.  
In addition to concentration of power, dependence on oil rents and revenues 
also produces a distinctive type of institutional setting, which weakens accountability. 
This is because oil revenues precipitate the decline of the extractive and regulatory 
institutions. “Unlike welfare states, which are redistributive, rentier states do not exist 
by extracting surplus from the local population because oil revenues enable 
governments to stop taxing altogether.”230 Hence, “with no revenue-gathering motive, 
these states are financially autonomous from their citizenry and therefore are not 
accountable to them.”231 Even before the inflow of significant oil rents, fiscal 
accountability, which creates a separation between public and private in state income 
has been very low in Azerbaijan. The weak fiscal structure in Azerbaijan delays the 
development of a modern consciousness of the state and contributes to the 
perpetuation of traditional concepts of authority as the personal patrimony of the 
ruler.  
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Moreover, development based on energy resources produces a classic alliance 
between foreign companies and local rulers to sustain each other’s interests.232 This 
alliance and oil revenues in Azerbaijan are seen as fortifying a preexisting network of 
nepotism and corruption within the state.233 Secretiveness of PSAs has created 
suspicion in society that foreign oil companies sustain a corrupt and unaccountable 
system. The bonuses that foreign companies pay when contracts are signed are a 
perfect illustration of corruption for Azeris. Many believe that even though there is a 
Special Oil Fund set up to keep oil revenues from being inappropriately used, a 
comparison of figures from oil contracts and from the figures of the National Bank of 
Azerbaijan clearly indicate a misbalance.234 It is claimed that some bonus payments 
are pocketed by corrupt officials and that foreign companies are turning a blind eye to 
this process even though they are very well aware of it. According to the common 
elite perception of the Western Oil Companies in Azerbaijan, the Western oil industry 
is aggravating rather than ameliorating the culture of corruption since collaboration 
with a corrupt regime is itself corrupting.235 
                                                          
232 The stability that is so consistently praised by foreign investors, is not seen as real stability 
contributing to the welfare of the society by opposition groups. Magerram Zulfugarov from the 
National Independence Party, during his interview with the author, called  it the “police stability.” 
233 The bonuses from oil contracts is the most visible example of this. As discussed earlier, many 
believe that these payments do not get included in the budget but instead end up in the pockets of a few 
individuals. Assim Mollazade from the Popular Front Party states that due to this corruption, there has 
been a capital flight of $80 million from Azerbaijan in the last few years.  
234 “Pocketing Caspian Black Gold” CEE Bankwatch Network (April 2002). According to IMF, which 
oversees the organization of the Special Oil Fund, this arrangement has been deficient due to a lack of 
formal and clear operating rules, and sole authority of the president on the use of the funds.  
235 Daniel Heradstveit, “Elite Perceptions of Ethical Problems Facing the Western Oil Industry in 
Azerbaijan,” Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) Report (2000). 
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Corruption is of course nothing new in Azerbaijan. In fact it is a legacy of the 
old Soviet regime. In its declining years the communist system lived on bureaucratic 
fiddling. In addition, the transition to a market economy without the necessary 
regulatory institutions has led to a burgeoning of corruption. Ranking compiled by the 
EBRD suggests that Azerbaijan is the fifth most corrupt country in the region but 
other sources disagree on the order, claiming that oil-rich Azerbaijan is even more 
prone to corruption than the rest.236  
Finally, many in Azerbaijan see foreign capital’s alliance with the regime as 
resulting in high levels of income inequality and poverty. There is a common saying 
among Azerbaijani people: “The name of oil belongs to us but the taste of it belongs 
to others”237 meaning that the Azeri people own significant amounts of oil resources  
but the benefits of oil accrue to others: the ruling elites and foreign companies. The 
discovery of oil has rarely meant immediate or long-term prosperity for the Azeri 
people. While the government estimates that the economy has grown significantly 
over a decade as a result of oil revenues, the UNDP report clearly states that the lives 
of 60% Azeris have not improved. The average per capita income is $40 per month 
for a population of 8 million, with the official poverty line set at $89 per month.238  
Despite considerable foreign investment in Azerbaijan’s energy sector, most of the 
country’s population suffers from high unemployment of 18-19 % since 1997 and a 
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low standard of living. As such, foreign capital has not improved the living standards 
of ordinary Azeris. On the contrary, it enriched those in charge of oil contracts and 
their patronage networks. Consequently, foreign capital has contributed to the zero-
sum nature of Azerbaijani politics and widened the gap between elites and masses. 
Without professional institutions capable of discharging the regulatory, 
extractive, and redistributive duties of the state, it is highly unlikely that the effects of 
large volume oil money will extend beyond a small, politically and regionally 
connected circle of the Azerbaijani population. With state institutions deformed in 
order to insulate presidential power, the Azerbaijani government has displayed little 
inclination or ability to develop the mechanisms necessary for channeling oil wealth 
into the national economy. Furthermore, exaggerated popular expectations of oil 
wealth can be destabilizing especially where the distribution of wealth is uneven. 
Sudden oil-generated wealth can upset the regional and international balance of 
power.  
Empirical evidence from other oil-producing countries also shows that 
resource wealth tends to have a negative effect on economic growth, and on other 
economic indicators as well.239 The current path of state and regime development in 
Azerbaijan points to a strong susceptibility to Dutch Disease.240 This occurs when 
                                                          
239 The negative economic effects of oil revenues are analyzed extensively in the literature. See 
especially Alan Gelb, “Adjustments to Windfall Gains: A Comparative Analysis of Oil-Exporting 
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disproportionate investment into a specific extractive industry causes wage and price 
distress in other sectors, ultimately leading to the distorted growth of services, 
transportation and other non-tradeables. In Azerbaijan, oil exports, which made up 
only 33.9% of total exports in 1994, soared to a stunning 66.4% two years later.241 
The production of virtually non-oil related industrial items on the other hand has 
slipped substantially between 1992-96. Upon the encouragement of the IMF and 
World Bank, only very recently in 2001, a new State Oil Fund was created to prevent 
the state from catching the Dutch Disease. It is meant to serve as an instrument for 
both macroeconomic stability and future economic development. The fund, with 
assets in excess of $430 million as of August 2001 will receive all profit oil revenues 
belonging to the Azeri state, oil bonus payments and selected other oil and gas 
revenues.242 However, given the way oil bonuses of the first contracts have been 
squandered by the ruling elites, it yet remains to be seen whether or not there is 
enough resolve to transfer these revenues to a transparent institution.   
Therefore, the success in attracting foreign investment in the oil sector does 
not necessarily translate into success in the efficient use of petrodollars. “Successful 
efforts to use petrodollars wisely depend on the presence of countervailing political 
and social pressures strong enough to curb ‘petrolization’, a process by which states 
become dependent on oil exports and their polities develop an addiction to 
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petrodollars.”243 Such countervailing pressures include transparent democratic 
institutions, which are powerful enough to rein in the alliance between multinational 
oil interests and political leaders. A democratic regime can constrain the centralizing 
and concentrating tendencies that petroleum exploitation leads to and limit the 
powerful alliance between rulers and oil companies that initially takes place when oil 
revenues circulate without strict controls. Hence lie the differences between 
Azerbaijan and Norway.  
 
VII. Conclusion 
  The economic attractiveness of the Caspian Sea oil resources has been a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for attracting significant amounts of foreign 
investment. A stable legal, regulatory and administrative investment framework was 
also crucial in turning the potential interests of the oil companies into actual 
investment projects. Even though cultural characteristics and geostrategic concerns 
can explain the preferences of ruling elites, they cannot explain differences of interest 
and the policy outcomes that result from the interaction of these interests. The initial 
euphoria in the Azeri society towards foreign investment in the first years of 
independence has over time left its place to increased discontent and hostility.  Today 
there is less broad consensus among Azeri people than the government wants to 
believe. The lack of politicization of oil issues has been due more to the strategies of 
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exclusion by a few elites than to the existence of consensus in the society over the 
terms of the relationship with foreign investors.  
In this chapter, I have argued that the political regime in Azerbaijan 
contributed to the stability in the investment environment. As a result of weak 
institutionalized competition, Aliev and his clique were able to exclude opposition 
groups and equip themselves with the utmost discretion and flexibility to negotiate 
with foreign investors. The sultanistic regime created a perception of stability for 
foreigners and reassured that the terms of their investment relationship would be 
guaranteed by the president and a rubber stamp parliament through the life of their 
contracts. The Azerbaijani case demonstrates that authoritarian regimes that provide 
for policy stability can be as successful in getting a share of the international 
investment as consolidated democratic regimes. The Azerbaijani case provides a great 
conundrum for those who see an inevitable relationship between globalization and 
democracy.  
Having said this it is also important to point out to some caveats. The 
favorable conditions and legal protection created for foreign investors in the oil sector 
are noticeably absent in other sectors.  It would be plausible to argue that the oil 
investments have been ring-fenced through production sharing agreements signed 
with the government. This special framework has kept these big oil companies 
immune to the difficulties of everyday business life experienced by other smaller 
companies. Azerbaijan in fact has proved to be a minefield for other foreign 
companies trying to establish operations in the country. Investors in other sectors face 
    151
many difficulties with outdated legislation, corruption and bureaucratic hurdles. 
Hence, the success in the oil sector demonstrates the partial capacity of the Azeri state 
in attracting selective foreign investment. An authoritarian state is useful only to the 
extent that it can provide isolated stability for certain industries that generate 
enormous rents. Azerbaijan’s shot at globalization is sector-specific.  
Moreover, given its negative impact on the political and economic 
development of the country, as discussed above, Azerbaijan’s ability to attract 
significant amounts of foreign investment in a very short amount of time should be 
approached with skepticism and not be considered a success that should be emulated 
by other oil producing countries in the post-Soviet region or in other developing 
countries. One of the dilemmas of global capitalism for developing countries lies in 
the choice between immediate economic success, i.e. the ability to attract foreign 
investment, and long-term economic and democratic development. Even though 
globalization poses such a dilemma for developing countries, the experience of 
Azerbaijan should at least provide a sobering example of the trade-offs involved in 
such a decision.  
In the next chapter, I analyze the investment environment in another oil 
producing country, Russia. Considering that both Azerbaijan and Russia, as newly 
independent states, started the development of their oil resources at the same time, the 
differences in their performance over the course of a decade are striking. With equally 
rich resources and similar needs for foreign investment, Azerbaijan has been able to 
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create favorable working conditions while Russia, to date, is still trying to set up a 
stable investment regime that would finally be acceptable to foreign investors.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
RUSSIAN INVESTMENT ENVIRONMENT: 
“TWO-STEPS FORWARD, ONE-STEP BACK” 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The oil and gas industry in Russia is the largest single sector of the Russian 
economy, accounting for 40% of its exports, and 13% of its GDP. Together, oil and 
gas production generates between 40-70% of government revenues and is the source 
of approximately 60% of foreign exchange earnings.244 Paradoxically, the industry is 
both the country’s best hope of achieving significant economic growth through new 
investment and at the same time, the sector that has historically received the least 
encouragement to realize its potential.  
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s oil industry, which 
accounted for approximately 90% of the former Soviet Union’s oil output, fell upon 
hard times due to decreased domestic industrial demand and a decline in drilling and 
capital investments. From 1992 to 1998, the country’s oil production plummeted 23% 
from 7.86 million barrels per day (bbl/d) to just 6.07 million bbl/d (See Figure 5.1). 
Russia’s oil industry, which was largely privatized in the mid 1990s, has bounced 
back over the past few years, posting strong profits and healthy increase in 
production. Buoyed by high world oil prices in 1999 and 2000 as well as a decline in 
production costs following the August 1998 devaluation of the ruble, Russian oil 
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companies ramped up production and by 2001 the country was pumping out an 
average of 7.29 million bbl/d, a 20% increase over the 1998 level. Russia is now the 
world’s second largest crude oil producer, behind only Saudi Arabia. With continued 
high oil prices, Russian oil production increased in 2002, reaching 7.8 million bbl/d. 
The Russian government has set a target of reaching and maintaining 7.83 million 
bbl/d of oil production in the next few years.245  
In order for Russia’s oil producers to achieve this production level, however, 
the country’s oil industry needs an estimated $1 billion in annual investments 
according to Russian Energy Minister Igor Yusufov. 246 Analysts believe that the 
Russian oil sector needs to raise vast sums of money, both short- and long-term, to 
undertake neglected capital expenditure programs to arrest future production declines, 
rehabilitate existing well bores, upgrade inefficient refining facilities, increase 
refining depth, alleviate export bottlenecks, and repair or replace an aging pipeline 
system.247 Russia's rate of oil production is exceeding its rate of discovery of new 
reserves by a significant margin, and the depletion of existing oilfields in West 
Siberia has raised fears that Russia's current oil boom will be followed by a sharp 
decline in the next few years. Although Russian oil majors like Yukos, Sibneft, and 
Lukoil are producing more oil in West Siberia from well ‘workovers’ and 
technological applications and are benefiting immensely from high world oil prices, a 
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required to maintain Russian oil production at healthy levels is USD 13 billion annually. A director at 
the Fuel and Energy Ministry, Irik Amirov, puts this amount between $5-15 billion/year. 
247 Mark Gyetvay (Partner, Global Energy and Mining. PriceWaterhouse Coopers) “The Russian 
Dilemma,” Oil and Capital X (1999): 13,14. 
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decline in Russia's oil production from the mature West Siberian oil province is less a 
question of "if" than of "when." Thus, in order to sustain and increase Russia's oil 
production from current levels, large amounts of capital will be needed to develop 
new fields and to extend the life of existing oilfields with exhausted and low-yield 
reserves. Even though some Russian oil producers are using their profits to invest in 
exploration and new drilling projects, capital requirements to develop new 
technologically-challenging offshore deposits is expected to come from external 
sources, especially in the form of foreign direct investments (FDI) from international 
oil companies.  
Yet despite the obvious need for foreign capital and explicit efforts by the 
government to attract foreign capital to reform its oil industry and sustain high 
production levels, in the first decade of its existence Russia has received far less 
foreign investment than it could, both relative to the size of its economy and in 
comparison with other emerging markets. In 1998 for example, according to the 
Moscow Times, Russia’s FDI averaged a paltry sum of $1.5 billion, equating to 1% of 
GDP or $10 per capita, roughly equal to Macedonia, Tajikistan and Belarus.248 
Between 1994-2001, Russia received about $ 21.5 billion in total FDI, of which $3.2 
billion went into the oil sector. As discussed in the first chapter, with almost 6 times 
the oil reserves of Azerbaijan, Russia received 7 times less FDI for each barrel of its 
                                                          
248 Mark Gyetvay, “Restructuring, consolidating top solutions for Russia’s major oil companies’ 
woes,” Oil and Gas Journal 98:11 (March 13, 2000). 
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oil reserves than Azerbaijan.249 According to the same UNCTAD FDI Performance 
Index, Russia ranked the 108th and 104th highest among 140 nations during 1994-96 
and 1998-00 respectively.  Even though there are positive signs of increasing FDI in 
Russia today, there is still suspicion and hesitation on the part of the investors to 
make long-term commitments.250 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economic factors cannot account for the dismal levels of FDI going into the 
Russian oil sector. The potential of the oil sector is enormous: proven reserves alone 
                                                          
249 Author’s own calculations based on UNCTAD 2002 Handbook of Statistics, U.S. Energy 
Information Administration Country Reports and BP Statistical Review 2002. These figures are 
calculated by dividing total FDI in oil over total proven oil reserves in that country. While Azerbaijan 
received 43 cents of investment per barrel of its proven reserves, Russia received 6 cents between 
1994-2001. 
250 For example, in February 2003, BP agreed to pay $6.75 billion to form a new Russian oil company. 
This deal is considered the largest single investment in post-Soviet Russia.  
Figure 5.1: Russian Oil Production 
and Consumption* 
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are 48 billion barrels, representing approximately 4.6 % of the world total.251 
Moreover the proximity of some of the Russian oil regions to growing markets in the 
Asia-Pacific region makes them very attractive for multinational oil companies to 
pursue oil development projects there. Finally, the skilled labor force and relatively 
low production costs put Russia at an advantage when compared to many other oil 
producers that similarly compete for foreign investment. Given the commercial 
attractiveness of the region, the foreign oil companies, since the beginning of the 
1990s, have regularly announced their intentions to commit huge sums of capital to 
arrest the decline of Russian oil industry.  
In this chapter, I argue that the instability of the investment environment in 
Russia explains the low levels of foreign investment into its oil sector. Russia falls 
short on investment conditions compatible with international practice. These 
conditions include clear and reasonable tax regime, which allows an equitable return 
on investment, a stable set of rules, and an equal opportunity to obtain and exercise 
rights to the oil fields. The creation of the Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) 
regime, which was offered as the only way for Russia to meet these conditions in the 
oil industry, has been a major test for the Russian state. Supporters of PSAs contend 
that the struggles over the PSA regime conservatively cost the oil industry billions of 
dollars of capital investments, let alone the lost revenues in tax collections to the 
country’s federal and local coffers and the missed opportunities to create much 
                                                          
251 U.S. Department of Energy, Country Analysis: Russia (October 2001), Energy Information 
Administration  (www. eia.doe.gov). 
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needed employment.252 The state’s net revenue from fields already put on the PSA 
List Law and those whose eligibility for development on PSA terms is currently being 
considered by the State Duma may reach $100 billion.253 No other source in the 
national economy can yield as much in the foreseeable future.254  
Mikhail Subbotin, who leads the group of PSA analysts in the Russian 
Ministry of Energy, believes that ‘optimistic investors’ of the early 1990s and 
‘realistic investors’ of the mid-1990s have been replaced in the late 1990s by 
‘observer investors’, standoffishly monitoring new clashes around the fundamental 
PSA law. Investors have waited for years for ‘normal’ legislation that ensures a 
reliable mechanism for investment and return of investment, which has given them 
grounds for assuming a wait-and-see stance. When compared to other countries in 
terms of political risks, Russia has performed dismally. According to the World 
Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report in 1999, Russia was the last out 
of 59 countries in competitiveness rankings. The International Institute for 
Management Development’s World Competitiveness Rating study placed Russia last 
                                                          
252 Gyetvay (2000), 4. 
253  Irik Amirov, “Simplify PSA Law substantially- or investors will go” Oil and Capital III (2000): 12. 
Since Sakhalin Energy’s contract (the first grandfathered PSA) became effective in 1996, the private 
sector consortium has paid $40 million of a $100 million bonus due over five years to the local 
Sakhalin Development Fund. It also paid $45 million in pre-production to the Ministry of Fuel and 
Energy and Sakhalin governor I.P.Fakhutdinov’s administration. 
254 Experience in other parts of the world shows that every dollar invested in oil projects generates four 
dollars to the economy. In economic jargon, this is called the multiplier effect.  
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out of 47 countries in its 1999 study. Finally, a survey in the Mining Journal (October 
1999) gave Russia the lowest ranking among the emerging countries.255 
In the first part of this chapter, I discuss the history of relations between 
foreign investors and the Russian state. After describing the state of the investment 
environment in the last decade, I discuss alternative explanations for why Russia 
fared so poorly in the international competition to attract foreign investment. Finally, 
I analyze the relationship between Russia’s political regime and its oil policy and 
trace the sources of instability to the limited institutionalized competition that its 
hybrid regime has produced. In the conclusion, I discuss the political alternatives 
facing the Russian government today as it struggles to improve the investment 
environment and to finally attract the much-needed foreign capital into the economy.  
 
II. History of Relations Between Investors and the Government 
i. The Background: Oil Investment Policy in the Soviet Union 
Early oil in Russia was produced in Baku (which was then part of the Russian 
empire) by Western investors, such as the Nobel brothers and the Rothschilds, who 
dominated the domestic Russian market and also supplied oil to Western Europe right 
up to the Russian revolution.  After the revolution in 1917 and until 1987, overall 
there was a negative attitude towards foreign investment as part of the communist 
                                                          
255 Glenn Waller, “Russia needs to establish a track record- Waller demolishes Russian PSA Myths” 
Oil &Capital III (2000): 16-18. 
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anti-imperial policy. Following the nationalization of foreign assets, foreign investors 
immediately fled Russia.256  
Only during Lenin’s New Economic Policy in the 1920s, there was a brief 
period in the history of the Soviet Union in which foreign investors were invited to 
form joint ventures with the Soviet state, but only in export-oriented sectors. While 
many Western oil companies protested forced nationalization and refused to 
cooperate with the Soviets, others, such as Standard Oil of New York, continued to 
invest in Russia. Western technology and investment enabled Russian oil production 
to recover and by 1923 Russian oil exports to Europe rose to their pre-revolution 
levels.257 After Lenin, however, Stalin abolished these joint ventures and forbid the 
creation of such entities.258 Not only was foreign capital strictly forbidden, but also 
even the mention of the word ‘capital’ was intolerable.259  
                                                          
256 Based on an interview with Ninel Voznesenskaya, professor at the Institute of State and Law, 
Moscow, April 20, 2001.  
257 Tina Obut, “Roots of systemic woes in Russian oil sector traceable to industry’s evolution,” Oil and 
Gas Journal 97:4 (25 Jan, 1999.) 
258 Ironically even though the Soviet state did not permit foreign capital to operate in the Soviet Union, 
Russian capital was permitted to participate in joint ventures in several parts of the world. After the 
WWII for instance, the German shares in some of the companies in Eastern European countries were 
transferred to the Soviet state. Once again there were joint ventures with Russian participation, but 
outside of the Soviet Union. Even though eventually these shares were passed on to the host 
governments, it still was an interesting experience for Soviet capital operating in other countries as 
their foreign investment. Another such incidence took place in the 1960s with joint ventures in Africa 
during the de-colonization period. According to Ninel Voznesenskaya, many countries in Africa 
announced that their economic zones in the territorial waters were 200 miles and not only 12 and 
invited the Russian fleet to operate with them in joint ventures in fishing activities.  In exchange for 
vessels, the Soviet state was given licenses to catch fish and then export. There were around 100 joint 
ventures formed and they were very successful. 
259 According to Ninel Voznesenskaya, if for instance a scholar had to use this word, he had to put it in 
a negative context by adding that foreign capital brings with it the exploitation of the workers. This is 
why in most of the Soviet texts of that period; one is likely to see other words such as “resources, 
income, funds” etc. instead of the word “capital.” This clearly symbolized the pure political, negative 
attitude towards foreign investment during this period. 
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 In the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, Russia’s domestic consumption of oil grew 
rapidly, causing a reduction of Russian oil exports. The 1950s saw resurgence in 
Russian oil exports due to massive investments in the newly discovered Volga-Urals 
oil province. By the early 1960s, the Soviets had replaced the Venezuelans as the 
second largest oil producer in the world and had once again become major 
competitors with the West. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Russians discovered the 
Tyumen and Samotlar oil basins in Western Siberia. Production from these basins 
increased rapidly to make Western Siberia the major oil-producing region of the 
Soviet Union by 1980.  
 The Soviet state viewed an uninterrupted supply of oil as crucial to economic 
progress. Therefore, under the administrative command economy, the country’s 
energy sector was bound by law to provide oil to domestic industries and consumers 
at prices significantly below that of the world market. Under Soviet rule, the oil 
industry was regulated by a group of Soviet ministries that wielded complete control. 
This centralized control of oil assets led to overproduction of existing fields to meet 
production quotas without regard for proper reservoir-management practices. The 
Soviet state favored the exploitation of big reservoirs rather than small ones with 
inefficient techniques, such as water flooding, that resulted in permanent damage to 
oil fields. Moreover, since there was no market-driven incentive to improve operating 
efficiency, the Soviet state chronically under-invested in technology. These systemic 
problems with Soviet era policy, combined with the continued deterioration of the 
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Western Siberia reserve base, resulted in a steady decline in Russian oil production 
from late 1980s onwards.260  
To reverse the dramatic decline in oil production, on Jan 13th 1987, 
Gorbachev adopted a decree permitting the formation of joint ventures. It was a very 
short decree, outlining only the basic principles but not specifying the details of the 
legal relationship or many issues critical to the oil industry, such as taxation, freedom 
of export, transportation and the question of government participation.261 Following 
Gorbachev’s decree, two government acts, number 48 and 49, were issued. 
Government Act number 48 permitted the organization of joint ventures with the 
participation of socialist countries, while Act number 49 permitted the creation of JVs 
with the capitalist and developing countries. Not only was this arrangement 
problematic for situations when an investor from each group was included in a JV but 
it was also significant in depicting the lingering mentality of separating the socialist 
camp from the rest of the world. Even though from a legal standpoint, there was not 
much difference between these two acts, symbolically it reflected a continuation of 
the discriminatory attitude towards Western foreign investors.262 
The Soviet Union had no laws regulating oil and gas development with the 
participation of foreign investors. A joint venture oil project had to get a special 
approval by a government decree issued by the then USSR Council of Ministers that 
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261 David R. Nelson, “Russia’s Production Sharing Law-A Foundation for Progress,” Oil &Gas 
Journal 94:5 (Jan.29, 1996): 106-108. 
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established the terms and conditions of the project. The first step in such a process 
was for the Soviet and foreign partners to draft an agreement with the advisory 
participation of either the Ministry of Oil and Gas (Minneftegaz) or the Ministry of 
Geology (Mingeo). The next step was to obtain approval of the Council of Ministers 
of the Republic where the deposit was located. The project then had to be submitted 
to the State Mining Supervisory Board and the USSR Council of Ministers, which 
finally issued the decree. After this, the joint venture could register with the Ministry 
of Finance.  
Without any corporate legislation and any clear-cut specifications as to the 
type of the legal entity that was created and how it was organized, the initial interest 
by foreign investors turned into disappointment with many JVs forming, but very 
little capital actually entering the economy. As some people called it, the initial 
euphoria of partnerships at this period proved to be just ‘foam.’263 Examination of the 
oil development during the Soviet Union demonstrates how the pattern of ‘lost 
opportunities’ did not suddenly appear in Russia in 1991. As Thane Gustafson noted a 
decade ago, the dominant characteristic of the energy sector in Soviet times was that 
of ‘crisis amidst plenty.’264 
 
 
                                                          
263 Ibid. 
264 Peter Rutland, “Lost Opportunities: Energy and Politics in Russia,” NBR Analysis 8:5 (NBR 
Publications, December 1997). Rutland here is quoting from Thane Gustafson’s Crisis Amidst Plenty: 
The Politics of Soviet Energy Under Brezhnev and Gorbachev (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1991.) 
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ii. Oil Investment Regime of the new Russian state 
 Despite a plethora of laws governing the oil and gas activities and foreign 
investment in general, Russia lacked comprehensive natural resource legislation.265 
The fundamental legislative act for natural resource development in Russia has been 
the Law on Underground Resources (LUR) adopted on February 21, 1992. In the 
early 1990s, except for some service contracts, the only regulated form of investment 
in the Russian petroleum sector was the establishment of a legal entity, typically a 
joint venture, which had to be granted a license to carry out all petroleum activities. 
The LUR provided a general framework for licensing exploration and development 
activities relating to minerals and other subsurface resources, including hydrocarbons. 
Under this law, petroleum exploration, development and production could take place 
as a result of a license issued jointly by the Russian Federation Ministry of Natural 
Resources and the legislative authorities of the territory in which petroleum 
operations were to be conducted.266  In terms of the financial aspects, the LUR 
                                                          
265 In 1991, the new Russian state passed the Foreign Investment Law (FIL), allowing the creation of 
other forms of investment in addition to joint ventures. Together with this law, there was a substantial 
body of other Russian laws and regulations that bore on oil exploration and production activities. 
Commercial relations were generally regulated by the Russian Civil Code of November 30, 1994, 
which set forth the applicable principles governing contracts, international transactions, forms of legal 
entities and other matters. Procedures for licenses were governed by a variety of regulations adopted 
on the federal and local level. Environmental issues arising from the exploration and production of oil 
were governed by the Russian law “On Environment Protection” of December 19, 1991 and the 
Russian Federation Law “On Ecology Expertise” of November 23, 1995. The use of land arising in 
connection with the exploration and production of oil was governed by the Land Code of the Russian 
Federation of April 25, 1991 and several Presidential decrees and numerous regulations issued by 
various federal and local bodies. Taxation was governed by a comprehensive set of laws and 
regulations. Financing exploration and production ventures from foreign sources was subject to foreign 
currency control regulations that are contained in the Laws “On Foreign Investments” of July 4, 1991 
and “On Foreign Currency Regulation and Control” of October 9, 1992. 
266 In July 1992, the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation approved the Regulations of the 
Procedure for Licensing the Use of the Subsurface. These regulations addressed the licensing 
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contemplated various kinds of payments to be made by those who explored and 
extracted subsurface resources. Such payments included charges for the issuance of a 
license, payments for the right to use subsurface resources, payments for resource 
replenishment and excise taxes. On February 8, 1995, the State Duma approved 
amendments to the LUR, which took effect on March 15, 1995.267  
The licensing regime depicted in the LUR, however, has not provided 
sufficient security, stability or predictability for private investors. In fact, it has raised 
a number of concerns for investors, which all stemmed from the fact that licenses and 
the licensing procedures were based on administrative law, rather than on contractual 
rights and obligations. This implied that the foreign investors were subject to state 
legislative action that could result in unilateral changes and modifications of the 
license, without granting the foreign investor any right to prevent or influence this 
process. The nature of a licensee’s rights under a license was not very clear. These 
rights did not appear to be property rights and they were open to change by new laws 
and regulations with no provision for compensating the licensee. For instance, the 
existing law and applicable regulations allowed a license to be terminated by the 
licensing agency in a wide range of situations without compensating the licensee and 
without adequate protection against the abuse of these powers. The grounds for 
terminating a license included events that were beyond the licensee’s control, i.e. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
procedure in greater detail than LUR. Accordingly, licenses were to be granted by means of 
competitive tenders or auctions. A license to engage in geographic exploration could be issued for a 
period of up to five years while a license to produce hydrocarbons for a period of up to twenty-five 
years.  
267 Levshov, 28. 
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force majeure circumstances. Adding to this difficulty were the provisions defining 
the duration of the license. The specified license term limited flexibility to provide for 
longer terms required by the difficulties of particular field conditions. The provisions 
for extension of the term did not provide adequate assurances that the extensions 
would be forthcoming.  
Moreover, the legal hierarchy established under the 1993 Constitution was not 
very clear as to the distribution of authority between the Federation and the subjects 
of the Federation, where oil reserves were located. Article 72 of the Constitution 
assigned questions of ownership and use of subsurface resources to the jurisdiction of 
both federal and regional governments. Even though it also stated that regional laws 
falling under such joint jurisdiction could not contradict federal law, in reality there 
were ambiguities as to the power of the regions to bypass federal laws.  
Finally, the severity of the tax burden under these laws was rivaled only by 
the frequency and unpredictability with which it changed. Many taxes-most notably 
the export tax- were levied not on profits, but on revenues. This was problematic for 
foreign investors who were often pursuing projects with high costs and low margins 
in those fields, which had been declared uneconomic by Russian production 
associations. A 1993 estimate suggested that the total tax burden on some Western oil 
producing operations was as high as 65-70% of revenues.268  
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In addition to heavy tax burden, the tax system was also too changeable, 
creating uncertainty and inconsistency.269 Export duties have changed perhaps a 
dozen times under this regime. Exporters have struggled with cumbersome and 
restrictive quota and licensing requirements, only to be plunged into confusion when 
the restrictions were lifted with no clear procedures for fair access to overburdened 
pipelines replacing them.270  
Many of the joint ventures that were established in early 1990s produced 
technical success in the sense that they succeeded in significantly raising production 
in the fields.271 However, they were not considered an economic success for foreign 
investors. After nearly ten years, not any one of the joint ventures has recovered its 
capital costs, largely because the original fiscal terms on which the investments were 
made were later changed. As a result many of these joint ventures closed and some 
Western companies left Russia. There has been no major new foreign investment in 
non-PSA energy projects in Russia since then. As a joint venture senior executive told 
                                                          
269 For instance, when White Nights joint venture was formed in 1991 it was subject to only four taxes, 
but by early 1993 this had risen to eleven, radically altering the economics of the project. Similarly, 
Gulf Canada cut off all additional investment in an oilfield near the Arctic Circle, where it had already 
committed $60 million. The company stated that its Russian tax bill exceeded 100% of its total 
revenues.  
270Kaj Hober, “The Russian Law on Production Sharing Agreements,” East/West Executive Guide 
(April 1997.) 
271 Some of the most important joint ventures were the US firm Phibro Energy’s White Nights venture 
with West Siberian production association Vareganneftegaz; Conoco and Arkhangelskgeologiya’s 
Polar Lights project to develop fields in the Timan Pechora region of northern Russia; and 
Occidental’s partnership with the West Siberian company Chernorneft. In 1993 there were a total of 42 
petroleum JVs registered in Russia, and by 1994 this figure had risen to 70.  
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Reuters in 1999, “the Russian government absolutely strangled the life out of every 
nascent joint venture right at the beginning.”272 
Given these problems with the existing legal and fiscal framework, the 
preferred form of investment in the petroleum sector soon became the production 
sharing agreements (PSA). The French company, Elf Acquitaine became the first 
company to sign a PSA with the Russian government in February 1992, when it 
contracted to develop fields in the Volgograd and Saratov oblasti. In 1994, Sakhalin 
Energy (a consortium comprising Marathon, McDermott, Mitsui, Royal Dutch/Shell 
and Mitsubishi) signed a similar contract (Sakhalin II) to develop oil and natural gas 
deposits off Sakhalin Island, and in July 1995, Exxon and the Japanese company 
Sodeco signed the Sakhalin I contract to develop other fields in the same island. 
Other major potential PSAs included the plans of Amoco and Shell to exploit large 
Western Siberian fields in cooperation with Russian partners Yuganskneftegaz and 
Evikhon respectively. None of these companies, however, was prepared to invest 
money in a commercial-scale production before the passing of a law to regulate 
PSAs.  
The PSA law is preferred by foreign investors because it puts them in a much 
more secure position and protects their rights for the life of their projects.273 Unlike 
                                                          
272 Quote taken from “Firms wait on laws in Russia’s black gold rush,” The Russia Journal 21: 64 
(June 5, 2000.) 
273 It is important to note that concessionary licensing is commercially more profitable for both the host 
government and the investors. Opting for a PSA regime is a political and psychological need for 
stability. If a reasonable tax system is in place and the investors trust that it will not be changed 
arbitrarily, then the investors prefer the concessionary licensing. PSA is, therefore, a developing 
country phenomenon.  
    169
the LUR, which provides a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ arrangement between the licensee and 
the state in that the licensee’s rights derive from a non-negotiable license, the PSA 
Law provides that the state is bound by the contractual obligations to the investor and 
should be liable for breach of contract.274 It also provides a regulatory framework for 
oil contracts, in particular establishing which government agency would be 
empowered to conclude production sharing contracts with foreign companies and 
most importantly, how exactly the project would be protected from any subsequent 
changes in other laws. Finally it permits the investor to submit disputes to binding 
arbitration in an international tribunal.275 Thus, investors can confidently commit 
billions of dollars to a project, knowing they have managed as much as possible the 
known manageable risks.  
Just like the investor, the Russian state would also enjoy certain benefits under 
the PSA Law. The chief benefit for the state is the claim of greater national control 
over natural resources and oil companies.276 Under PSAs, the state keeps title to the 
land and resources and retains a significant portion of the natural resource product. 
By creating a stable and transparent system, the state is provided with opportunities 
for collecting investors’ payments into the stable budget- opportunities that cannot be 
                                                          
274 Note however that PSA investors and producers are still required to obtain a license. The difference, 
in theory, is now a mandatory formality on the part of the government, rather than a discretionary 
administrative act.  
275 Coudert Brothers, “The challenge of international diversification in the oil and gas industry,” 
International Financial Law Review (1997): 5-6. 
276 Author’s interview with Daniel Lefebvre (Yukos) Moscow, April 23,2001.  
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yet secured by the current tax regime.277 The PSA regime also provides direct support 
for domestic producers who are competing in the world market for capital intended 
for direct investment.278  
Furthermore, with the enactment of the PSA law, new forms of relations 
between the center and regions emerge, opportunities for their cooperation on equal 
terms are created, and the real replenishment of local budgets is secured. Under the 
PSA law, the government of the Russian Federation and a body of executive power of 
the subject conclude a preliminary agreement stipulating the degree of their 
participation in a certain project, control functions, and the terms of the surplus of 
production sharing between budgets of various levels.279    
Given these characteristics, the PSA law in Russia was designed to ‘jump-
start’ the oil and gas investment process by immediately establishing a special legal 
regime for PSAs. It was meant to insulate investors from many risks that JVs faced. 
However, the PSA regime could not be developed timely and smoothly in Russia. In 
fact the struggles over its development proved more problematic than any of the 
attempts before it. It would be possible to argue that the restructuring of the oil 
                                                          
277 For instance, as of January 2000, investors in the only working PSA projects in Russia- Sakhalin 1 
and Sakhalin 2- had paid more than $100 million to the federal and local budgets, and the state’s 
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industry, as reflected in the PSA process, has been one of the fiercest struggles that 
the new Russian state had to go through in its first decade of existence.  
 
iii. The Evolution of the PSA regime: “Progress Stalled Again” 
 Russia is a textbook setting for the use of PSAs. It is rich in hydrocarbon 
resources, but lacks the financial and technical means to develop them efficiently. 
Moreover its tax and legal regime have been too unpredictable and burdensome to 
attract large-scale, long-term investments. However, despite the immediate need for 
it, the creation of a PSA regime that encompasses the PSA law and the necessary 
regulations for its implementation has not been fully completed over the course of a 
decade.  
 Russian lawmakers had begun making provisions for PSAs even before the 
break-up of the Soviet Union. The concept first entered the legislative arena in July 
1991, with the Foreign Investment Law (FIL). Article 40 called for the enactment of a 
specific piece of legislation establishing procedures by which foreigners could 
acquire concessions over natural resources.280 However, such enabling legislation was 
not quick to follow.  And rather than wait for PSA legislation, many foreign 
companies chose instead to pursue projects through the already established joint-
venture framework. Almost all JVs have at one point or another been hit hard by the 
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very thing that PSAs are designed to protect against: fluctuations in the tax and legal 
regimes.  
 1994 was an important year for the PSA process. Galvanized by the continued 
reluctance of foreign investors, Russian authorities focused in earnest on creating an 
adequate PSA law. Already on December 24, 1993, Yeltsin had signed the 
Presidential Decree No. 2285, outlining the general features that PSA enabling 
legislation should contain, and called on the new Duma to pass a law embodying 
these proposals. Over the course of a year, no fewer than three special working 
groups answered the President’s call and set to work drafting the new legislation.281  
 Under the direction of the head of the Legal Department of the Presidential 
Administration, Ruslan Gennadievich Orekhov, and his executive officer, Alexander 
Sergevich Pashkov, the first group came forth with an initial draft early in the 
summer. The draft was submitted for comments to a broad variety of groups, 
including foreign legal specialists. The second group came from the Ministry of Fuel 
and Energy (MFE). Deputy Minister Vadim Anatolievich Dvurechensky has been 
leading the Ministry’s efforts to draw up draft PSA legislation. By the end of 1994, 
the MFE’s group joined forces with the presidential administration group to author a 
single, common draft, which came to be known as the “government draft.” The third 
group, on the other hand, was the inter-ministerial working group, led by Andrei 
Aleksandrovich Konoplyanik and technocrats from different ministers. In addition to 
drawing up enabling legislation, this group focused on drafting the normative acts, the 
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instructions to be used by ministries in implementing the general precepts of a PSA 
law. This group also worked up a ‘model’ PSA contract to provide guidelines for 
actual contracts. Soon the Yabloko party in the State Duma sponsored this draft, 
which eventually became known as the “Duma draft.” Both of these competing 
versions of a PSA law were submitted to the State Duma for debate in December 
1994. The failure of the backers of these two drafts to reach an agreement was the key 
factor holding back initial parliamentary approval of the Law on PSA.282  
The session of the State Duma of February 24, 1995, finally adopted the  
Duma’s draft Law On Production Sharing Agreements in the first reading and voted 
down the government draft. Overall 162 members voted for it, 19 voted against it and 
7 abstained. The PSA law that was adopted by the State Duma on June 14, 1995 
simultaneously in the second and the third reading was not, however, approved by the 
upper house of the parliament, the Federation Council on October 3, 1995.283 As the 
law did not gain the necessary number of votes (for –64; against-41; and abstained- 
4), it was voted down because of disagreement with some of its provisions and passed 
to the State Duma for a new consideration. At the same time, a Conciliatory 
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Commission was set up to reconcile the differences between the two houses. Finally 
on December 6, 1995, the State Duma adopted the revised PSA law. On December 
19, 1995, it was approved by the Federation Council and on December 30, 1995, it 
was signed by the President. The PSA law got published on January 11, 1996 and 
from this date on came into force.  
Even though the basic PSA law was enacted in January 1996, foreign 
investors still did not find the investment environment stable enough to start their 
projects. For instance, Exxon released a statement that the law “will not provide the 
stable foundation upon which the legal framework required to attract foreign 
investments can be developed.” A Texaco spokesman concurred saying “it is not a 
law that you can depend on in terms of your exports, your tax rates, your ability to 
gain a reasonable economic return.”284 Western oil companies raised their concerns 
with Russian authorities and legislators at such forums as the Gore-Chernomyrdin 
Commission meetings, Petroleum Advisory Forum, the Congressional US-FSU 
Energy Caucasus and other institutions.285  
Except for the three PSAs that were signed before the adoption of the law and 
that were grandfathered when the law took effect, no other project gained any 
momentum.286 The reasons for this stalemate were the shortcomings of the core PSA 
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law on the one hand, and conflicts between the PSA law and various subsoil use, tax, 
customs, and foreign trade laws on the other.  
 The core PSA law was not consistent on key contractual issues such as the 
priority of civil law arrangements, the transfer and pledge of PSA rights and dispute 
resolutions. The drafters did not clearly classify the relationship between the state and 
the investor under a PSA as purely contractual. Article 1.3 of the draft provided that 
the ‘rights and obligations of the parties to a production sharing agreement which are 
civil in nature shall be governed by this Federal Law and the civil legislation of the 
Russian Federation.’ According to some, this implied that certain rights and 
obligations of the parties to the PSA are not civil in nature, and as such, would be 
governed by administrative law principles. On its face, the text of the law was unclear 
as to where the line was to be drawn and did not identify those provisions which were 
not civil in nature.287 
 Compounding this confusion was a provision of the law, added at the 
insistence of the Federation Council, stating that provisions of a PSA may not conflict 
with the provisions of the LUR. Since the LUR’s administrative approach 
fundamentally conflicted with the PSA law’s civil contract approach, there was no 
clear way of determining how disputes over critical issues such as issuance, 
suspension and termination of mineral rights were to be resolved. This ambiguity and  
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the possibility that certain provisions of a PSA could be governed by administrative 
law created the risk of broader administrative discretion by supervisory authorities, 
greater liability exposure for the investor and non-arbitration of disputes.288 
 A last minute amendment to the draft PSA Law imposing broad legislative 
approval requirements also caused concern among foreign investors. Accordingly, 
exploration and development under a PSA would be permissible only for fields and 
blocks named in a list that was approved by the legislature. In addition to this first 
approval, the law also envisaged a second and final legislative approval for any PSA 
that has been awarded without a tender as well as PSAs with respect to fields which 
are located on the continental shelf and fields involving ‘special state strategic 
interests.’ In essence, this meant that after the investor negotiated a deal with the 
federal and local authorities, the deal could be renegotiated on the demand of the 
Russian legislature as a condition for its approval. Given the difficult legislative path 
already faced by the PSA law, the requirements of legislative approval for each 
individual PSA and any amendments to them caused justified consternation among 
investors. For them, this requirement was unprecedented around the world in 
countries using PSAs. 
 Another shortcoming of the final draft of this law was the provision that 
regulated the export of oil production. One of the key benefits provided by the 
original draft of the PSA law was the unrestricted right to export an investor’s share 
of production from the Russian Federation in accordance with the terms of the 
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agreement, free from any restrictions such as export quotas, licensing requirements or 
the mandatory sale of production through designated organizations. This protection 
was weakened in the final version of the law by the addition of the clause permitting 
export restrictions to be imposed in accordance with the law “On State Regulation of 
Foreign Trade Activity.” This law permitted the introduction of export restrictions or 
prohibitions based on ‘national interests’, which were defined to include 
environmental protection, ‘the necessity of preventing the depletion of non-renewable 
natural resources, if measures relating to this are taken simultaneously with the 
introduction of restrictions on domestic production and consumption of the relevant 
natural resources,’ and ‘protection of the external financial situation and support of 
the balance of payments of the Russian Federation.’ The uncertainty introduced by 
this exception could have potentially raised the costs of financing a PSA, since 
lenders would demand a higher margin to assume the risk associated with a possible 
cut off of project revenue.289  
 Another significant benefit provided by the original draft PSA law was the 
ability to choose foreign law to govern the contractual relationship between the state 
and the investor, which was a significant step toward recognition of the realities of 
cross-border contractual relationship in the energy sector. The use of a foreign law to 
govern PSA would reduce political risks because it would prevent the state from 
obtaining an unfair advantage over the investor by manipulating its domestic laws. In 
addition to being neutral, the laws of a foreign country with a more highly developed 
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legal system would be better suited to the specific requirements of multinational oil 
projects. However, the final version of the PSA law was amended in such a way to 
make it clear that PSAs were governed by the Russian law. Given the developing 
status of Russian law and the possibility of unexpected changes that might affect the 
interpretation of the liabilities under a PSA, this was a very unwelcome term for the 
investors. 
 Furthermore, the stabilization provisions of the PSA law were weakened by an 
amendment introduced by the Federation Council, which required the amendment of 
a PSA on the demand of one party ‘in the event of a material change in circumstances 
in accordance with the Civil Code of the Russian Federation’. The Civil Code 
permitted juridical reformation of a contract in these circumstances, but the 
conditions that had to be met in order to grant such a unilateral amendment were very 
stringent.  
Finally, the taxes and accounting provisions that would apply to PSA projects 
under this law could not be effectively put in force until additional legislative action, 
i.e. amendments to the Tax Code, took place. This conclusion was based on an old 
Russian Supreme Soviet Decree and the Law on Fundamentals of the Budgetary 
System and Budgeting Process in the Russian Federation, which stipulated that no 
changes could be made to the Russian tax system except through the adoption of new 
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tax laws or the amendment of existing tax laws. As a result, taxes could not be 
introduced or changed through non-tax laws.290 
Given these shortcomings in the final version of the core PSA law, no PSA 
project was given a start during this period. The investors demanded further 
amendments to this law, including the elimination or curtailment of the role of the 
legislature and resolution of fundamental conflicts with the LUR. Moreover, 
regulations were needed to set forth detailed rules for taxation, determination of 
recoverable costs, accounting and other matters. Amendments to a number of other 
laws and regulations were expected to implement the PSA law’s tax exemptions, to 
eliminate conflicts with the existing licensing system, to permit the use of 
internationally recognized technical and safety standards and thus harmonize the legal 
system. It had taken a long time, almost three years, and much difficulty before the 
basic PSA Law became effective in January 1996. It was, however, only a first step. 
There was still ahead the task of providing the list of fields to be developed under 
PSA as well as the amendments and enabling legislation to be adopted to allow the 
basic law to operate. 
 In 1996-97, the government, together with the regional authorities, prepared a 
number of bills with the lists of fields allowed for PSA and submitted them to the 
State Duma. The lists contained over 250 deposits, including 213 deposits of 
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hydrocarbons, located in 32 administrative regions of the Russian Federation.291 After 
Duma’s pro-communist majority rejected previous drafts, finally in July 1997, it 
approved only seven out of 250 deposits in the first List Law. 292 However, not a 
single project out of these legally permitted seven deposits was signed. The basic 
PSA law still proved to be insufficient without modification in the existing legislation 
on tax, customs, foreign investment, as well as regulations for the use of underground 
resources in the offshore zones.  
 First, in July 1997, a PSA Commission was created. Then a year later in July 
1998 the Amendments Law, which became known as ‘ the ultra nationalist 
amendment,’ was introduced. The Federation Council, however, returned this law to 
the State Duma on September 4, 1998, with a number of critical remarks. The 
Council was mostly concerned about the provision in this draft on the limit imposed 
on the share of discovered reserves that would be subject to development under PSA. 
This July version of the law, established this share for the oil sector at 10%, which 
had been already exceeded at that moment and would hamper future projects under 
PSA.  
With the help of the conciliatory commission, which was set up to resolve the 
conflicts between the two houses of the parliament, the new Duma committee 
responsible for PSAs drafted a new version of the Amendment Law. Hence, after 
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another three years of debating, the Federal Law on the Introduction of Amendments 
and Additions into the Law on Production Sharing Agreements was signed on January 
14th 1999 and shortly after it became effective as of 17 February 1999. The PSA 
Amending Law and the Enabling Law, together, resolved many of the legal 
uncertainties that had been retarding major work on the few PSAs already signed and 
that had been delaying the negotiation and signing of several others.  
First of all, the contradictions between LUR and PSA Law as to whether PSAs 
would be treated as civil-law contracts under a special, self-contained PSA regime or 
would be subject to the general LUR licensing/administrative law regime, has been 
clarified in favor of PSA contract predominance. This fundamental improvement 
applied to such issues as bases for termination of rights, extension of the 
contract/license term, and field conservation measures.293 
Second, the special, stabilized regime of taxes and other payments for PSAs, 
enacted by Article 13 of the PSA in 1995 but subject to question since then as to its 
legal validity, has been confirmed through the Enabling Law by specific amendments 
to the relevant tax laws. As with taxes, exemptions from tariffs also had to be 
reflected in the proper legal act to be guaranteed under Russian law. The Amendment 
to the Customs Tariff Law and the Customs Code provided for import tariff 
exemption on goods brought into Russia at the investors’ expense for work on a PSA, 
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and export tariff exemption on goods taken out of Russia under the terms of a PSA.294 
Moreover, PSA investors’ right to freely export their share of production was fortified 
by an addition to the Law on State Regulation on Foreign Trade Activities, clarifying 
that any qualitative restrictions on exports introduced by the Russian government 
must take into account the state’s free-export obligation to investors under the PSA 
Law. 
Finally, another amendment to the PSA law permitted conclusion of PSAs 
without the approval of the State Duma for projects involving relatively small 
reserves of oil and gas (up to 25 million tons of oil and/or 250 billion cubic meters of 
gas.) This would give regions a larger role in the PSA process and save certain 
projects from lengthy debates in the parliament. Such reduction of the role of the 
parliament’s role in the PSA process was seen as a major accomplishment. In 
addition, the amendments largely abrogated the previous requirement that investors 
obtain Duma’s approval for specific PSAs involving larger deposits. Even though 
such fields still had to be included by the Duma on list laws before they could be 
eligible for a PSA status, the Russian government was now permitted to negotiate and 
implement PSA terms for individual projects without parliamentary approval (unless 
the projects involve national security interests, the Russian continental shelf, or an 
exclusive economic zone of the Russian Federation, in which case the Duma’s rubber 
stamp is needed). Along the same lines, the new legislation did not require Duma 
approval for conversion of previously existing non-PSA projects into PSAs in cases 
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where the subsoil users had already obtained a license, or for development under PSA 
terms of unexplored acreage that the Russian government may put up for tender.295   
Despite these positive steps, the PSA Amendments also introduced some new 
requirements, and restrictions that were not welcomed by foreign investors. 
Specifically, these amendments introduced quotas of 30% on the reserves that could 
be subject to PSA, 70% on the value of goods and services that must be purchased 
from Russian suppliers, and 80% as the minimum labor-force quota for Russian 
nationals. As the deputy chairman of the State Duma Economic Policy Committee, 
Svetlana Gvozdeva stated, with these conditions Russia was “creating a new iron 
curtain for investors.296  
As for the 30% quota, foreign investors saw it as a major deterrent to 
investment because the huge old reserves that were put under the first field list 
already filled up the quota, which meant that the list of new fields would be virtually 
closed.297 Investors likened this quota to Lenin’s limitation of foreign concessions in 
Soviet Union to 30% of Russian resources. Moreover, the quotas on labor and goods 
and services caused some concern among investors since using Russian goods and 
technology that were not competitive in respect to reliability, safety, quality and 
delivery times could stall major investment projects. Even though the Amendments to 
the PSA law and the Enabling Law are significant steps in bringing the investment 
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environment to a more favorable and workable position, some problems still remain. 
The fact that not a single PSA project has been started under this law is a proof of this 
fact.  
First of all, the so-called Normative Acts (detailed government-level 
regulations to implement the PSA Law), which have been circulating in various draft 
forms over the past years, still remain to be finalized and adopted. These important 
acts are expected to cover and fill in gray areas and gaps on such fundamental matters 
as taxation, accounting, cost recovery, and supplemental procedures for tenders and 
fore entry into PSAs. Of the Normative Acts, without which there cannot be an 
effective PSA regime, none has been completed satisfactorily after more than two 
years of drafting.  
Moreover, the PSA tax regime remains to be put in the Chapter 26 of the Tax 
Code (Part 2) in a way that does not undermine the PSA law. Part 1 of the new 
Russian Tax Code, creating a basic general legal framework for taxation, was enacted 
in July 1998. The need to put PSA tax regime is highlighted by article 18 of the Tax 
Code, which requires that special tax regimes be set forth in the Code. This legislation 
is of vital concern to investors in PSAs because, among other things, it will determine 
the level of the profit tax, which is levied on PSA partners along with non-PSA oil 
producers. 
In addition, there are about 6 draft laws covering yet more amendments to the 
basic PSA Law. One of the most significant amendments seeks to remove taxation 
from a PSA project altogether and allow direct distribution of production between the 
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government and the investor. According to the draft law’s authors, after this single 
tax is paid, or rather after a share of production or its equivalent is handed over to the 
state, the investor becomes the owner of the rest of oil and no longer has to deal with 
tax agencies.298 The proposed innovation is aimed at simplifying substantially the 
realization of PSAs since if adopted, investors would get a chance to ignore executive 
agencies’ inactivity that blocks work under PSAs. It is also useful for the state 
because it fixes the state’s take in production and encourages the investor to reduce 
production costs and increase profits that are not taxed. This one, unless drafted 
carefully however, could result in no or minimal foreign investment for Russia’s PSA 
projects because the introduction of a ‘single tax’ would mean that foreign investors 
could be subject to double taxation in their home countries.   
Other suggested draft laws would seek to impose limits on the length of time 
for PSA project negotiations, to mandate the purchase of Russian goods and services 
even if economically uncompetitive, to introduce a “third key” principle in which 
three instead of two levels of government would be required in PSA negotiation and 
to mandate approval by the Duma of all contracts concluded for PSA projects.299 
Thus, not only the shortcomings of existing laws stall foreign investment, but also the 
prospect of tinkering with the favorable provisions of the basic PSA law depicts a 
negative picture for the future of PSA developments. 
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In 2003 Russia has a PSA Law that took 9 years to prepare, but as yet it does 
not have an effective PSA regime. In the seven years since the 1996 PSA Law, 28 
fields have been put on the list of PSA projects whereas none, other than the grand 
fathered three projects, has been in effect. The total of investment in PSAs since 1993 
comes to only $1.5 billion.300 This is not even close to what is actually required to 
develop the industry. This is quite disappointing given that in Azerbaijan, for 
instance, 21 PSAs have been signed and in operation during the same period. Only 
PSAs can yield enough resources to give Russia a strong impetus in the investment 
sphere.  
Why is the Russian system of PSA developing so slowly, showing constant 
failures to attract the much-needed investment into the oil sector? Why is the 
investment policy of the Russian state so uncompetitive as compared with other 
countries? What explains the lack of state capacity in creating a PSA regime and 
leading the development of natural resources in Russia? Why does so much 
controversy surround the PSA law? Now in the next part of the chapter, I turn to the 
answers of these questions.  
 
III. Sources of Instability in the Investment Environment 
One of the sources of instability in Russia’s investment environment is seen in 
the deep-seated cultural opposition of Russians to the idea of foreign investment. 
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Russia’s history, not just in the Soviet period but going back centuries, has been one 
of isolation from the West and distrust of the outside world. This is often couched in 
terms of Russian national interests. The common fear is that Russia should not allow 
itself to be ‘colonized’ by Western investors and that it should not give away its 
natural resources to foreigners. This cultural hostility is best expressed in attitudes 
towards PSA. Many argue that adopting an investment regime that is used by third 
world countries is embarrassing for Russia. This pride is considered as one of the 
obstacles to a PSA regime in Russia.301 This suspicion of foreign investment is 
perhaps stronger in Russia when compared with other oil producing states because the 
Russians have discovered most of their oil and gas reserves themselves without 
foreign assistance, and hence are more reluctant to give them away. Russian oilmen 
can remember having built a successful, growing industry of their own and resent 
being patronized by Western counterparts who belittle their achievements.302  
Suspicion of Western involvement has not, however, been widespread as 
cultural arguments posit. Rather it depended on the type of investment project being 
considered and the extent of the control stakeholders have over that investment. 
When the Western side makes finance and technology available to the Russian party 
without seeking to obtain an equity stake in the project, it is normally welcomed with 
open arms. However, the idea of Western participation in the form of a joint venture 
or production sharing agreement arouses far greater suspicion. Such direct 
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participation has tended to be permitted only when there were significant, usually 
non-financial barriers to the independent development of resources by a Russian 
entity.303 Moreover, the nationalists and communists used this cultural and ideological 
rhetoric against foreign investment in order not to lose control over the resources that 
provide them with political and financial leverage.304 What is more interesting is that 
the PSAs that these groups so strongly oppose have been also promoted and used by 
Russian oil companies. This is a clear sign that opposition to PSA was less due to 
cultural hostility than political interests. In fact, in late 1998, when the responsibility 
to prepare the PSA amendments was transferred from the Natural Resources 
Committee (which was headed by a Yabloko deputy) to the Committee on Industry, 
Construction and Transportation, which would be headed by someone close to 
communists, PSA became a communist ‘issue.’305 
Another obstacle to a stable investment environment is seen in the geographic 
size of Russia and the resulting lack of coordination between its center and regions. 
The argument is that the central government can not afford to alienate or ignore 
regional actors. They have to be somewhat included in the decision making process, 
which makes consensus building fairly difficult. Therefore, as opposed to a small 
country, a large country like Russia produces many gatekeepers, which makes 
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politicization of investment issues more likely.  Others argue that the size of the 
economy makes Russia less dependent on foreign investment. It, in a way, provides 
some level of self-sufficiency and thus less need to integrate into the global economy. 
This is especially important in a strategic sector like the oil industry. Oil is not only 
the main source of government revenues for Russia, but it is also the main foreign 
policy instrument towards the near abroad and the West. Hence, geostrategically, it is 
more difficult for Russia to share the operation and control of this ‘commanding 
height’ with foreigners and become vulnerable to outside interference.  
Clearly, Russia’s culture, size and geostrategic concerns have produced 
constraints on the creation of a stable investment environment. Yet, the more 
important question is how determinative the weight of these factors has been as 
opposed to the impact of political regime in Russia in the last decade.  Unlike what 
these explanations assume, there was no consensus over investment policies, 
especially in the oil sector. While some groups used cultural, ideological and 
geostrategic reasons to oppose foreign investment, others were in favor of 
partnerships with foreign companies and supported the creation of an attractive and 
stable investment environment for them. As a result, these investment policies 
became very politicized and the Russian state faced fierce political struggles over 
them. Therefore, in order to understand the reasons why it has been so difficult to 
create a stable investment environment in Russia, we need to understand the interests 
of different actors and the institutions that shape these interests. The political regime 
enhances or constrains the capacity of different interest groups to influence policy 
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outcome. Now I turn to a discussion of the characteristics of the Russian political 
regime and the extent of institutionalized competition over oil policies.  
 
IV. Political Regime and Instability 
 During the 1993-2000 period, Russia has been a hybrid political regime. It had 
many components of democracy such as regular elections and free competition. 
However, it also failed to approximate an authentic democracy.306 This is why many 
scholars have labeled it  ‘low-caliber democracy,”(Fish, 2001) “bureaucratic quasi-
authoritarianism,” (Shevtsova 2001) “electoral democracy,” “unconsolidated 
democracy” etc.307 In this dissertation, I characterize Russia’s political regime during 
the 1990s as ‘hybrid’ due to the limited extent of institutionalized political 
competition. While there were important veto players to challenge the policies of the 
government, there were also weak institutions to aggregate interests into policy 
coalitions and resolve conflicts among veto players through negotiation and 
compromises. Hence, pluralism within the state was left unchecked. It led to 
jurisdictional power struggles among state actors, resulting in both policy deadlock, 
chaos and instability. First I discuss the veto players in the political regime.   
 Despite the conventional wisdom, which assigns unprecedented powers to the 
president, in Russia the parliament has been an important veto player in the last 
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decade.  Many scholars argue for instance that while the constitution created a strong 
presidency, in reality Yeltsin was a weak president and the struggle between the 
legislative and executive branches had a significant impact on the policy 
environment.308 Despite his constitutional powers, Yeltsin did not always rule without 
regard for the parliament. He in fact made several compromises on key issues. After 
the tumultuous relations between the legislative and executive branches during1991-
93, both sides refrained from confronting each other too directly and tried to avoid 
another constitutional crisis. However, while the 1993 Constitution elevated the 
presidency above parliament, it also reserved sufficient powers for the legislature to 
complicate presidential rule. Even though the president had the power to legislate by 
decree, such decrees had to be subordinate to statute law in the Russian hierarchy of 
legislation. Being the principal lawmaker, the State Duma rejected or delayed draft 
laws presented by the government. Especially because the State Duma was practically 
constrained in its ability to remove the government (in fear of its own dissolution,) it 
has been less willing to share responsibility for the government’s actions and policies. 
During most of Yeltsin’s presidency, the ideological battle between reformists 
and anti-reformists has further fueled the battle over institutional jurisdiction. 
Opposition parties solidified control over the State Duma in 1995 and the Communist 
party emerged as the center of an opposition that controlled a working legislative 
majority. As such, obtaining the Duma’s agreement in particular policy issues became 
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very difficult for the government and the president. The strategy of the conservative 
parliamentary majority has been to restrict the executive branch’s freedom of 
maneuver without assuming governing responsibility. The Duma, which could not 
influence the government decisions on many important cases, showed hostile attitude 
while discussing laws.309 
 In addition to the strength of the lower house of the parliament to challenge 
the government, the regional administrations also exerted significant amounts of veto 
power over the executive branch during Yeltsin’s presidency. The disintegration of 
the Soviet Union had resulted in the devolution of considerable political and 
economic power to 89 regional administrations both in terms of law making and 
implementation of laws. In terms of law making, the upper house of the parliament, 
the Federation Council, played a crucial role. Made up of regional executives and the 
leaders of regional legislatures, this legislative body was designed by Yeltsin as an 
instrument of legislative control but has in fact developed into a more autonomous 
lawmaking body that have embodied the interests of regional elites.310 Moreover, in 
1996, Yeltsin relinquished his appointment power over regional executives and 
allowed them to be directly elected. This gave the upper house a greater degree of 
autonomy. Although it remained less confrontational than the lower house of the 
parliament, it nevertheless defied Yeltsin on several occasions.311 It also challenged 
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the State Duma and prevented the development of federal legislation and regulation. 
It has been responsible with the scrutiny and approval of bills prepared and passed by 
the Duma. As a rule, bills going through the Russian Parliament had to pass through a 
total of three readings in the Duma, then a fourth by the Federation Council and 
finally be signed by the president before they actually become a law. In this capacity, 
the Federation Council has become a significant veto player. For example, during the 
Duma’s second term, the upper house vetoed 23% of all laws passed by the Duma.312  
 The regional administrations have also been assigned significant regulatory 
and administrative powers to oversee the implementation of laws. Yeltsin’s famous 
statement “take as much independence as you can swallow” to the regional elites in 
1990 had been quite instrumental in creating this autonomy. This ‘parade of 
sovereignties’ was intentionally engineered by Yeltsin in the wake of the breakup of 
the Soviet Union and the violent showdown between the president and the Supreme 
Soviet of October 1993. Even though with the 1993 Constitution he later aspired to 
limit the powers of the regions and centralize state authority313, his concessions to the 
regions during the ‘parade of bilateral treaties’ not only reduced the authority of the 
federal center but also eroded the legal equality the Constitution proclaimed for 
different levels of center-periphery relations. Regional elites won budget privileges, 
powers of appointment, exemption from various federal requirements, and a tacit 
                                                          
312 Paul Chaisty, “Legislative Politics in Russia,” in Archie Brown, ed.,  Contemporary Russian 
Politics (Oxford University Press, 2001), 118. 
313 Yeltsin incorporated two articles (71 and 72) in the Constitution enumerating exclusive federal and 
shared federal and regional areas of jurisdiction, but did not include an article exclusively reserving 
certain powers for the regions.  
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understanding that federal officials would look away from violations of the Federal 
Constitution and federal policies.314 Between 1994 and 1998, forty-six of the eighty-
nine subjects of the Federation signed bilateral treaties with the federal executive. In 
addition to these treaties, many republics and regions adopted their own constitutions 
and charters. This ‘war of laws’ produced thousands of laws and constitutional 
clauses that contradicted the federal constitution and federal law.315 The federal 
government’s default on many jurisdictional responsibilities left the regions with 
empty policy space and free reign. 
  Pluralism within the state is in fact a characteristic of democratic regimes. 
Separation of powers is crucial for a state to function effectively. And so are the 
mechanisms of checks and balances. Horizontal accountability among state 
institutions prevents the tyranny and domination of one over the others. What makes 
Russia a hybrid regime, however, is the combination of this pluralism in the state with 
weak institutions of conflict resolution. The indicators that I use for this variable are 
the strength of political parties, interest group organizations and bureaucracy, which 
not only provide institutional channels for societal actors to check the powers of the 
state, but also provide mechanisms of negotiation and comprise among veto players.  
Parties are needed to aggregate social interests, construct majority coalitions 
and serve as a bridge between the branches of government as well as between 
                                                          
314 Jeff Kahn, “What is the new Russian Federalism,” Contemporary Russian Politics (Oxford 
University Press, 2001): 374-384. 
315 Ibid. Kahn also reports that in 1996, nineteen out of twenty-one republican constitutions violated 
the federal constitution.  
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national and local politicians. Parties also constrain and discipline their members in 
the parliament, but because they aggregate constituent interests, they also provide 
parliamentary deputies with resources allowing them to act collectively. Without 
strong political parties, politics becomes very personalistic. Politicians prefer 
dictating and ruling directly to governing through impersonal, established rules and 
agencies and view institutions as obstacles than as necessities.  
Russia has had a weakly institutionalized party system. During the 1990s, 
political parties in Russia could not facilitate compromise and cooperation between 
the legislative and executive branches. The absence of disciplined party blocks 
endowed parliamentary politics with a fractious fluidity. The erratic fluctuation in the 
number and size of political groupings complicated the identification of party 
alliances capable of forming winning majorities. Parties were often divided internally, 
usually dominated by a single strong personality.316 Moreover, parties had weak 
control over policy coordination and legislative strategy across committees. As a 
result, deputies enjoyed a high level of personal control over legislative activity in 
Duma committees, which resulted in a legislative process that furthered particularistic 
interests. Finally, parties failed to link the state actors to their constituencies. With no 
vertical accountability, these state actors engaged in jurisdictional power struggles 
over the institutions of the state, furthering the constitutional conflict between the two 
branches of government.  
                                                          
316 Richard Sakwa, “Parties and Organized Interests,” in Stephen White, Alex Pravda, and Zvi 
Gitelman, eds.,  Developments in Russian Politics (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), 89. 
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The absence of well-developed political parties was not only an obstacle to 
stable executive –legislative relations but also undermined center-periphery relations. 
In Russia there were not many national political parties that could perform unifying 
functions. Most of the political parties that had candidates running in the elections to 
the State Duma had little institutional presence outside of Moscow. The communist 
party of Zyuganov was to a certain extent an exception but even it was unable to 
provide a great deal of assistance to local candidates. Many of the communist 
governors pursued their own agendas as opposed to the party’s interests. Moreover, 
most regional assemblies were populated by elected deputies with no party 
affiliations.317  
By the same token, weak interest group organizations in Russia could not 
check abuses of office by members of the parliament and government. For instance, 
the new trade unions were subject to the factionalism and splits typical of the pseudo-
parties. Including trade unions, most of the larger social organizations tended to be 
top-heavy bureaucratic organizations with weak links to the mass of their 
membership. Interest groups played a much less salient role in post-Soviet political 
life than they did during the perestroika period. Individuals and groups had no 
organized sphere in which they could articulate and reconcile their interests on the 
bases of established laws.318 
                                                          
317 Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, 124. 
318 Marcia A. Weigle, Russia’s Liberal Project: State-Society Relations in the Transition from 
Communism (Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), 335. 
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Instead of a pluralism of interest groups, Russia’s political life was dominated 
by key groups, such as finance and raw materials lobbies. Others like the agrarians, 
the manufacturers, and the military-industrial complex had very little and sporadic 
influence.319 Due to financial and organizational constraints, they found it difficult to 
mobilize their constituencies. The energy lobby and their banker allies, on the other 
hand, could pressure the state on various policies, using their media outlets and 
informal personal contacts with government bureaucrats, parliamentary deputies and 
regional elites. This oligopolistic influence on the state crippled the 
institutionalization of different interest groups. It made the lobbying process highly 
opaque and unbalanced. Rather than providing checks on the executive and mediating 
among state veto players, it hastened the spread of corruption at all levels of the state.  
Finally, the weakness of the Russian bureaucracy has been a destabilizing 
force in Russian politics. Especially since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the 
economic difficulties facing bureaucrats have given them incentives to pursue their 
self-interests more than the interests of the state. The influence of powerful economic 
groups over the bureaucracy has been enormous, leading to significant levels of 
corruption. Different government ministries and agencies have been fighting one 
another to gain as much power and financial benefits as possible. In the law making 
arena, this lack of coherence and hierarchy in the government produced a plethora of 
                                                          
319 Vladimir Chervyakov and Vladimir Berezovskii, “Corporate Groups of Industrialists and Managers 
in the Production Sphere,” and “Sectoral Production Capital: Military Industrial Complex and Fuel 
Complex,” in Klaus Segbergs and Stephan De Spiegeleire, eds., Post-Soviet Puzzles, Vol.3, ch. 13 and 
14 (Baden: Nomos, 1996). 
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different government proposals and drafts reflecting different and oftentimes-clashing 
interests of various bureaucratic agencies. In the implementation of the laws, once 
again this infighting caused confusion and delay of investment projects.  
Additionally, the split nature of the executive branch contributed to the 
weakness of the bureaucracy. In Russia the president and the government constitute 
the two major components of the state that carry out executive functions. The 1993 
Constitution established them as two different branches of power. The President, 
independent of the government, has at his disposal the presidential administration. On 
the other hand, the government works independently, with only intermittent direction, 
or intervention from the president. This split structure weakened the mechanisms of 
coherence and responsibility sharing within the bureaucracy. The presence of 
presidential and governmental teams above the ministries confused lines of authority 
and encouraged ministries to play the head of state and head of government against 
each other. All too often, the result was confusion and self-destructive competition.320 
Once enacted, laws faced neglect or distortion at the hands of bureaucratic officials 
responsible for implementing the law. Laws remained without effect until they had 
been concretized through the issuance of enabling acts by the government and 
relevant ministries. Because the formation of the government was in the hands of the 
president, and the parliament practically could not use its vote of no confidence to 
control the actions of the government, the ministers did not feel accountable to the 
                                                          
320 Eugene Huskey, “Democracy and Institutional Design,” in Archie Brown, ed., Contemporary 
Russian Politics (Oxford University Press, 2001), 45. 
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parliament and frequently obstructed the implementation of the laws. According to 
many, this incompetent, unprofessional, corrupt bureaucracy was the main reason 
why it has been so difficult to create a stable policy environment in Russia.  
Given this institutional mix and the enormous stakes involved in controlling 
oil resources, the PSA issue immediately became, what many observers called, a 
‘political football’ in Russia. The hybrid regime that assigned significant veto powers 
to various state actors in the absence of conflict resolution mechanisms made it 
difficult for proponents of PSAs to exclude or co-opt opposition groups. In the next 
part of this chapter, I discuss in detail this political competition over oil policy.   
 
V. Political Competition Over Oil Policy 
 Passage of the PSA legislation, which potential foreign investors describe as a 
key problem in attracting large-scale investment in the fuel and energy sector, has 
been a source of domestic political debate for almost a decade. Promoting and 
controlling PSA have become politically attractive. At the federal level, the executive 
and legislative branches have been locked in a battle for political authority and the 
government itself had to fight, often in vain, to assert its control over semi-
independent administrative agencies. Moreover, the federal government and the 
regions were clashing over resource ownership.  The pluralism within the state in the 
absence of strong parties, interest groups and a cohesive bureaucracy that serve 
integrative and conciliatory functions led to jurisdictional struggles over oil policy. 
Unchecked fragmentation in the state hindered the development of coherent 
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legislative and regulatory framework as well as the implementation of these rules and 
regulations for the oil industry. In the last decade the Russian state produced 
conflicting legislation and regulatory measures at different levels of government (see 
Figure 5.2). The conflicts also made it difficult for foreign investors to know who has 
the authority to strike a deal in Russia. 
  
i. Between the executive and legislative branches 
 
First of all, the initial draft law on PSAs encountered significant opposition in 
the upper house of the Russian parliament because it would involve a transfer of 
regulatory power in the other direction, away from the legislative branch, which was 
responsible for defining license-issuing procedures under the Natural Resources Law, 
to the executive branch, which would be responsible for negotiating the conditions of 
production sharing contracts with investors. This was unacceptable to Duma members 
because of their traditional mistrust of the government. They assumed that if 
government officials had the right to sign agreements with foreign investors, they 
would be bought off and the state would be left with nothing. Thus the reluctance of 
officials in the legislature to relinquish the regulatory power, which they enjoyed, was 
certainly one factor delaying legal reform.   
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        Figure 5.2: The hierarchy of Russian laws on oil 
 
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Especially the leftist factions in the State Duma had problems with the clauses 
on the contractual nature of the relation between the investors and the government, 
international arbitration and the royalty system of payments.321 Initially, the left wing 
factions blatantly ignored the bill on the grounds that all PSA legislation amounted to 
“privatization of natural resources.” It was with great difficulty that it proved 
possible, in 1997, to get the first seven deposits eligible for development on PSA 
                                                          
321 Opposition in the Duma came especially from Sergei Glaziev, leader of the Democratic Party of 
Russia faction and the chairman of the Duma Committee for Economic Policy. Another key critic has 
been Gennady Zyuganov, the Communist leader. Neither of these men has actually ever directly and 
unequivocally challenged the need for investment in the energy sector and for PSAs. They were really 
objecting to the terms of these contracts.  
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    202
terms through the State Duma and to clear the first reading of the Bill on 
Amendments towards the final endorsement. The leftist factions in the Duma agreed 
to vote for the extremely badly needed Amendments (upon its third reading) only 
after the Federation Council, the higher parliamentary chamber, approved changes 
and additions to the PSA law on December 1998 and the president assured his 
signature.  
 The division of power and differences in opinion between the two branches 
was also apparent during the discussions on the Law On the List of Fields Eligible or 
Development on PSA Terms. The government in response to demands from regions 
promised to develop a long list of oil fields under PSA terms. These promises 
hindered government’s ability to cut down the list when communist deputies in the 
State Duma flatly declared that they would never vote for a PSA list exceeding 
twenty fields and refused to participate in a session on the 20th of March to adopt the 
draft Law.322 For almost a year, neither the legislative branch nor the executive could 
do anything to advance PSAs.323 Following months of exhaustive wrangling, the 
Duma finally approved in principle a draft law on the list of fields eligible under PSA 
terms (see Figure 5.3.) 
                                                          
322 Even though dissatisfaction with the draft may have been one reason behind the boycott, many 
argue that it was also very much political. Both Liberal Democrats and Communists were insulted that 
Yeltsin restructured his Cabinet without first consulting them. Second, Yeltsin would have liked to cite 
progress on PSA legislation during a summit with US president Bill Clinton and the leftist factions 
wanted to avoid any actions that could be interpreted as pro-government or as economically 
detrimental to regions and workers. “Lurching Forward: Despite Encountering New Setbacks, PSA 
List Law is Poised to Clear Major Hurdle,” Russian Petroleum Investor (April 1997): 18-22. 
323 “Something for Everyone: Duma Edges Closer to a Viable Version of PSA List Law, but Foreign 
Investors Remain Wary,” Russian Petroleum Investor (March 1997): 19-23. 
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Figure 5.3: State Duma Vote on PSA List Law 
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 The passage of the amendments to the 1995 Law on PSA has been also 
woefully drawn out because of similar conflicts between the government and the 
leftist majority in the State Duma. By this time, though, the Duma did not want to 
make either a positive or a negative decision on PSA issues. A vote in favor would 
have drawn criticisms from radicals within their ranks but voting against the PSA 
laws would have sparked a falling out with the regions and Russian companies. 
Some progress on the PSA regime was finally achieved as a result of major 
concessions to the parliament. In exchange for its acceptance of some of the 
government proposals on PSAs, the parliament acquired significant veto powers over 
the PSA process.  However, its increasing involvement in oil policy making created 
unprecedented obstacles for foreign investors. According to the Article 19 of the 
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Federal Law on Production Sharing Agreements, for instance, when proposing a draft 
federal budget law the government had to submit annually to the State Duma a report 
on the result of work under production sharing agreements. Moreover, the approval of 
the parliament was needed for each PSA field to be initially put on the list of fields to 
be explored. What this meant was that companies had to present to Duma some kind 
of feasibility studies before they could even negotiate and prepare the contracts with 
their partners. Not only was this approval seen as costly and risky for the investors, 
but it also meant that they needed to negotiate with the Duma first and then with the 
government. Such a legislative approval is not a very common procedure around the 
world. In 42 oil-producing countries that use PSAs, legislative bodies are not 
involved in the approval of oil contracts.324 In Russia, on the other hand, agreements 
had to be approved by special laws. That meant that amendments to a commercial 
contract would be treated like any other federal law. The approval of the Russian 
parliament was also required for specific PSA deals negotiated after a field has been 
included in the PSA zone. As such, Russian practice dictated that amending a contract 
would require more than a year.325 This veto power of the legislative branch over the 
creation of the PSA law and approval of each PSA has been a major obstacle for 
foreign investment in Russia in the last decade. 
                                                          
324 PSAs are approved by the government in Algeria, or they require an authorized minister’s approval 
as in China or the president’s sanction in Indonesia. On the contrary, in Venezuela a single joint sitting 
of the Congress’s two chambers is required to approve an agreement. The procedure is similar in 
Tunisia. In Denmark, rights to acreages on the continental shelf (but not the agreements themselves) 
are approved by the parliament’s special committee. In Azerbaijan, as discussed in chapter 4, the 
parliament approves agreements but the country does not have a special PSA law. However, in these 
countries the parliamentary approval is very different than it is in Russia.  
325 Mikhail Subbotin,“The dangers of writing too much into the law,” Oil & Capital II (2000): 14-15. 
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ii. Between the Center and the Subjects of the Federation 
The stalemate over the PSA regime has been further exacerbated by the 
challenge that the subjects of the Federation posed for the central government both in 
terms of making and implementation of laws. Within the legislative branch, the 
tendency of the Federation Council to challenge the legislative authority of the lower 
house has significantly contributed to the PSA legislative impasse. The members of 
the Federation Council on many occasions have utilized their constitutional powers to 
veto the PSA legislation in fear that it would limit the prerogatives of regional 
governments and impose on them financial obligations.  
First challenge came during the adoption of the draft law on PSA in 1995. 
Even though Federation Council favored the concept of PSA legislation, it opposed 
the simplified tax plan contained in the draft.326 This provision according to the 
regional and local government leaders, limited their ability to collect taxes from PSA 
projects on their territories.327 Because the law undermined the lengthy tradition of 
unlimited state control over Russia’s natural resources, it faced opposition from 
several factions within the Federation Council. Moreover, a powerful group of 
regional senators representing the interests of heavy equipment manufacturers in their 
region also opposed the terms of the PSA draft law. Burdened with a glut of 
outmoded and financially struggling manufacturers, deputies from those regions 
                                                          
326 The opposition group in the Council was headed by Krasnodar’s newly elected governor, Nikolai 
Kondratenko, who with RF Audit Office Chairman and former Council member Yuri Boldyrev was 
instrumental in persuading the Council to reject the PSA law in 1995.  
327 “On the Right Track: PSA Legislation Edges Forward,” Russian Petroleum Investor (April 1995): 
18-20. 
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fiercely lambasted the current version of the draft law, demanding that the legislation 
guarantee that domestic enterprises receive as much as 70% of the orders for 
equipment required for use under PSAs.328 Finally, representatives from agricultural 
regions had minimal interest in energy-related projects, and saw little benefit from 
foreign investment in such projects.329  
Another controversy between the two chambers of the legislative branch was 
fueled during the discussion of the List Law. Regional representatives in the 
Federation Council directly accused Duma deputies of disrupting major investment 
projects whose implementation could markedly improve these regions economy. 
Certain regions engaged in ‘revenge politics’ and tried to kill the law because their 
fields were removed from the list.330 Although not successful at the end, these regions 
were at least able to prolong the legislation process and hamper the PSA projects in 
the regions approved by the list law. After much debate, the Federation Council 
approved the list law at the end. Those regions that supported PSAs were able to 
achieve the majority in the Council to reject the ultra nationalist amendments 
proposed by the Duma in 1997, on the grounds that they would adversely affect the 
core law approved in 1995. 
In addition to the representation of regional interests in the Federation 
Council, the Article 72 of the Russian constitution invests the regional governments 
                                                          
328 “Change of Venue: After finally clearing the Duma, PSA legislation meets opposition in 
parliament’s upper chamber,” Russian Petroleum Investor (September 1995): 17. 
329 “Stalemate: Leftists’ New Clout in the Council of Federation Could Endanger Investor-Friendly 
Legislation,” Russian Petroleum Investor (February 1997): 13-15. 
330 “Glimpse of the Future: Council of the Federation Chairman Predicts the Future of Foreign 
Investment in Russia,” Russian Petroleum Investor (October 1997): 12-14. 
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with joint jurisdiction (alongside federal authorities) over the underground resources 
in their regions. Because of the two-key system, which requires that investors 
negotiate PSA contracts both with the regional governments and the Ministry of Fuel 
and Energy, the regional governments have been pivotal in the signing and 
implementation of these contracts. While some, like the Sakhalin and Tatarstan 
administrations, have been strong advocates of PSA contracts, others like the Nenets 
Autonomous Okrug, have been opposing PSAs and obstructing the attempts by 
foreign investors to initiate oil development projects.331 In other regions, the regional 
legislative bodies passed laws on PSA that contradicted or circumvented the federal 
legislation without openly violating it.332  
Moreover, the contest at the sub regional level also contributed to the 
difficulties facing the investors. Autonomous districts (okrugs) in some oblasts were 
claiming the same rights as oblasts and ethnic republics based on the ‘ambiguous’ 
                                                          
331 The government of Tatarstan was one of the key proponents of the 1995 Law on PSA during its 
turbulent passage through the federal parliament. Since adoption of this law, Tatarstan president 
Shaimiev has continually pushed the federal government to pass the necessary amendments and 
enabling legislation. In 1997, it even adopted its own Law on Oil and Gas. Similarly, in Sakhalin, three 
post-Soviet governors exerted a positive influence on the progress of PSAs. Not only did they support 
the federal government’s efforts to create a PSA regime, but they also implemented one of the two 
PSA projects in Russia today. As a result, after Moscow, the Sakhalin island became the second largest 
FDI recipient in Russia. As some analysts have argued, Sakhalin became the chief laboratory for 
Russian PSAs. On the other hand, the governor of Nenets okrug, Vladimir Butov, in April 1997 
excluded several fields of primary interest to Western investors from the list of fields that it was 
proposing for development under PSA terms. He claimed to oppose PSAs because they fail to specify 
time periods for initiation of geological exploration and production. He argued that Western 
companies’ preference for PSA terms was a pretext to reap super profits at the expense of Russia in 
general and Nenets okrug in particular.  
332 An example of this was seen in Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous District. In 1996, the district Duma 
passed a law on PSA that restricted the foreign oil company operations. “More Power to Them: 
Khanty-Mansiysk’s regional PSA Legislation Could Restrict Investor Rights,” Russian Petroleum 
Investor (August 1996): 16. Another example is Tatarstan. In July 1997, Tatarstan legislature enacted 
its own Law on Oil and Gas.  
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provisions in the 1993 Constitution. An important example of this institutional feud 
was seen in the Tyumen oblast. The two okrugs Khanty-Mansiisk and Yamal-Nenets 
were locked in an increasingly fierce dispute with the Tyumen oblast for control over 
oil and gas projects and revenues. As a result of these disagreements, in February 
1999, the Russian State Duma decided to exclude three Khanty-Mansiisk oil fields 
from the proposed Uvat PSA project.333  
Finally, even though the constitution grants them no rights over underground 
resources, some municipal governments have also used independent taxation powers 
(granted to them in a presidential decree) to exact additional revenues from foreign 
investors. Even though investors managed at times to win exemptions from such 
taxation, overall municipal authorities used their control over utilities and influence 
with the local population to extort payments from foreign investors. 
The significance of the regional dimension is heightened by the fact that 
Russia’s energy resources are heavily concentrated in a handful of Russia’s 89 
provinces.334 For instance, Tyumen alone accounts for more than two thirds of 
Russian oil output. This regional concentration has created a tug of war between the 
have and have-not regions. The regions which are not self sufficient in energy and 
have experienced frequent energy shortages, as in the Far East, have lobbied against 
some of the terms of the investment relationship with foreign companies. For 
                                                          
333 John Webb, “Election season in West Siberia: A signpost for foreign investment,” CERA Decision 
Brief (September 1999.) 
334 According to Rutland, this is partly a result of geography, and partly a result of deliberate decisions 
in the 1960s to focus development efforts on the West Siberian oblast of Tyumen.  
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instance, they opposed sale of oil abroad and the raising of energy prices and 
promoted domestic content requirements that can help moribund local industry. 
Those with substantial oil resources, on the other hand, have been more open to 
foreign investment. Generally speaking, they have been inclined to give foreign 
investors a break on domestic content requirements, tax burdens etc. However, as 
discussed earlier, the attitudes of the subjects of the Federation towards PSAs have 
not been uniform. Some opposed PSAs fearing that the local governments would 
have little control over them and be left out.335 Others on principal welcomed PSAs 
but delayed the implementation process as a result of red tape and too much 
regulation.   
 
iii. Interest Groups and Political Parties 
Despite the strength of veto players in challenging the PSA legislation and 
implementation, the societal interest groups had little institutional means to mobilize 
their interests into voting as a bloc and to exert influence on state policies regarding 
PSAs. Different groups that could have benefited from PSA projects could not 
constrain the jurisdictional power struggles among state veto players. Considering the 
impact of PSAs on many interest groups, the lack of this societal pressure has further 
contributed to policy deadlock and instability. PSAs are especially beneficial to 
established communities in regions experiencing hard times. They not only serve to 
preserve existing jobs in the old oil towns, but also create new ones in new oil 
                                                          
335 Germana Canzi, “One Step Forward, Two Steps Back,” Project Finance 193 (May 1999): 26-27. 
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fields.336 Moreover, the domestic content requirements in PSAs can in the long run 
serve to improve local industries and subsequently bring significant amount of 
welfare to the regions.  Despite these benefits of PSAs, interest groups such as worker 
unions and certain industrial groups could not pressure the state actors to make the 
investment environment more attractive for foreign investors.  
Moreover, political parties could not resolve the conflicts among various veto 
players by disciplining their members and reaching compromises among them. They 
could not aggregate interests into majority coalitions in the parliament. Oftentimes 
they voted as a block for or against PSA legislation but their positions depended more 
on the institutional balance of power than the interests of the constituents they 
represented. Business groups have contributed to political parties and parliamentary 
factions, but no clear pro-business party organization has emerged.337As a result, 
Russian political parties could not provide the representative and integrative functions 
that are expected of strong parties. Lack of such institutional constraints left ample 
room for state actors to get into jurisdictional struggles with one another.  
 In some ways, the oil lobby was an exception to this rule. The Russian oil 
elites were able to influence investment decisions to a certain extent by means of their 
interest organizations and political connections. The best example of this was the Our 
Home is Russia party, led by Chernomyrdin. This party was in fact called “Our Home 
                                                          
336 Typical Russian oil towns that were built next to an oil field and populated by immigrant workers 
from other provinces are entirely dependent on the viability of oil production there. In the event that a 
field closes, Russian authorities face the prospect of mass unemployment and will be compelled to 
evacuate hundreds of residents.  
337 Rutland, 13. 
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is Gazprom” for it was seen as representing the interests of the energy lobby and the 
financial corporations associated with them.338 When Chernomyrdin became the 
prime minister in December 1992, his government was often called ‘the Government 
of the Energy Complex” implying that the industrial background and sympathy of the 
prime minister gave the oil and gas network unlimited opportunities for interest 
representation. Chernomyrdin was the founder and head of Gazprom and during his 
government positions he obtained important privileges for the oil industry and 
Gazprom in particular and promoted their interests. For instance, in terms of the PSA 
legislation, it is argued that his natural inclination was to go slow to protect domestic 
oil companies. “He would always find an excuse to leave Moscow whenever there 
was a discussion of the PSA legislation in the parliament.”339  
 The Ministry of Fuel and Energy also articulated the interests of the oil 
industry. The careers of ministers like Vladimir Lopukhin, Yuri Shafranik were 
closely tied to oil industry, and so they often became active supporters of oil interests 
in the government. Russian oil companies had direct access to the government. They 
strongly affected the appointment of some members of the cabinet. Many government 
officials at the middle levels were paid by oil companies to promote company 
interests.340 Finally, these oil companies made sure that those leaders that were 
                                                          
338 Ibid. Overall, though, there were about 5 deputies connected directly to the oil industry.  
339 Author’s interview with Glenn Waller (Petroleum Advisory Forum) Moscow, August 28, 2000. 
340 Author’s interview with Alexander Misulin (Head of the Department of Foreign Economic 
Relations in the Ministry of Energy) Moscow, May 17, 2001. 
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supportive of their interests were elected as governors. This way they ensured that 
their interests would be represented in the Federation Council.341  
Even though the oil lobby had some success in eliciting support for its 
political interests, it lacked the organizational and ideological unity to act as a strong 
interest group. The Russian oil companies did not have a uniform influence on 
policies regarding foreign investments. The most important form of lobbying has 
been the informal personal contacts between oil directors and government bureaucrats 
and deputies in the parliament. The lobbying process was highly opaque, fragmented 
and disorganized. Although organized groups have been created, such as the Union of 
Oil Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, the Union of Oil Exporters, the House of Oil 
etc., their influence generally has been weak and sporadic. Since the biggest 100 
companies produce 40-50% of GDP but employ less than 3% of the labor force, 
building a broad based party of oil business interests has been fairly difficult.342 
Moreover, most other parties and parliamentary factions have been critical of the 
interests of the oil and gas industry. Yabloko party in the liberal wing of the Duma, 
for example, supported measures to increase taxes on the Russian oil and gas 
complex. Similarly, the support for the oil industry in the government was only 
                                                          
341 For instance, these governors included Yevgeny Krasnoyarov of Sakhalin, Yuri Komaravsky from 
the Nenetsk Autonomous Region, Pavel Balakshin from the Arkhangelsk region, Alexander Filipenko 
of Khanty Mansiyk etc. 
 
342 The support for this party came mostly from regional governors. Despite their lack of strong 
representative organizations at the national level, industrialists have been quite successful at 
coordinating their activities at the regional level. In most regions of Russia, the industrial party in the 
form of an informal network of local economic elites and their political-bureaucratic allies effectively 
runs local politics.  
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conditional. The role of the oil companies in using the Ministry of Energy to express 
their views depended on the issue and changed over time.343 The Ministry also had its 
own agenda, that of maintaining its supervisory functions. It was not always 
considered the conduit for the oil and gas companies. Even with Chernomyrdin, the 
influence went both ways. While in some cases Chernormyrdin was promoting the oil 
industry’s interests, at other times he used pressure on the oil and gas complex to 
register its support for certain government policies in return.  
   Finally, Russian oil companies’ attitudes towards PSAs were mixed. In the 
first years after the breakdown of the Soviet Union, many companies were wary of 
going into partnerships with foreign companies on an individual basis.344 Prior to 
partial privatization, the position of the heads of large oil production associations- the 
oil generals- were very insecure, and so partnership with a foreign company bringing 
with it greater publicity and increased fiscal demands from central and local 
governments, was more of a hindrance rather than a help.345 Overall, these companies 
had no tradition or mentality of partnerships- even with other domestic companies.346 
                                                          
343 Lane, 5. 
344 With the collapse of the Soviet ministries in 1990/91 and the shift of control from the USSR to the 
republics and the regions, a spontaneous process of privatization began. Enterprises and organs of local 
administration together began to form independent companies. The management of the companies and 
the leaders of the local administrations took over assets in the oil industry. They sought to maximize 
short-term profit and neglected investment. For more information on the Russian oil industry 
organization, see David Lane, ed., The Political Economy of Russian Oil, (Rowman &Littlefield 
Publishers: 1999.) 
345 On the part of the foreign companies, it was also difficult to do business with local companies. It 
was difficult to understand who controlled a particular company, what relations were between the 
company’s component parts and between it and other enterprises. Overall this lack of transparency 
deterred many foreign investors.  
346 Author’s interviews with Mikhail Subbotin (Advisor to the government) Moscow, April 19, 2001 
and with Valeriy Ovcharenko (Conoco) Moscow, April 16, 2001. Mr. Ovcharenko further argued that 
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Moreover, these managers wanted to buy oil companies as cheaply as possible and so 
they did not want multi-billion dollar PSAs on the books, driving the prices up.347 
They had short-term concerns and priorities; planning for the long-term performance 
of the industry was not on their agenda. As the Russian banks gained more control of 
the oil industry, the short-term profit motive of the industry by sacrificing long-term 
investments got even stronger. With access to bank capital, domestic companies did 
not see any need to attract foreign investors.348 
Some of the domestic companies have been trying to limit foreign investment 
because they feared the advantages that projects involving foreign investment enjoy 
over Russian producers and the competition for export capacity. More importantly, 
these companies have been more interested in empire building or exporting their 
capital offshore than in investing to renew their assets or restructure their 
operations.349 In the beginning, then, most Russian companies were very reluctant 
about PSAs.350 They were not necessarily always against it but they were not for it 
either. They in fact lived quite well under the existing system. They knew how to 
                                                                                                                                                                      
this lack of trust for partnerships was a legacy of the command economy in which companies were 
always competing for funds and equipment but not for selling their product and making a profit out of 
it. If the end goal was profit, these companies would have engaged in a win-win situation by forming 
partnerships.  
347 “Russian Oil: Not a Gusher,” Economist  (October 14, 1995): 78,79. 
348 The experience of YUKOS and Menatep with regard to Priobskoye project was a good indicator of 
this trend. The Priobskoye field was supposed to be developed by the Russian oil company, YUKOS 
and Amoco (US). However, when Menatep bank acquired control of YUKOS, the Russian partner’s 
negotiating stance changed dramatically. Instead of proceeding with the comprehensive development 
of the field and waiting eight to ten years to recoup its investment, Menatep insisted on developing the 
field block by block to get quicker returns.  
349 Thane Gustafson, Capitalism Russian-Style (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 226. 
350 Author’s interview with Alexander Strugov (Director of Center for PSAs in the Ministry of Natural 
Resources) Moscow, April 18, 2001.  
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maneuver, how to influence, and whom to influence.351 They enjoyed being the 
‘insiders.’ 
However, over time, the former corporate unity of the oil elite from the Soviet  
Union was weakened by the appearance of outsiders in the top echelons of 
administration. Increasingly, bankers and financial dealers were recruited to the 
boards of directors.352 This change in the management structure, according to some, 
has made some companies more open to foreign investment.353 As the operations 
grew and the geographic span widened, some companies became less locally based 
and more nationwide with their headquarters located in Moscow. These companies 
made significant progress in lobbying for the full-scale introduction of PSAs in 1998-
2000. However their support was conditional. They were in favor of PSAs when the 
price of oil dropped, the costs were high, and there was no alternative financing 
available. At times when they could finance the projects themselves or through 
lending, they did not lobby for PSAs.354 Other companies that were located in a 
particular region and acted as a monopoly, on the other hand, resisted the 
                                                          
351 Author’s interview with Anders Morland (BP) Moscow, April 3, 2001.  
352 For more information on the configuration of the oil elite and their values and attitudes, see David 
Lane, “The Russian Oil Elite: Background and Outlook” in Lane, ed., The Political Economy of 
Russian Oil (1999.) 
353 For instance, the Russian company, TNK, is more open than most Russian oil companies to 
partnership with the West. The company’s president, Simon Kukes, is a former Amoco executive with 
16 years of business experience in the US. This orientation was reinforced in July 1998 when Len 
Blavatnik, the head of a New York based shareholder in TNK was elected to TNK’s board of directors. 
354 Author’s interview with Alexander Levshov (Statoil) Moscow, March 14, 2001 and Dmitri 
Zhdanovich (Surgutneftegaz) Moscow, April 9, 2001.  According to Mr. Zhdanovich, Russian oil 
companies found PSAs useful only for old oil fields because developing new ones were costly and the 
PSAs did not give a chance to cover the costs.  
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liberalization of the investment environment.355 They either pressured the regional 
administrations to build barriers for foreign investors or they simply stayed passive 
regarding the PSA process. 
  
iv. The Bureaucracy 
In some accounts, the real opponent to PSAs has been the infamous Russian 
bureaucracy. There has been a covert infighting to control PSAs within the 
government since 1993 because PSAs directly affect budgetary revenue on which all 
parts of the government depend.356 The whole subject has become a ‘talking shop’ 
with proposal after proposal being drafted and then argued in talks between the 
ministries of fuel and energy, finance, economy, taxes, and natural resources without 
developing a common, constructive approach. Ministers and top civil servants have  
been reshuffled more than the meetings have been, which has made it difficult to 
consolidate any position.357 This zigzagging of power at times brought policy 
deadlock and passivity within the federal government.358 
                                                          
355 “Business: A dangerous bear-dance,” Economist  (August.29, 1998): 57-58. 
356 According to Andrey Krivorotov (Oil and Gas Eurasia) during his interview with the author in 
Moscow on April 10, 2001, this infighting among Russian bureaucracies was encouraged by Yeltsin on 
purpose. In order for them not to fight him, he provoked them to fight one another.  
357 “Putin tells ministers to end PSA impasse,” Oil & Capital V (2000): 8-9. Part of this reason was 
certainly the legal vacuum that provided no clear guidelines as to how government agencies should act.  
358 Author’s interview with Anatoly Averkin (PriceWaterHouseCoopers/Advisor to Duma) Moscow, 
April 13, 2001.  
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Not all departments and agencies of the government have been similarly 
interested in creating an attractive foreign investment climate. The Finance Ministry, 
the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, and Customs Committee, for instance, 
viewed PSAs as receipts of income flowing into the federal budget and imposed 
heavy tax burdens without taking into consideration the long-term effects of these 
taxes for foreign investment. They also feared the fixed terms of the PSAs, which 
would potentially reduce their control of oil revenues.359 Struggling to maintain their 
control over the licensing process, geological associations, represented by the State 
Committee on Underground Resources, Roskomnedra, were equally against the PSA 
contracts, which proposed the bypassing of the licensing system entirely.360 On the 
other hand, those parts of the government that were responsible for long-term 
economic development – the Ministry of Fuel and Energy, the Committee for Foreign 
Investments and the Ministry of Economics- tended to be against heavy taxation and 
thus for PSAs.361 Even though there were ideological differences in terms of priorities 
among different bureaucracies, the competition among them to have as much power 
and money through oil deals is an important explanation of why enactment and 
implementation of PSA have been obstructed by the government for so long. The 
interests of government officials and agencies were best served not by laws which 
outlined their powers and responsibilities in a very precise way, but by a system in 
                                                          
359 “Everything’s Negotiable: Finance Ministry’s Opposition Could Slow Approval of PSA Tax 
Changes,” Russian Petroleum Investor (May 1996): 30. 
360 “Trench Warfare: PSAs could jeopardize Roskomnedra’s control over subsoil use,” Russian 
Petroleum Investor (February 1995): 20-21. 
361 Watson, 449. 
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which they enjoyed as much freedom as possible to enter into negotiations with 
individual clients, to request certain kickbacks and bribes in return for particular 
favors.362  
The pluralism within the executive branch and a lack of coordination among 
federal agencies have been very destructive for the implementation of investment 
projects. For instance, the Sakhalin II project, which was one of the three grand 
fathered PSAs that was able to start oil extraction, faced many bureaucratic hurdles, 
at times subverting and delaying its operations. Companies had to obtain more than 
600 approvals from different agencies only to start the first phase of their Sakhalin 
project. They estimated that the number of approvals would be 3000 for the second 
phase.363 Moreover, federal customs officials in Sakhalin were ignoring both the 
Federal Law on PSA and Prime Minister’s direct orders to stop collecting value-
added and import taxes on equipment and material imported by Sakhalin projects. By 
refusing to carry out Russia’s obligations, as defined in the Sakhalin PSAs, the State 
Customs Committee was trying to meet its short-term fiscal quotas. This willfulness 
of bureaucrats who were accustomed to making decisions on matters concerning their 
departments based less on laws than on personal whim was a significant hindrance to 
foreign investors.364  
 
                                                          
362 ibid., 440. 
363 Author’s interview with Ivan Chernyakhovskiy (Sakhalin Energy) Moscow, April 9, 2001.  
364 “Caught in the Crossfire: Conflicting Agendas Threaten to Stall Russia’s Only Active PSAs,” 
Russian Petroleum Investor (February 1997): 46-49. 
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v. Crises and Personalities 
Even though the institutional structure was the same, interests within and 
outside of the state changed course over time due to several reasons. First of all the 
August 1998 economic crisis365 and resulting evaporation of much Western 
investment in Russia have clearly forced Russian politicians and businessmen to 
rethink their traditional opposition to PSAs in the interest of attracting new sources of 
Western funding for energy projects. The withdrawal of several Western oil 
companies raised the alarm that despite the talk, there has been little investment into 
the oil sector. Low oil prices highlighted the danger of a sectoral collapse in the 
absence of significant levels of new capital investment. Multinational oil companies, 
under PSAs were recognized as one of the few reasonable sources of financing in the 
near term for the oil industry. This change in interests was a crucial factor in the 
limited progress that there was regarding the PSA regime in 1999. Criticism of PSAs 
from communist and nationalist deputies became less vocal than before. Similarly, 
the regional governments that were imposing harsh conditions on PSA projects 
became more accommodating to foreign investors’ interests and increasingly 
supported the PSA regime. Finally, the Russian oil companies’ initial benefits from 
the ruble devaluation were offset by the decline in the domestic price of crude, from 
                                                          
365 The August crisis had two distinctive phases. The first phase was triggered by international 
developments related to the Asian financial meltdown-the fall in world crude prices and the ‘flight to 
quality’ of Western investment capital. The second phase began on August 17 with the Russian 
government’s de facto devaluation of the ruble and default on its short term debt, and the 
accompanying collapse of Russia’s commercial banking system and key elements of its trade 
networks.  
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$67 per ton to $24 per ton in September.366 The companies also faced reduced 
availability of foreign credits owing to a general collapse of investor confidence in 
Russia. Thus, they started seeing PSAs as something to be supportive of since it was 
the only way to develop their fields.  Some analysts argue that if Russian oil 
companies had not thrown their full weight behind it, the PSA legislation would not 
have made much progress during legislative discussions in 1999. While initially PSAs 
were the exclusive goal of foreign investors in Russian oil, especially after the 1998 
economic crisis and drop in oil prices, they have also become the goal of Russian 
companies. Indeed, many of the fields that the State Duma has made available for 
development under PSA terms were exclusively licensed to Russian companies. PSAs 
secured these companies’ operations against unfavorable low oil prices. Russian 
companies such as TNK, Lukoil, Surgutneftegaz, Tatneft and Yukos became the 
biggest beneficiaries and supporters of PSA legislation.367 Overall, then the harsh 
realities of the financial crisis of 1998 motivated all groups involved to improve the 
legal environment for western oil company participation. This helped to eliminate 
many of the earlier problems associated with the creation of a PSA regime. 
 Personalities also played an important role, no doubt. Significant progress on 
PSA legislation was not made until Prime Minister Primakov worked directly with 
the Duma to get the legislation passed. As the former head of foreign intelligence 
service and as somebody deeply respected by the communists, he was a moderating 
                                                          
366 Vadim Eskin and John Webb, “Russian Oil Companies in the New Time of Troubles,” CERA 
Private Report (January 1999): 11. 
367 “Oil Sector Report,” Troika Dialog  (May 2001): 94. 
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force. In November 1998, Primakov sent new drafts of enabling legislation and 
amendments to the 1995 PSA law to the Duma, along with his personal 
instructions.368 Moreover, he settled a critical dispute between the Ministry of Fuel 
and Energy and the Ministry of Natural Resources, which ensured that PSA will take 
precedence over both the Subsoil Law and Ministry of Natural Resources’ licensing 
power for exploration and production. He earned the trust of investors by staking his 
reputation on PSA passage.369 His commitment to continued foreign investment was 
certainly an important factor that pushed this process further. Conversely, reluctance 
of Chernomyrdin370 and inexperience of the Minister of Energy, Gavrin, both 
contributed to the delay in the PSA process.371 Some even argue that the fact that 
Yeltsin was never a ‘true champion’ of PSA, as Aliev was in Azerbaijan for instance, 
was also influential in the outcome.372 
  While these contingent factors, such as crises and personalities, are important, 
they cannot by themselves explain the change in the opposition to the PSA regime in 
Russia. Essentially, the institutional structure and power relations within the state 
                                                          
368 Pat Davis Szymczak, “Oil Slump Eclipses PSA Triumph,” AMCham Newsletter (March-April 
1999.) 
369 White Paper: Energy Sector Investment in the Russian Federation, prepared by the Energy 
Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce in Russia and the Petroleum Advisory Forum 
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370 It is argued, for instance, that on July 20 and 21 1995, precisely when the Federation Council was to 
decide the fate of the Law on PSA, Chernormyrdin chose to hold a colloquy in Tyumen that included 
the administration heads of Siberian regions, the leadership of local oil companies, and pivotal pro-
PSA legislators. Thus many of the lawmakers supporting the PSA law were forced to miss the reading 
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372 Ibid. 
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determine the constraints faced by supporters and opponents of PSA and the 
mechanisms at their disposal to overcome conflicts of interests. Interests certainly 
change over time due to crises or to initiatives of certain individuals, but they do so 
within an institutional setting that affects the outcome of these changes. In this 
chapter, I outlined this distribution of institutional power in Russia’s hybrid political 
regime to demonstrate the difficulties that foreign investors encountered in the oil 
sector over the last decade. 
 
VI. Political Effects of Foreign Capital 
 Russia today is at a crossroads. Its significant oil resources cannot be 
developed by domestic oil companies alone. It is true that when oil prices go high, 
Russian companies have healthier cash flows that can also be used for investment. 
Considering the frequent changes in oil prices, however, counting on the cash flows 
of domestic companies is not very realistic.  Moreover, the bulk of current production 
comes from fields in the middle to late stages of their production lives and domestic 
companies are able to exploit these old Soviet fields without much foreign 
involvement. However, Russia’s next generation of oil deposits are generally located 
offshore or in hard-to-reach remote areas without preexisting infrastructure. Most of 
these deposits require large investments, typically several billion dollars and so it 
would be difficult for any company to finance these projects on its own. It might be 
possible to get that sort of money from large international financial institutions but 
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their attitude towards Russia is similar to that of international oil companies. 
Cooperation with major foreign companies not only brings access to international 
technology, management experience, but also access to international markets. Finally, 
Russian state cannot afford to wait until the domestic companies accrue the money 
needed to undertake the investments themselves. Some investments in particular 
those in well rehabilitation need to be undertaken immediately. Decline of oil output 
from fields in which investments have not been made may create energy shortages 
that would have disastrous effects on the economy. Therefore, as the competition for 
international investment capital gets severe, Russia cannot afford to watch this 
opportunity go by. 
As foreign investors have repeatedly emphasized, in order to benefit from 
foreign capital flows, Russia needs to make its investment environment more stable 
and attractive. As this dissertation demonstrates, stability in investment environment 
can more easily be achieved in either authoritarian regimes or consolidated 
democracies than in hybrid regimes. Consequently, Russia is faced with two options. 
It can either become more authoritarian by excluding opposition groups from the 
decision making process or more democratic by mediating among them and co-opting 
them into acceptable policy outcomes. Unfortunately, the latest developments in 
Russia since Putin came to power make the former trajectory more likely.  Having 
realized the immediate importance of a PSA regime, Putin has been taking 
authoritarian measures to deprive certain groups of their rights to oppose and 
challenge the PSA process.   
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When Putin came to power, he pledged personal control of the PSA process 
and that Russian PSA legislation would be brought in line with world standards by 
the end of that year. In his address to the PSA-2000 Conference in Sakhalin, Putin 
maintained that PSAs were Russia’s strategic priority and delaying them would be 
against the country’s interests. Warning against turning PSAs into a “political 
football”, he envisioned several institutional changes. First of all, he asserted that 
instead of a cumbersome bureaucracy, the Ministry of Economic Development and 
Trade would take charge of PSAs.373 Under this ministry, a new State Investment 
Agency that would act as a consulting and support center was created. Second, Putin 
suggested that the state oil company, Rosneft, would realize the income from the 
state’s share of production. Rosneft’s getting the right to sign agreements on state’s 
behalf would be similar to the role played by Norway’s Statoil or Azerbaijan’s 
SOCAR.374 Hence this new approach to PSAs is based on strengthening the state’s 
regulation and control functions so that PSAs yield results without any further delays. 
This administrative reform to provide a single window approach under which an 
investor deals with one government authorized agency on all issues promises to be 
one of the solutions to the investment conundrum in Russia.  
                                                          
373 Natalya Olenich, “Gref’s Share: His ministry will be in charge of PSAs,” Vremya Novostei 
(February 7, 2001). Even though the government made its preliminary decision in August, the Ministry 
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374 Creation of a state oil company responsible from PSA projects is seen as an important strategy to 
overcome the bureaucratic barriers that investors have been facing. This procedure would save the 
investor a lot of time and trouble in terms of reducing the number of gatekeepers. However, Rosneft’s 
proposed role in PSAs is opposed by other domestic companies that fear the privileges that might be 
given to Rosneft.  
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 As well as streamlining the government bureaucracy, Putin has also 
challenged the authority of Duma’s involvement in the PSA process by proposing to 
transfer the functions of PSA approvals from the Duma to the federal executive. 
According to some, this would not be difficult given the new balance of power 
between the executive and the State Duma. In the new Duma, communists do not 
enjoy the deciding vote anymore. Four pro-Kremlin factions, Unity, Fatherland-All 
Russia and Russia’s Regions and People’s Deputy-two small centrist factions- have 
more than the 226 needed for a majority in the 450-member Duma.375 As a result, the 
polarization between the executive and legislative branches have seemed to wane, 
making it easier for Kremlin to forge alliances between left and right and push for 
reforms. It seems that the Law on PSAs has ceased to be a focal point of political 
battles on the parliament floor. There seems to be a new pragmatism in the 
legislature.376As Alexander Kursky, advisor to the Duma, argues, “bills drafted by the 
government, including lists of PSA-eligible projects, encounter next to no resistance 
in the Duma and quickly pass the parliamentary hurdles.”377 Furthermore, the new 
law on political parties by setting strict requirements on party formation and state 
financing of parties, is another attempt by Putin to curtail political competition and 
assert extensive state control over opposition in the parliament.378 
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In addition to changing the relations between the executive and legislative 
branches, Putin is also consolidating more power in the state by excluding regions 
from policymaking. In May 2000, he announced a sweeping reorganization that 
replaced the presidential representatives in most of Russia’s regions with seven 
presidential representatives in seven new administrative districts that are outside the 
governors’ sphere of authority. This decree was also designed to ensure greater 
presidential control over the thousands of other federal employees who are scattered 
across Russia and who have been subject to control by regional authorities. The 
decree removed all such federal employees from the direct jurisdiction of the 
governors.379 In an even more direct challenge to the governors’ authority, Putin also 
introduced legislation that would remove governors from the Federation Council and 
empower him to dismiss governors and disband regional legislatures on legal 
grounds.380 Finally, Putin’s tax reform aimed to centralize collection and distribution 
of tax revenues left to governors. The 2001 tax law takes about 60% for the federal 
budget as opposed to the previous 52%.381 As such, Putin succeeded in significantly 
rolling back powers seized by the regions during the 1990s. The creation of a new 
layer of lawmakers-not elected, but appointed- is likely to lead to unrepresentative 
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legislative action.382 As most analysts agree, this move is a clear breach of the 
principle of the division of executive and legislative powers.383 
 Putin has further centralized his authority by building a police state. He has 
been using primarily the police organs of the Federal Security Service- the main KGB 
successor agency, known as the FSB- and the army to seize all key power positions, 
eliminate dissent and attack both internal and external ‘enemies.’ New laws and 
decrees have given the FSB control over electronic and email transmissions in Russia 
and reinvigorated the FSB’s agent network in society and its ability to recruit 
informers in the army. The FSB conducted raids on businesses and media outlets 
deemed critical of Putin and his regime. 384 This “law of dictatorship” instead of the 
dictatorship of the law that Putin has promised when he came to power, seems to be 
moving Russia away from democracy.  
Finally, under Putin, the traditional oligarchs are finding it harder to obtain 
favors from the government for their companies. In the summer of 2000, Putin met 
with them to announce that the government would not favor any company over the 
others and that it would distance itself from these vested interests and aim to provide 
equal conditions for business, domestic or foreign.385 As much as this sounds like a 
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move towards the rule of law, many commentators in fact have asserted that the 
oligarchic structure would be allowed to continue in Russia. Replacing one set of 
oligarchs with another that is loyal to this administration provides more evidence for 
Putin’s attempts in concentrating more power in the state.  
As Putin centralizes political power in Russia, foreign investors are beginning 
to utilize the opportunity offered by this country’s huge natural resource potential. 
Anglo-Dutch Shell and Germany’s Wintershall almost simultaneously announced 
spectacular increases of their involvement in Russian oil projects, off Sakhalin and in 
the Barents Sea.386 Other companies are speeding up their projects and getting ready 
to invest more.387 The recent investment by BP in a new Russian oil company 
underscores the fact that foreign investors are increasingly feeling more secure with 
the terms the Putin regime is providing for them.388 A strong and stable centralized 
power is acclaimed by foreign companies as the most important condition under 
which they can invest in Russia.389  
Even though Putin’s consolidation of state power seems to be working, it will 
take a long time before a long-term stable investment climate is guaranteed for 
investors. Putin’s authoritarian style may not be enough to overhaul the Russian 
system over night. After all, in contemporary Russia Putin cannot institute a 
sultanistic regime like Azerbaijan. Despite the changing balance of power between 
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the legislature and executive branches and the depoliticization of the PSA issue to a 
certain extent, it seems very unlikely that Duma is going to give up its control over 
the oil policy altogether. The latest Duma proposals that tinker with the favorable 
provisions of the PSA law are evidence to this ‘foot dragging.’390 It is plausible to say 
that the parliament is still committed to maintaining Russia’s Byzantine PSA system, 
which is a chief pillar of parliament’s influence over Russian economic life.391  
The same is true also for the bureaucracy. There is still hidden opposition that 
is reflected in the delays concerning PSA issues.392 For example, even though the 
government made its preliminary decision to transfer the PSA responsibility to the 
Ministry of Trade and Economic Development in August 2000, the Ministry had to 
wait for an approval for nearly six months. And there are still many normative acts 
that need to be passed in order to ensure the compliance of government bureaucracies 
to the PSA legislation. Therefore, despite some positive signs, it looks like it will take 
a long time before investors can fully commit themselves to Russia. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
For twelve years since it first emerged as an idea in 1991, PSA legislation has 
become an indicator of Russia’s investment climate, an acid test as to whether the 
investment crisis has been overcome, how radical the reforms in the economy are and 
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whether there is hope for permanent economic growth. It has been one of the most 
contentious pieces of legislation to pass through the Russian parliament since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. Investment conditions in Russia have made PSA 
legislation and regulations a necessary precondition for the huge amounts of FDI that 
have been identified and in some cases contingently committed. The law was meant 
to unleash billions of dollars of investment in oil projects and help Russia reverse a 
dramatic decrease in production. However, despite genuine attempts by certain 
groups in the state and society and regular insistence of foreign investors, the PSA 
regime has not yet taken effect in Russia. 
 In this chapter, I argued and demonstrated that this failure to create a stable 
investment environment for foreign investors was a result of the limited 
institutionalized competition that Russia’s hybrid political regime produced. While 
within the state, different regions, and two houses of the parliament had institutional 
veto powers to challenge oil policies, weak institutionalization of political parties, 
interest groups, and bureaucracy made it impossible to keep the conflicts among veto 
players in check, and resolve them through compromises. As a result of weak 
mediating institutions, proponents and opponents of PSAs engaged in jurisdictional 
struggles to gain as much political control and economic benefits as they could from 
oil development projects. This unchecked fragmentation of state power often 
produced deadlock in legislation as well as confusion and ambiguity over the 
implementation of PSAs.  
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 The study of the investment environment in the Russian oil industry illustrates 
the difficulties facing hybrid political regimes in a globalized economy. The PSA 
story demonstrates the fragmented and divided configuration of political and 
economic elites who have contributed to the development of chaotic capitalism in 
Russia.393 In the twenty-first century, new challenges are facing Russian elites as they 
try to integrate their economy into global networks of capital and production. 
Whether or not they will be able to create an environment in which capitalism can 
flourish will essentially depend on the political choices that they will make. The 
eventual trajectory that Russia will take remains to be seen.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION: 
TWO FACES OF GLOBALIZATION 
 
Even though some question its novelty and extent, globalization- defined as 
the enormous acceleration of transactions among national economies in the past two 
or three decades- poses major challenges to nation states. In order to benefit from 
international flows of capital, states need to make certain adjustments in their 
investment regimes. Not every state with attractive economic endowments, such as 
significant natural resources, cheap labor, large domestic markets or supporting 
industries, can successfully attract foreign capital. While these factors are important, 
foreign investors also look for various legal, fiscal and administrative guarantees that 
can secure their property and contract rights throughout the life of their projects. 
Considering the fierce competition for foreign investment around the world, the host 
governments that need outside financing and expertise cannot overlook these 
demands from international investors. In order to provide stability, predictability and 
consistency in their investment environments, governments need to overcome 
domestic opposition to the terms offered for investors by either excluding or winning 
over the consent or acquiescence of non-beneficiaries. As such, domestic politics 
plays an important role in providing the conditions under which foreign capital is 
attracted. 
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In this dissertation, I focus on foreign direct investment in the oil sector of 
three major oil-producing countries, Norway, Azerbaijan, and Russia. Given the 
capital-intensive nature of exploration and development, and the long lead times in 
commencing production, generating income and recovering costs, the stability of the 
investment environment has always been of vital importance to multinational oil 
corporations. Host governments can provide for that stability by formulating laws that 
clearly set the investment terms regarding taxation, production ceilings, license 
requirements, operational safety regulations and dispute resolution mechanisms. 
Governments are also expected to create a regulatory and administrative framework 
in which investment laws are implemented and safeguarded by executive bodies and 
investors have clear channels of interest representation. An attractive investment 
regime does not only consist of investment promotion policies, such as tax cuts, ease 
of entry and exit, and deregulation. As the Norwegian case illustrates, high taxes and 
strict licensing terms do not necessarily drive investors away. A clear, enforceable 
framework protecting property and contract rights provides the stability that is 
attractive for foreign investors.  
This dissertation explores the causes behind the variation in levels of foreign 
investment and the political effects of foreign capital in these three countries. I make 
two main arguments. First, regime type plays an important role in determining the 
extent to which foreign investment can be attracted and the form that investment 
takes. The Azerbaijan and Norwegian cases demonstrate that globalization favors two 
polar opposites: authoritarian regimes and established democracies. Through co-
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optation or exclusion of opposition groups, both of these regimes are able to create 
policy environments that significantly reduce investment risks for foreign investors.  
The observation that both of these regimes can successfully attract foreign 
investment brings to attention the analytical importance of thinking about regimes 
along a continuum rather than as dichotomous variables. Stuck between the two, 
hybrid regimes that have both authoritarian and democratic elements are fast 
becoming the norm rather than the exception in many third wave democracies. As the 
Russian case demonstrates hybrid regimes face many difficulties in attracting foreign 
investments. Limited institutionalized competition leads to arbitrary and 
unpredictable policy changes that threaten the profitability and security of investment 
projects. In hybrid regimes, like Russia, high degrees of political risk keep investment 
levels down. The property and contract rights that a democracy provides cannot be 
secure if the democracy itself is not.394 This dissertation contributes to a burgeoning 
literature on hybrid regimes by showing how such regimes respond to globalization.  
An initial analysis of the statistics offered by United Nations World 
Investment Report support my argument based on these three case studies. The top 
host economies that have the highest FDI Performance consist mostly of either 
established democracies or authoritarian regimes (see Figure 6.1). Even though 
further research needs to be done to clearly confirm and generalize the relationship 
between regime type and foreign investment performance, the three cases analyzed in 
this dissertation provide valuable insights into the causal dynamics of this 
                                                          
394 Mancur Olson, Power and Prosperity (Basic Books, 2000), 41. 
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relationship. Although there are many other factors shaping investment decisions, 
political factors figure more prominently in these decisions than it is generally given 
credit for.   
In this dissertation I also call attention to the other ‘face of globalization’: the 
political effects of foreign capital. I argue that the flow of foreign capital as well as 
the need to attract it has significant effects on regime type. First, I challenge the 
Anglo-American ideological prescriptions, aptly labeled the “Washington 
Consensus,” which assume a direct relation between increased economic openness 
and democratic transition. According to this line of thinking, the neoliberal policies 
that increase trade and free mobility of capital bring economic prosperity to countries, 
and consequently sow the seeds of democracy. The Clintonesque policy of 
encouraging developing countries to join in global networks of trade and capital had 
at its base this assumption that globalization would not only bring a convergence in 
macroeconomic policies, but also a convergence toward democratic political systems.   
The appearance of the former Soviet republics as new states with the collapse 
of the Soviet Union provided a venue for testing this neoliberal view of 
globalization’s political affects. Many in the West initially believed that opening up 
these formerly planned economies to global market forces would undermine 
authoritarian regimes and speed democratic transitions. This would not only be the 
triumph of capitalism over communism, but also democracy over totalitarianism. 
Almost a decade later, however, the picture is not so encouraging for advocates of the 
neoliberal  paradigm. As the Azerbaijani case clearly demonstrates, those former 
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Soviet republics that successfully attracted significant amounts of global capital, 
instead of becoming more democratic, legitimized their authoritarian regimes and 
strengthened their hold on power. The partnership between global capital and 
autocratic rulers in countries like Azerbaijan disconfirms neoliberal arguments about 
the positive political effects of foreign capital.  
In this dissertation, I also challenge the dependency theories, more specifically 
the rentier state literature, that emphasizes the anti-democratic elements of foreign 
capital. The Norwegian case clearly demonstrates that economic success brought on 
by the inflow of foreign capital, increases the legitimacy of decision-makers and 
strengthens the foundations of a democratic state. Foreign capital in Norway has had 
a positive effect on further consolidation of the welfare democracy. Therefore, I 
emphasize that political regimes not only help determine whether there will be 
foreign investment in the first place, but they also mediate the effects of foreign 
capital once it is invested. In both authoritarian regimes and consolidated 
democracies, foreign investment has a ‘reinforcing effect’ on the political regime. 
The success of attracting significant amounts of foreign capital into the economy 
strengthens and consolidates the existing regime regardless of its nature. Foreign 
capital provides not only additional resources to state coffers, but it also gives 
legitimacy to the ruling elite.  
Finally, I argue that foreign capital has ‘polarizing effects’ on hybrid regimes. 
In the face of globalizing pressures, i.e. the need to attract foreign investment, hybrid 
regime is inherently non-viable over the medium term. It must transit to either the 
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authoritarian and democratic type. However, the troubling aspect of globalization is 
that the urgency to attract foreign investment may leave the ruling elites with no 
options. Not being able to introduce the necessary institutional measures to create 
stability means less competitiveness in a world where international investment 
resources are scarce and states in need of investment are plenty. Especially when 
faced with serious economic crises, decision-makers in hybrid regimes are left with 
little flexibility and oftentimes are inclined to use exclusionary tactics to overcome 
opposition rather than include different interests in the decision-making process and 
engage in institution building. A move towards a more authoritarian regime may be 
the inevitable accompaniment to economic reforms.  Those who are in power may 
rationalize their authoritarian measures as temporary solutions to overcome economic 
problems. They might use the rhetoric that authoritarianism is a necessary step to 
achieve economic development and democracy in the long run. 
Recent evidence from Russia under Putin’s presidency shows that this is 
exactly what is happening in Russia today. Putin is consolidating more power in the 
state and increasingly depriving certain groups their rights to oppose and challenge 
his policies. Putin’s authoritarian moves mean more stability for investors who regard 
stability as the key requirement for long-term investments. The recent investment by 
BP in a new Russian oil company underscores the fact that foreign investors are 
increasingly feeling more secure with the terms the Putin regime is providing for 
them.  
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 Figure 6.1: Inward FDI Performance Index by Host Economy:  
The Top 20 and the Bottom 20  (1998-2000)  
     
 
Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report 2002 
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Even though the recent hike in oil prices and increase in oil production are 
benefiting domestic Russian oil companies and giving the impression that PSAs are 
not an urgent issue in Russia, Putin’s personal endorsement of the PSA regime 
demonstrates the undisputable need for foreign investment in order to develop the 
new and technologically challenging oil fields.395  The bulk of current production 
comes from fields in the middle to late stages of their production lives and domestic 
oil companies are able to exploit these old Soviet fields without much foreign 
involvement. However, Russia’s next generation of oil deposits require substantial 
foreign investment to develop, as such deposits are generally located offshore or in 
hard-to-reach remote areas without preexisting infrastructure.  Having realized the 
significance of PSAs for the future of oil production in Russia, Putin is taking 
authoritarian measures to exclude opposition groups from the PSA process. Even 
though by all means, there are many other factors shaping the trend towards 
authoritarianism in Russia, this paper draws attention to the pressures coming from 
foreign investors and the institutional measures the state needs to take in order to 
create a stable investment environment in the oil industry396. Given the strategic 
importance of oil for the Russian economy and politics, it is not surprising to see this 
association between oil investments and the political regime.  
                                                          
395 In his address to the PSA-2000 Conference in Sakhalin, Putin pledged personal control over the 
PSA process and said that PSAs were Russia’s strategic priority and delaying them would be against 
the country’s interests. 
396 For further discussion of the increasing authoritarian tendencies in Putin’s Russia, see Journal of 
Democracy 12:4 (October 2001). 
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While this dissertation underscores troubling aspects of globalization, it still 
leaves room for optimism. As the experiences of these three countries demonstrate, 
there are apparent trade-offs for each regime type. In a consolidated democracy, 
deliberations may take longer among different interest groups but oftentimes a 
compromised solution is reached at the end that produces stability. In an authoritarian 
regime, on the other hand, contracts are signed faster and with more rewards for 
foreign investors, but at the expense of greater benefits for the society. Authoritarian 
regimes may produce quick fixes and short time stability but “the only societies 
where individual rights to property and contract are confidently expected to last 
across generations are the securely democratic societies.”397 Therefore, even though 
globalization constrains policy options of elites in hybrid regimes, the response to 
global forces still depends on political decisions that take into consideration these 
trade-offs and the priorities of those who rule and in some cases even those who are 
ruled.  
To conclude, the goal of this dissertation is not to engage in a normative 
debate over the benefits of authoritarian and democratic regimes. Simply put, this 
dissertation attempts to demonstrate the trends underlying investment decisions in the 
oil industry and to explore the causal relationship between regime type and the ability 
to create a stable investment environment.  Future research on a larger selection of 
cases can further shed light on this relationship that this dissertation has introduced.  
                                                          
397 Olson, 42. 
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